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ABSTRACT 
 
Freeman, Tyler, M.Sc. University of Saskatchewan, Saskatoon, October 2005. 
From the Ground Up: An Agent-Based Model of Regional Structural Change. 
Supervisors: J. F. Nolan and R. A. Schoney. 
 
 
The Saskatchewan farm sector is a dynamic system that is faced with the reality of farm consolidation and 
other structural adjustments.  While structural adjustment may result in increased productivity at the farm-
level, the declining farm population has a direct impact on rural regions.  Given the economic difficulties 
now inherent in many rural regions, there has never been a more important time to improve our 
understanding of the structural dynamics of the farm sector.  
 
 By utilizing agent-based methods, competition that exists between farm households in land markets is 
modelled in a dynamic framework.  By modeling land markets in this manner, structural adjustments that 
occur due to the re-allocation of land among farm household becomes endogenous to the model.  The 
farming simulation was validated by evaluating its ability to replicate actual structural shifts that occurred 
during the period of 1960-2000.  The results obtained from the simulation were found to mirror historic 
shifts, which gives the author confidence that the parsimonious assumptions made are robust, yet still 
characteristic of farm level behaviour in the region.  Other scenarios were simulated in order to estimate a 
counterfactual structural evolution of the modelled region, in the absence of government stabilization and 
support programs.  Significant deviations are observed between the base and zero transfer scenarios with 
regards to the consolidation of farm assets among a declining number of farm households.  Most 
significantly, the decline in farm numbers accelerated significantly in the late 1980’s in the zero transfer 
scenario compared to the base simulations.             
 
The application of an agent-based framework allowed for the study of regional structure with an emphasis 
on the behaviour and actions of the primary decisions makers within the system.  While structural change is 
driven by a number of factors, the ability of a farm household to fully employ their labour resource was an 
important factor in the simulations.  This contrasts with the finding that productive efficiency, and 
purchasing and market power at the farm level is not a necessary condition for the observed consolidation 
of farm assets.   
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
1.0 Introduction 
 
Significant structural change is occurring at the farm level in Saskatchewan.  While not well understood, 
these changes appear to be due to a number of factors that are both endogenous and exogenous to farming 
and agriculture – including industrial decline and consolidation, demographics, entrepreneurial behaviour, 
rural migration, implementation of the WTO and the removal of many farming subsidies. There has never 
been a more important time to improve our understanding of regional issues and the farm sector.  
 
Agriculture is a multi-layered economic system comprising numerous individual agents.  These agents 
compete for limited resources, including land, against a constantly changing backdrop of agricultural 
policies, technologies, markets and natural events.  Farm characteristics like operator age, land tenure, farm 
type, farm size, debt level and motivation vary widely across Canada.  Changes in these factors underlie 
farm industry structure, and this issue is of perennial interest to agricultural policy makers.  The desire to 
understand farm structure has led to the development of a number of well documented farm-level models, 
including FLIPSIM in the U.S. and CRAM (Canadian Regional Agricultural Model) in Canada (Klein and 
Narayanan 1992).  
 
I argue that adaptive farm models based on individual interactions are necessary to help unravel the 
intricate interplay among natural and economic developments in the farming sector. Part of the motivation 
in this research is the realization that farming behaviour possesses characteristics of a complex system in 
the computational sense, and complex systems often generate large-scale behaviour that cannot readily be 
predicted by simply examining components of the system. In the complexity literature, such large-scale 
phenomena are referred to as “emergent” if they require new categories or methods of description, 
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categories that were not required to explain the actions of the underlying agents (Gilbert and Troitszch 
2002).  To their credit, the previous generation of farm-level models were not designed to capture 
complexity or emergent behaviour, yet complexity is arguably one of the most crucial characteristics of any 
economic system.  It is the potential to reveal emergent farm level behaviour that will distinguish new 
generation behavioural models from the older generation of atomistic farm level policy models. 
 
At the micro level, there are many potential drivers for rural structural change.  These include 1) the 
presence of economies of size and scale, 2) technological change and 3) changing lifestyle expectations and 
income.  Another underlying driver that has not been fully explored in this context is the fundamental and 
intrinsic difference in farming “management style”.  Considerable anecdotal evidence exists among 
agricultural professionals as to how differences in decision making lead to a management style (Jensen 
1977).  While there are many possible management attributes, management style should encompass: 1) a 
willingness to accept/or reject the current situation or status quo, 2) a willingness/unwillingness to act or 
respond under incomplete information and to accept risk (entrepreneurship), and 3) a view of farming as a 
business/life style.  These particular attributes are not necessarily independent and may be in turn 
influenced by a number of demographic variables.  I will explore each of these alternative explanations of 
rural structural change in this thesis   
 
1.1 Objectives 
 
The focus of this thesis is to better capture the inter-relational dynamics of individual farm 
households/managerial units and to examine the resulting aggregate structure at the regional level.  By 
building on an assumption that an agrarian region can be modelled as a complex system, issues concerning 
the limitations of farm-level modeling and policy analysis are re-examined using agent-based systems 
theory.  In turn the aggregate outcome of historic market conditions as well as policies directed at the farm-
level is analyzed by focusing on decisions made at the level of the individual farm household/managerial 
unit.  These decisions become the underlying driver of regional structure.   
 
I also seek to improve upon the limited predictive ability of previous farm-level modeling methodologies.    
Through the application of agent-based modeling techniques, and their inherent flexibility, the potential of 
including structural change as an endogenous factor to farm-level models will be illustrated.  First, the 
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structural evolution of a proto-typical rural municipality (RM) in the dark brown soil zone of Saskatchewan 
for the period of 1960-2000 will be simulated in the agent framework.  By comparing the simulated and 
actual structural adjustments, the validity of the simulation can be evaluated.  Subsequently, initializing the 
simulation model with alternative distributions of managerial characteristics allows the sensitivity of the 
model to variations in the initial farm population management profile to be evaluated.  This also permits an 
analysis of the role of individual farm household/managerial units’ management style as a driver of 
structural change.  The latter has never been done before in the farm-level modeling literature, and 
represents a major contribution of this thesis.  
 
Ultimately, a set of hypothetical or counterfactual scenarios will be simulated to assess the impact of 
historic farm stabilization and support programs on the structural evolution of the region.  I call these zero-
transfer scenarios.  By directly comparing the results from both the validated base and hypothetical zero 
transfer scenarios, I can directly assess the impact of government transfers to the farm household on the 
structural evolution of the studied region.       
 
1.2 Motivation for Study 
 
Agent-based modeling is a newly emerging tool for the study of agricultural and resource management 
issues.  Agent-based models serve as laboratories (or artificial societies) where competing hypotheses and 
theories of individual and social behaviour and rules can be tested in an empirical manner (Gumerman et al 
2002).  The use of agent-based models for creating artificial societies ranges from the development of 
abstract worlds1 to recreating historic societies (Rauch 2002).   Within the field of natural resource 
management there is a growing use of agent-based methods for the study of property rights, externalities 
(Parker 2000) and the use of common pool resources (Deadman 1999; Rouchier et al 2001). 
 
The use of agent-based methods to study agricultural issues is limited but expanding.  Some agricultural 
economists have begun to utilize these methods to study a number of important agricultural issues, ranging 
from regional structural change (Balmann 1997), EU farm policy-reform (Happe 2004), technology 
diffusion and resource use (Berger 2001) and land-use management (Polhill et al 2001).  There is a need to 
                                                 
1 A good example is the Sugarscape model.  The simplest version of the Sugarscape artificial world consists of a single population of 
agents gathering a renewable resource (sugar) from the environment (a two dimensional lattice), and is used to investigate the 
distribution of wealth that arises (Epstein and Axtell 1996). 
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further develop these models in order to gain insight into structural change associated with the unique 
properties of Saskatchewan agriculture.  And as there are still some concerns surrounding the use of agent-
based methodologies, especially among economists, these concerns need to be acknowledged before these 
models are applied to study structural change in the farm sector.  
 
1.3 Thesis Organization 
 
This thesis is composed of six chapters.  A brief review of the literature pertaining to the relevant issues of 
structural change in the agricultural sector and the role of farm management and entrepreneurial behaviour 
is found in chapter two.   Within chapter three, the strengths and limitations of a number of farm-level 
modeling methodologies are outlined.  As well, a substantial portion of chapter three discusses complexity 
theory and how it relates and leads to the use of agent-based systems and modeling.  The structural logic, 
assumptions and initial characteristics of the simulated regional model of farming activity are laid out in 
chapter four in significant detail.  The fifth chapter includes a presentation and discussion of the model 
results within the context of the issues and questions raised in chapters two and three.  Finally, a summary 
and conclusion is presented in the final chapter, along with a discussion of model limitations and 
suggestions for further research.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
TRENDS AND FACTORS OF STRUCTURAL CHANGE  
 
 
 
2.0 Introduction 
 
Farming and farm policy is faced with the reality of structural change.  The underlying characteristics of 
the agricultural industry may change from the time a policy is introduced and the time its full impact is 
realized.  As a result, policy makers are faced with the unenviable task of formulating and enacting policy 
that not only meets the short term objectives, but ultimately has a net positive impact on the long term 
sustainability of the industry.  In order to assist policy makers, farm-level models for forecasting have been 
developed to help assess and predict the impact of policies, including its collateral or second order effects.  
Assessment and prediction becomes a significant challenge when policies have long term impacts that are 
difficult to capture in a model without explicitly endogenizing structural change.  In order to improve the 
assessment and predictive ability of farm-level models, structure change needs to be made endogenous to 
these models.  In order to achieve this, a thorough understanding of the factors contributing to rural 
structural change is required.   
 
2.1 What is Structural Change? 
 
Significant structural change occurs at all levels of the agriculture industry.  A number of authors have 
categorized structural shifts in the agricultural sector under the rubric of the “industrialization of 
agriculture” and the consolidation and integration of production on larger operations (Sofranko et al 1999).  
The majority of academic and mass media publications describing structural change within Canadian 
agriculture have focused on the declining number of farms and the trend towards larger economic units 
although other issues related to increased capital assets, reduced labour requirements and part-time farming 
have also generated significant interest (Jones and Buckley 1980).  Structural change in the sector is 
defined by Goddard et al (1993) as “changes in the essential characteristics of productive activities”.  As a 
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result, structural change encompasses not only characteristics describing the number and size of farm units, 
but also the demographic and economic characteristics of the farm operators, the methods of production 
and the mix of products produced by industry participants.  Simply stated, structural change in agriculture 
encompasses shifts in what is produced, how it is produced and where and by whom it is produced.   
  
2.2 Trends and Patterns of Structural Change in Saskatchewan Agriculture  
 
The long term structural transformation of agriculture has been well documented within the Canadian 
industry (Bollman, Whitener and Tung 1995).  The focus of this brief discussion on structural change 
trends will be on the region of interest for this study, the Canadian province of Saskatchewan.  Foremost, 
structural shifts in Saskatchewan agriculture center on a declining number of farms, shifts in the crop 
portfolio and cultivation practices, and an increased integration between the farm and non-farm sectors of 
the rural and urban regional economies.  
 
The dominant trend in Saskatchewan agriculture has been the consolidation of production and control of a 
relatively fixed land resource among a declining number of farms.  The number of farms within the 
province has been declining steadily since the late 1930’s.  Farm numbers declined from 93,924 in 1960 to 
50,598 as of 2000 (Saskatchewan Agriculture, Food and Rural Revitalization 2004).  The relatively 
constant area of land employed in provincial agricultural production dictates that mean farm size is 
inversely related to the number of farms.  Mean farm size increased at a rate approximately equivalent to 
the rate of decline in farm numbers over the same period (figure 2.1).     
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Figure 2.1: Saskatchewan Farms Numbers and Mean Acreage 1960-2000 
Source: Saskatchewan Agriculture Food and Rural Revitalization 2004 
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The number of farms, and mean farm size, which are generally well published figures in the popular press, 
are only summary statistics and fail to portray key aspects of underlying change in the distribution of farm 
size.  For example, while mean farm size approximately doubled between 1960 and 2000 (figure 2.1) the 
proportion of farms managing less than 400 acres remained relatively constant (figure 2.2).    
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Figure 2.2: Distribution of Farm Acreage (Saskatchewan) 1960 and 2000 
Source: Census of Canada: Agriculture: Saskatchewan  
 
 
In addition to the persistence of small farm operations, the contrast between the distributions of farm size 
for the 1960 and 2000 periods highlights the growing heterogeneity between individual farms.  In 1960 
farms managing less than 1120 acres accounted for approximately 87% of all farms, whereas by 2000 this 
had fallen to 60% of all farms (figure 2.2).       
 
Methods of crop production and the portfolio of crops produced by Saskatchewan farmers have also shifted 
over the past 30 years (figure 2.3).  One of the most dramatic changes in production methods has been the 
reduction in soil cultivation and in particular the practice of leaving crop land in fallow.  Summer fallowing 
farm land was a common practice for the majority of crop producers in the 1970’s.  Throughout the 1970’s 
close to 40% of Saskatchewan’s crop producing land was fallowed in a given year (figure 2.3), while over 
the following decades the proportion of crop land in annual fallow declined steadily, accounting for less 
than 20% of crop land in 2000 (figure 2.3).       
  
 
 
8
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
180
200
1971 1973 1975 1977 1979 1981 1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999
 A
cr
es
 (h
un
dr
ed
 th
ou
sa
nd
s)
Summerfallow Acreage Spring Wheat (Harvested) Acreage Canola (Harvested) Acreage
 
Figure 2.3: Saskatchewan Spring Wheat, Canola and Summer Fallow Acreage 1971-2000 
Source: Saskatchewan Agriculture Food and Rural Revitalization 2004 
 
 
The importance of spring wheat production also declined significantly over the same period.  Spring wheat 
production accounted for approximately one-half of the harvested crop acres as recently as the early 1990’s 
(Saskatchewan Agriculture, Food and Rural Revitalization 2004).  Spring wheat production has declined in 
the past ten years to a level representing approximately 30% of the harvested crop acres annually 
(Saskatchewan Agriculture, Food and Rural Revitalization 2004).  Reductions in the relative proportion of 
farm output represented by spring wheat have been offset by the increasing acreage of alternative crops, 
including canola (figure 2.3) and pulse crops.  In fact, the number of Saskatchewan farms classified as 
wheat type2 has declined from 64% to less than 20% of all farms over the period 1971-2000 (Statistics 
Canada). 
 
At the production level, one of the most significant, but least understood, structural adjustments occurring 
in the industry is the substitution of capital assets for labour input.  An increased proportion of farm equity 
tied up in capital assets and increasing levels of debt financing (figure 2.4) has had a significant impact on 
the aggregate behaviour of the farm sector.  This aspect of structural adjustment needs to be properly 
analyzed.  
 
The growth of part-time farming and off-farm income are closely related to the trend of farm capitalization 
and the high cost of labour relative to capital.  The structure of the farm household has shifted dramatically 
                                                 
2Defined as a farm on which potential wheat sales account for at least 51% of the total farm receipts (Statistics Canada).   
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from the ideals of independence and self-reliance (Raup 1972), to the current reality where most farm 
households earn more money from off-farm sources than from agricultural production (Short 2004).   
0
5
10
15
20
25
1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
year
de
bt
 p
er
 a
cr
e 
(1
96
0$
)
 
Figure 2.4: Saskatchewan Farm Debt per Cultivated Acre (in constant 1960s dollars) 1960-2000 
Source: Saskatchewan Agriculture Food and Rural Revitalization 2004 
 
 
In addition to the increasing capital intensity of crop production, and the related increase in farm debt, the 
importance of capital associated with non-farming land owners has increased over the 1960-2000 period.  
With the exception of the early 1960s, the percentage of farm land owned by non-farming individual and 
organizations, and subsequently leased3 to farm operators, has increased (figure 2.5).   
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Figure 2.5: Proportion of Land under Lease Agreement (Saskatchewan) 1960-2000 
Source: Census of Canada: Agriculture: Saskatchewan  
 
 
The prevalence of land leases increased significantly in the first part of the 1980s, with an approximately 
6% increase between 1980 and 1985 (figure 2.5).  A significant adjustment in the proportion of farm land 
                                                 
3 Lease arrangements consist of two general types: cash leases and crop share leases. 
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operated under leases can be expected to have a number of potential consequences that may alter both 
aggregate and individual behaviours.   
 
The market value of farmland is determined by a number of factors, including regional supply and demand.  
The demand for farm land in this model is a function of its productive capacity, and the number of potential 
bidders. The latter is determined, at least in part, by the financial characteristics, cost structures and 
geographic location of individual farm operations.  The supply of farm land is also a function of the 
characteristics of individual farm operations.  If land is the residual earner of farm profits, all of the 
characteristics of structural change discussed are indirectly captured in land values or cash leases.  In 
addition, it is through land markets that land control is obtained and transferred4.  Accordingly a model that 
attempts to capture the underlying farm structural dynamics must play close attention to the underlying 
characteristics of the farmland market and land values.          
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Figure 2.6: Saskatchewan Land Values per Acre (in constant 1960s dollars) 1960-2000 
Source: Saskatchewan Agriculture, Food and Rural Revitalization 2004 
 
 
Saskatchewan land values grew rapidly during the 1970s period and reached a peak of approximately $120 
(1960$) in 1981 (figure 2.6).  This period of rapid inflation in land values was followed by an equally 
dramatic downward adjustment in prices which resulted in land values returning to their pre-rally levels by 
the early 1990s (figure 2.6).  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
4 This ignores the importance of inter-family land transfers.  
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2.3 Forces Driving Structural Change 
 
While effort has been exerted on understanding the dynamics of structural change, research conclusions 
have not been consistent, and have lead to strikingly varied conclusions and policy recommendations 
(Harrington and Reinsel 1995).  Figure 2.7 highlights eight major causative factors of structural change 
identified by Goddard et al (1993).  The remainder of this section will be dedicated to a brief discussion 
about those key drivers of structural change within the Saskatchewan and western Canadian crop 
production sector.   
 
     Public Programs - Commodity support, credit, taxation, 
          monetary and fiscal policy and research and extension
     Related Market Structure - Institutional development
     Demographics - Farm entrants, consumption patterns
     Off-farm Employment - Income effects, time allocation
     Economic Growth - Non-farm opportunities, product demand          
     Prices - Substitution effects (inputs and consumption),
          induced innovation
     Human Capital - Managerial ability, consumption patterns     
Factors Affecting Structural Change
     Technology (economies of size, labour bias technical
           change adoption rates)
Industry Structure
Characteristics of Productive Activities
(What, where and how is output produced)
 
 
Figure 2.7: Dimensions of Structural Change: Industry Structure and Casual Factors (Goddard et al 1993). 
 
 
 2.3.1 Technology and Relative Factor Prices 
 
Technological innovation is an important factor in the constantly evolving structure of Saskatchewan 
agriculture.  Cochrane’s (1958) “technological treadmill” is a well-known theory of structural change that 
is based on the incentives of individual producer’s to adopt new technology.  The typical producer, who is 
unable to individually influence market prices but has the ability to control production costs, has a strong 
incentive to search for cost reducing (output increasing) innovations (Cochrane 1958).  Early adopters 
benefit in the short run, but diffusion of the innovation increases the industry output and results in lower 
commodity prices.  Subsequently, a reduction in farm revenue forces other farmers to either adopt the new 
technology to maintain farm revenue at the level realized prior to the introduction of the innovation, or to 
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exit the industry and transfer resources to the innovating producers (Harrington and Reinsel 1995).  The 
consolidation of resource ownership is further accelerated when technological innovations are embodied in 
capital goods that require a minimum production size to be profitably adopted by producers.  Technology 
embodied in capital assets result in larger farmers being better positioned to innovate and capture the 
benefits of early adoption (Harrington and Reinsel 1995).  However, in contrast to these a priori supporting 
arguments, Giannakas et al (2001) found no clear relationship between farm size and technical efficiency 
among wheat producers in the province of Saskatchewan.   
 
Technological innovation involving the mechanization of agriculture has resulted due to the price of capital 
falling relative to the price of labour.  Producers respond to changes in relative prices by seeking out 
technology that saves the relatively more expensive factor of production (Karagiannis and Furtan 1990).  
As a result of changes in the relative prices of capital and labour, producers have incentive to replace labour 
inputs with capital inputs.   
 
Others observe that technological change results in more than a simple alteration of the mix of inputs 
employed to produce a given level of output.  It can also give rise to increases in economies of scale, 
requiring the producer to employ greater units of input (specifically land) in order to utilize labour inputs 
efficiently (Helmberger 1972).  The presence of increasing returns to scale at low or moderate output levels 
suggests that farms within this size range will either exit the industry or expand to a size that is consistent 
with minimum long run average cost.  Consequently, growth in farm size is consistent with economies of 
scale (Goddard et al 1993).  Meanwhile, others have suggested that observed increases in farm scale are the 
result of farms attempting to garner higher total returns to bridge the gap between farm and non-farm 
returns to labour.  This line of thinking postulates that it is not the presence of economies of scale, but 
rather the non-existence of significant diseconomies of scale that is driving farm growth (Goddard et al 
1993). Both hypotheses are consistent with empirical evidence suggesting that agricultural production is 
characterized by either a steep L-shaped or a lazy U-shaped cost curve (Schoney 1997). 
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 2.3.2 Labour Mobility and Non-Farm Opportunities 
 
Kislev and Peterson (1982) focus their explanation of farm size growth on the assumption of perfect labour 
mobility between farm and non-farm sectors.  A rise in non-farm incomes provides a strong incentive for 
producers to leave the farm to obtain higher returns to their labour, thus freeing resources for the remaining 
producers to decrease the urban-rural income gap.  Kislev and Peterson (1982) hypothesize that the out-
migration of farm labour and the growth in farm size are two aspects of a single economic process.  Goetz 
and Debertin (2001) apply a similar idea to explain an individual’s decision to quit or to remain farming (or 
start).  Individual producers compare the utility they expect to derive from operating a farm to the utility 
derived from off-farm opportunities.  A farm family, earning an opportunity wage on their labour, must 
increase in size as the real off-farm wage increases to maintain equilibrium between farm and non-farm 
returns to labour (Huffman and Evenson 2001).  Thus, as the non-farm wage rate declines relative to farm 
returns to labour, this theory would suggest that the number of farms would increase.5  
 
An increase in non-farm wages results in an increased opportunity cost for the farm family’s labour input.  
The increasing cost of labour lowers the relative cost of capital and will result in an increase in the optimal 
capital-labour ratio (Kislev and Peterson 1982).  The farm family is forced to either expand the farming 
operation to fully employ their labour input, or employ their excess labour in alternative markets.  Both 
scenarios have a profound effect on the structure of the agricultural sector.  The decision made by the 
individual farm family will be constrained by the opportunities that are available in both the farm and non-
farm sectors.     
 
 2.3.3 Capital Immobility 
 
The asset fixity or capital immobility argument also provides a rational basis for the observed diversity of 
farm size and technology adoption (Harrington and Reinsel 1995).  Johnson (1972) argued that capital 
investments become fixed over a wide range of rates of returns between the acquisition cost of expanding 
capacity and the salvage value of reducing capacity.  A resource becomes fixed for a given farm if its 
earning power is too low to justify the purchase of more of the resource at the market (acquisition) value, 
                                                 
5 The economy wide depression of the 1930’s was characterized by an increasing number of farm operators which may be at least 
partially explained by the lack of non-farm employment opportunities, and the resulting lower expected non-farm labour returns. 
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yet too high to justify selling the asset at its salvage value (Johnson 1972).  The direct result is that in the 
short run, farm structure can be characterized by significant diversity of farm size and technology.       
 
 2.3.4 Demographics and the Life-Cycle Hypothesis 
 
Demography is a powerful and often under-utilized factor in understanding economic activity.  Foot (1996) 
argues that it is not possible to do any accurate economic forecasting without knowledge of demographics.  
Demographic characteristics of a population play an important role in both public policy and business 
analysis in the long run.  Demand for education and health care services are two prime examples where 
public policy and demographics interact.  
 
Extant demographic characteristics of a population are the best predictor of the future demographic 
structure of an economy.  As a simple example of the power of demographics for educational policy 
analysis, consider that the number of births in a school district in 2004 constitutes a highly accurate forecast 
of the number of children entering the first grade in 2010.  By failing to understanding the obvious future 
consequences of current demographic characteristics, the task of developing a forecast is needlessly 
complicated (Foot 1996).     
      
One of the most useful statistics for predicting general economic behaviour is the age composition of a 
population (Foot 1996).  While humans make decisions independently, individuals in the same age cohort 
generally engage in similar activities as their peers.   In fact, highly similar patterns of behaviour are 
observed among age cohorts over time.  Some observe that this behaviour can only be marginally altered 
by economic conditions, government programs, or external shocks (Harrington and Reinsel 1995).  In most 
instances the participation rates of various age groups in different activities are relatively stable over the 
medium run.  For instance, it is highly likely that a 45 year old in 2014 will behave the same as a 45 year 
old in 2004; chances are also good that an individual will move out of their parent’s home, buy their first 
car, and get married about the same age as peers (Foot 1996).  This basic life-cycle model of economic 
activity can have important impacts on the aggregate economy as the population ages6 and the age 
composition of the population shifts and alters the number of individuals in each stage of the life cycle.      
                                                 
6 “Population aging” refers to the basic fact that each year every individual is one year older, and should not be confused with an 
“aging population” which is generally characterized by an increase in the average age of the population. 
 
 
15
A basic farm life cycle model will explicitly recognize the various life stages as well as management 
objectives an operator experiences.  The operational ladder typically followed by a farm operator in Canada 
is to enter the industry by renting farm assets, add additional rented land for part of their lives while 
progressively acquiring ownership of land and capital assets throughout a growth phase, and finally 
relinquishing control of leased and owned assets as they exit from farming (Harrington and Reinsel 1995).  
Ultimately, structural change is the result of micro-level dynamics of entry, growth and exit.  Some offer 
that government policies, economic conditions, and technological change may only marginally affect the 
incentives and opportunities within the life cycle of the farm operator (Harrington and Reinsel 1995).   
 
Demographics imply are that while operator ability and hard work are important factors in farming, the 
timing of start up and initial capital stock may play a significant role in determining the success of a farm 
operation.  Operators who have inherited substantial farm assets, or who operate established farms with a 
significant level of equity, are better positioned to withstand extended downturns in the farm economy that 
may bankrupt equally able and efficient operations.  As a result, it is important to incorporate family and 
farm life cycles when analysing current and future farm survival and structural shifts (Barlett 1984) 
 
In an industry where the bulk of the entry occurs from a relatively young age cohort (i.e. between 20-30; 
Harrington and Reinsel 1995), a reduction in the number of farmers, as well as young people raised on 
farms, has implications for the future of the food production sector (Goddard et al 1993).  A declining 
number of young people raised on farms, who historically have accounted for the majority of new farm 
entrants, will lead to a further decline in farm entry.  This in turn signals a shift away from the traditional 
single owner-operator farm arrangement (Goddard et al 1993).  
 
 2.3.5 Productive Heterogeneity 
 
The changing structure of agricultural production is thought by some agricultural economists to be a 
consequence of the heterogeneous nature of productive efficiency.  The existence of varied levels of 
productive efficiency among farm operations might also explain the consolidation of farm assets among 
fewer operators (Harrington and Reinsel 1995).  Deferring to a mechanism similar to Cochrane’s (1958) 
“technology treadmill”, some have argued that efficient producers will earn economic profit, while the 
inefficient farms will incur losses.  Facing a downward sloping demand, this cumulative process will result 
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in the transfer of land and capital assets from the inefficient farms to the efficient farms.  Increases in 
production resulting from the efficient use of these resources will increase aggregate supply, further leading 
to relatively low market prices and still more pressure on the net incomes of less efficient farms 
(Harrington and Reinsel 1995).     
 
2.4 Farm Management/Entrepreneurship 
 
At the farm level, there are many potential drivers for rural structural change.  But one possible underlying 
driver that has not been fully explored in the literature is the fundamental and intrinsic difference in 
farming “management style.”  Much anecdotal evidence exists among agricultural professionals as to how 
differences in decision making lead to a management style (Jensen 1977).  While there are many possible 
management attributes, management style should encompass; 1) a willingness to accept/or reject the 
current situation or status quo, 2) a willingness/unwillingness to act or respond under incomplete 
information and to accept risk (entrepreneurship), and 3) a view of farming as a business/life style.  Clearly, 
these attributes are not necessarily independent and may be in turn influenced by a number of demographic 
variables.  
 
Agricultural and rural structure is related to the ownership and control of agricultural land.  The past, 
present and future ownership and/or control of the land resource are directly linked to the relative bidding 
potential of land market participants (Harris and Nehring 1976).  A number of economic factors, including 
net income, income variability, wealth, marginal tax rate and interest rate, have a direct impact on the land 
bidding behaviour of an individual (Harris and Nehring 1976).  Which farms are best suited for future 
growth and will gain the most from expanding their farm acreage?  In turn, this leads to a second, 
potentially more important, question of the growth willingness of the farm manager/entrepreneur (Welter 
2002).   
 
The growth aspirations/willingness of the individual farm agents may have a profound effect on the final 
allocation of land.  While theoretically growth is initially desirable to achieve a sustainable scale of 
production, personal growth ambitions play a significant role in shaping a farm’s growth path (Welter 
2002).  A farm agent with a higher bidding potential and thus having more to gain from farm growth may 
ultimately end up being outbid by another farm manager with a lower bidding potential due to the agent’s 
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lower growth aspiration.  In fact, the individual farm entrepreneur’s growth ambition can be incorporated 
into their land market bidding behaviour in a number of ways, including the incorporation of a degree of 
risk aversion when forming a land bid (see Harris and Nehring 1976) as well as the simple choice of 
entering the land market or remaining on the sidelines.  A general pattern of land market participation 
behaviour can be observed based on the age of the farm manager and the corresponding business phase.  
Studies have shown that participation is typically limited to established farms still in the growth phase, as 
farm managers nearing retirement typically refrain from participating in the land market as buyers.  In 
addition, young farmers still in the entry/establishment phase are typically blocked from entering due to 
high debt-levels (Olson 2004).                
 
The growth of a farm operation is directly linked with the underlying management style of the farm 
household.  Within the literature, a rather consistent categorization of farm management styles has emerged 
(Taylor et al 1998).  The business-oriented style of management encompasses the entrepreneur (Olsson 
1988), dedicated producer (Fairweather and Keating 1994), and the efficient operator (Walker 1989).  In 
contrast the lifestyle approach to farm management is typically characterized by strategic caution (Olsson 
1988) and sufficing behaviour (Fairweather and Keating 1994).  A number of researchers (Bennett 1982; 
Fairweather and Keating 1994) suggest that farm management styles are largely influenced by the life-
cycle of the enterprise and may vary as time progresses.  Ultimately, different approaches to farm 
management exist, and the distribution of management styles among a relevant farm population may have 
an effect on the aggregate agricultural structure of a region.  
 
2.5 Summary 
 
The literature on structural change in agriculture suggests a number of factors that may be driving the 
transformation of agriculture and in general, the composition of the farming sector in Saskatchewan in 
particular.  The factors considered and highlighted here include technology, labour mobility, capital 
immobility, demographics and productive heterogeneity.  While a diverse literature, a consensus has 
emerged that at the aggregate level, structural change results from transformations occurring at the 
individual farm level.  Thus, theories concerning the sources of structural change have in common the 
importance of the individual farm household as the significant decision making unit in agriculture.  This 
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buttresses the need to establish the individual farm operation or household as the primary unit of analysis in 
a study of aggregate farming behaviour.   
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
FARM LEVEL MODELING 
 
 
 
3.0 Introduction 
 
General policy analysis in agriculture often uses computational farm-level models.  Early versions of these 
traditional models were designed by government and universities beginning in the 1960’s to better 
understand the farming sector and the overall impact of policy change.  Even today, the vast majority of 
farming models are founded on one of either representative producer, input/output or computational general 
equilibrium (CGE) methods.  The first method is not statistically defensible when the population is highly 
diverse.  The latter two types of models offer macro predictions based on structural equation parameters 
estimated from highly aggregated data.  One of the inherent limitations of all of these traditional farm-level 
models is that due to hysteresis, they are often unable to accurately forecast behaviour very far beyond 
those years from which the model parameters were derived.  This situation is a major impediment to 
formulating sound agricultural policy in an ever-changing economic environment.  
 
This inherent limitation of the traditional models for understanding and predictive purposes has led to 
research into a new generation of farm-level models.  General advancements in computer simulation 
environments have sparked the development of detailed, microscopic computational approaches to simulate 
the behaviour of human systems (Parker et al 2003).  While these models are now widely used in some 
fields of research, there has been limited application so far to agriculture.  Great potential exists for this 
kind of simulation modeling to better assess and forecast the major structural change now happening in 
Saskatchewan agriculture.  The appropriateness and application of these new computing and simulation 
tools to the issues of farm-level modeling, agricultural production and land use will be the focus of this 
thesis. 
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3.1 An Alternative to the Neoclassical Economic “Toolkit” 
 
Neoclassical economics has been the dominant paradigm in both economic research and teaching since the 
1940’s (Happe and Balmann 2003).  This has resulted in the widespread acceptance of modeling economic 
problems and individual behaviour using the mathematical optimization ‘toolkit’.  The widespread use of 
optimization techniques to represent individual behaviour has resulted in some confusion regarding the 
fundamental economic concept of individual rationality.  Rationality is often confused as a technique, the 
optimization technique, rather than a concept (Vriend 1996). Rationality, in economic terms, simply refers 
to an individual selecting the option, from their perceived opportunity set, believed to be in their best 
interest (Vriend 1996).  Mathematical models are simply one way of representing an individual’s selection 
process, but they should not be understood as an economic principle in spite of their widespread use.  
Alternative models of individual behaviour may result in the selection of different ‘optimal’ choices under 
assumptions using equivalent information, without violating economic rationality.   
 
The concept of bounded-rationality in economics is defined as situations where limited resources constrain 
fully rational decision-making and this can also be described as ignorance.  Bounded information is the 
direct result of economic search costs, and should not be confused with rationality, which is unaffected by 
economic factors (Vriend 1996).  Modeling bounded-rationality presents two problems - modeling 
ignorance and modeling rationality.  While agent-based modeling facilitates the development of a tractable 
model of individual learning and ignorance, some authors argue it is the second issue that will ultimately 
lead to its widespread acceptance as a new economic modeling ‘toolkit’ (Arthur 1994). 
 
Agent-based systems are generally defined by a set of autonomous entities, or agents, which have limited 
knowledge and computational abilities (Berger 2001).  As the name suggests, individual agents are the 
primary component of any agent-based model.  Of primary interest to social scientists is the interaction and 
information exchange between agents that occurs in a decentralized and “somewhat social” manner within 
the simulation environment (Berger 2001).  I will argue that the technique maps well onto farming and 
farm behaviour, especially the paradigm of interacting yet autonomous decision-makers conducting their 
business on a physical landscape.   
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The unit of analysis in an agent based system model is the individual actor or agent behaving as a result of 
autonomous decisions.  Many systems are not controlled by a central planner; rather, stability or 
equilibrium in these models is generated via the decisions and actions of multiple individual agents, 
coupled with their interactions with other agents and the environment (Schelling, 1978).  One advantage of 
the de-centralized decision making inherent in agent based modeling is that many well specified models 
generate unpredicted (‘emergent’7) patterns of behaviour at the macro level (Bonfanti et al, 1998).  Today, 
the agent-based literature is firm about the simulation algorithm - once initial conditions are set, all future 
events in these virtual worlds are initiated and driven by agent-agent and agent-environment interactions, 
with no further intervention by the modeller required or permitted (Tesfatsion, 2000). 
 
The path to widespread acceptance of agent-based modeling methodologies is expected to parallel the 
development of the field of experimental economics from its pseudo-science status in the early 1960’s.  
Experimental economics gained acceptance with the development of new equilibrium concepts (e.g. Nash 
equilibrium, and the core) in the late 1960’s, and primarily as a methodology for choosing between 
alternative theories of behaviour (Friedman and Sunder 1994).  The development of alternative equilibrium 
theories resulted in the focus of behavioural economics expanding from causal propositions in the form of 
“If x then y” under the existence of a single rationality theory to actual testing of the suitability of 
alternative theories based on experimental data (Friedman and Sunder 1994). 
   
The development of alternative models of human behaviour to compete with the “economic man” paradigm 
has resulted in a need for methodologies to accommodate appropriate individual behaviour.  It has also 
been argued that agent-based models have the ability to serve as a “social laboratory” for testing the 
plausibility of various behavioural models (Casti 1999).  Furthermore, agent-based modeling can provide 
the researcher with a method that allows the modeling and testing of alternative models of individual 
behaviour that have been previously neglected due to tractability and complexity issues.   
 
 
 
 
                                                 
7 Emergence is the property that a system is not simply equal to the sum of its individual parts.  Phenomena at the macro level cannot 
always be explained by observing the properties of the system in isolation.  Macro level structures are rather the result of interactions 
of the individual components of the system (Happe and Balmann 2003).    
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3.2 Current Farm-Level/Land-Use Modeling Methodologies 
 
Research within the multidisciplinary fields of agricultural production and land-use has resulted in the 
application of a variety of model building methodologies.  The appropriate modeling methodology must be 
based on the structure of the underlying system and the objectives of the research project.  As a result the 
focus of this section will be to briefly examine the strengths and weaknesses of a number of broadly 
categorized alternative methodologies.  
 
Agarwal et al (2002) identified three general components that are important for the evaluation of land-use 
models including space, time and human decision making.  These three axioms form the basis for a 
discussion on alternative modeling methodologies.  These authors argue that in order to adequately capture 
all relevant dynamics within a system characterized by a strong human-environment relationship, the 
interactions between the temporal and spatial environments and human choice must be explicitly 
incorporated into the model system.     
 
 3.2.1 Farm Budgeting/Planning Models 
 
Initial modeling efforts at the farm-level are best described as farm management tools that were developed 
to study financial problems at the individual farm level.  These early farm models consisted of simple 
partial budgets to predict the outcomes of alternative production scenarios, along with case studies of 
successful farms to determine common characteristics of successful producers (Klein and Narayanan, 
1992). 
 
While individual producers remain key factors in any agricultural system, the increasingly heterogeneous 
profile of remaining producers and the farm specific nature of these types of models limit their use for 
policy analysis as stand alone models.  That is not to say that these simple partial budget and case studies 
are useless to the development and analysis of future policy tools.  In fact they may help lead to a solution 
for the problem identified by Simon (1955), replacing the “economic man” model of human action based 
on global rationality with a model consistent with the computational capacity and access to information 
actually possessed by human actors in an economic system.  The successful development of future farm 
level policy models within an increasingly complex and heterogeneous industry will require a better 
understanding of the characteristics that drive individual farm management decisions.    
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 3.2.2 Equation Driven Models 
 
Equation driven (quantitative) models have traditionally played an important role in the development and 
analysis of agricultural policy.  The structure of these models has generally taken either a macro-
perspective or a micro-perspective of the system under analysis.  Attempts were made at developing 
classical spatial equilibrium models of agriculture, but they were inherently complex, difficult to solve and 
led to poor forecasts (Takayama and Labys, 1986).  In addition, by focusing on either the macro level 
(country, province or region) or the individual farm (micro perspective), a number of significant issues that 
are functionally situated in between these extreme perspectives, such as structural and distributional effects, 
are effectively lost (Happe and Balmann 2003). 
 
Micro-level models generally select a typical farm to represent a relatively homogenous group.  The 
representative farm incorporates detailed micro data and is most often used to simulate adjustment to a 
policy change (Happe and Balmann 2003).  The method of modeling each individual solution and then 
aggregating the results to determine the macro effects of a policy is referred to in the literature as 
microprogramming (Fisher and Kelley 1982).  Modeling each individual farm is costly, and in many cases 
the solutions are non-feasible (Kelley and Fisher 1982).  This problem is usually solved by aggregating 
similar producers and building so-called ‘representative’ farms.  The development of the CRAM model 
(Canadian Regional Agricultural Model) of the Canadian agricultural sector and the REPFARM model of 
the U.S. sector are examples of behavioural farm-level models (Klein and Narayanan 1992) that focus on a 
limited number of representative farms which in turn are assumed to exist in isolation with no allowance 
for explicit inter-farm interactions.  
 
In addition, analysis of the results generated through the aggregation of representative farms is subject to 
aggregation bias and error due to the difficulty in developing artificial farms that are truly representative of 
the entire group.  As far back as the 1960s, Day (1963) argued that even though it is theoretically possible 
to achieve exact aggregation in economic models under certain conditions, developing satisfactory criterion 
remains a major problem.   
 
Significant advancements in computational capacity allow researchers to avoid aggregation issues by 
facilitating much more disaggregate micro-programming.  While decreasing computer processing costs 
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may avoid the classic aggregation problem, current microprogramming methodologies are still hindered by 
a second aggregation bias identified by Happe and Balmann (2003).  The simple arithmetical aggregation 
of individual farm models, solved independently to represent an industry or a region, completely omits any 
interactions and dynamical effects that can occur between individual farms and the subsequent macro level 
phenomena that emerge from these interactions (Happe and Balmann 2003).  Berger (2001) compared the 
inability to capture interactions between farm-households to the assumption that no transaction or 
information costs exist.  A second criticism of mathematical programming based on simulation models 
identified by Berger (2001) is the inadequate representation of the important spatial dimensions of 
agricultural activities.  As a result, the role of internal transport costs and the immobility of land are often 
ignored in traditional farm-level models – an effect that can be likened to the assumption of zero 
transaction costs (Berger, 2001).    
 
Through the 1970s, the growing importance of world markets and the cost of commodity based support 
programs resulted in a shift in farm modeling towards aggregate supply response of the industry (Klein and 
Narayanan 1992).  However, a macro-level approach ignores the heterogeneity in behaviour and resource 
endowment among individual producers that form the aggregate response (Happe and Balmann 2003).  The 
lack of understanding about the effects of policy at the individual producer level is the major point of 
criticism directed at macro-level modeling.  Predictions generated from macro-level models are based on 
extrapolation from historic aggregate data patterns, with minimal attention paid to the behaviour of 
individual economic agents (Stoker, 1993).  The use of macro-level modeling techniques not only masks 
the distributional effects of a policy change, it also fails to capture the important linkage between response 
at the individual level and the aggregate response.  A relatively small shift in individual producer incentives 
or a change in the profile of producers in the region, resulting from a policy change, can potentially result 
in a significant impact on the aggregate response.  The latter is not something macro-level models based on 
historical data can easily incorporate.   
 
The inability of current farm-level models to readily adapt to shifts in individual responses also limits long-
run predictive ability.  If policy issues, such as structural change, are in fact path dependent8 (Balmann 
                                                 
8 See page 28 for a definition of path dependency 
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1997), the current models lack the ability, due to their limitations for long-run prediction, to fully assess the 
impacts of a policy option.  Policy makers using these models must be careful to ensure that those policies 
intended to have a positive impact in the short-run do not have an unwanted and damaging impact on the 
long-run performance of the sector.  
 
3.3 Agent-Based Systems: A New Farm-Level Modeling Paradigm 
 
The use of agent-based or multi-agent systems originated in computer science through the field of 
distributive artificial intelligence.  Today, the use of agent-based systems is a growing multidisciplinary 
research tool.  Unfortunately, a degree of uncertainty still exists concerning the precise definition of an 
agent.  The definition adopted by individual researchers varies depending on the area of study.  However, a 
minimal common definition, as proposed by Ferber (1999), is as follows: 
 
 An agent is a physical or virtual entity; 
 
o which is capable of acting in an environment 
o which can communicate directly with other agents 
o which is driven by a set of tendencies (in the form of individual objectives) 
o which possesses its own resources 
o which is capable of perceiving its environment (to a limited extent) 
     
Balmann (2000) offers a more succinct definition, which captures Ferber’s - agents are reactive, 
autonomous and goal orientated entities with the ability to sense their environment and, in particular cases 
the ability to communicate, learn and be mobile.   
 
A number of concepts and issues associated with agent-based systems draw from the related field of 
complexity theory.  While a detailed description of complexity theory (Manson 2001) is outside the scope 
of this thesis, it is worth briefly exploring the relationship between agent-based modeling and complexity. 
Complexity theory covers a variety of analytical concepts and is inherently a multidisciplinary field of 
research.   It is important to note a fundamental difference between complexity theory, which is often 
concerned with non-linear relationships, and the linear relationships defined by stocks and flows in general 
systems theory (Manson 2001).   
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No concrete definition of complexity theory exists.  Rather, complexity research is founded on a common 
concern for understanding how a system can be characterized with reference to its individual components 
in a non-reductionist manner (Manson 2001).  Further, complexity theory is concerned with the evolution 
of system behaviour as a result of the interactions between constantly changing individuals, as opposed to 
the parameterization of entity interactions under the assumption of equilibrium that is implicit in general 
systems models (Manson 2001).  Thus, agent-based models are often used to describe or explain social 
situations characterized by complexity.   
 
In sum, agent-based models are founded on the idea that aggregate or system characteristics are the result 
of the actions of the system’s underlying sub-components.  In turn, these are affected by feedback from the 
aggregate system (figure 3.1).  While traditional “top down” modeling approaches are focused on 
developing models that capture the outcome of individual actions, “bottom up” approaches explicitly model 
the individual actions and behaviours that likely generate the given outcome.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1: “Bottom Up” Modeling Logic (Lewin 2000) 
 
Complexity theory and agent-based modeling broaden our understanding of economic phenomena as the 
emergence of order out of complexity.  The direct interaction of economic agents is the foundation of 
economic complexity, and has been previously explored by some authors (Holland and Miller 1991; Day 
1994; Arthur 1999).  This conceptualization is significantly different from the majority of economic models 
in which individuals only interact through market clearing prices (Durlauf 1998).  The value of 
incorporating ideas from complexity theory within the field of economics lies in its potential to enrich our 
understanding of the relationship between individual decisions and aggregate outcomes (Durlauf 1998).  A 
modeling approach that consistently combines individual behaviour and interaction with aggregate 
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phenomena is lacking within the mainstream economic literature.  Agent-based systems offer the potential 
to remedy this issue by explicitly acknowledging the contribution of each individual in the system under 
analysis to outcomes at the aggregated level (Happe and Balmann 2003).        
 
 3.3.1 Why Agent-Based Methods? 
 
There are a number of well-developed techniques of farm-level modeling for the purpose of policy 
analysis.  However, each of these modeling methodologies has significant limitations.  Equation-based 
spatial and aspatial models are generally only able to capture a limited degree of realism due to analytical 
and computational tractability issues (Takayama and Labys, 1986).  And while analytical models can 
provide some insight on the impact of heterogeneity and neighbour effects in spatial modeling, they are 
generally limited to representing average and not extreme effects (Parker et al 2003).  Due to the multitude 
of potential spatial and social interactions that may occur within a complex system, these analytical 
techniques can be inadequate for assessing issues that are guided by these interactions. 
 
If formulated correctly, agent-based systems provide the researcher with the ability to overcome these and 
other limitations.  The capability of agent-based systems to evolve solutions to phenomena that are 
regarded as systems of autonomous interacting components, like a farm economy, provide the motivation 
for increasing interest in ABS research in the social sciences (Sycara, 1998). 
 
 3.3.1.1 Flexibility and Complexity 
 
Agent-based modeling is characterized as a “bottom up” approach, in that it is not driven by central 
coordinating mechanisms.  “Bottom up” modeling approaches do not rely on exogenously imposed 
assumptions, including fixed decision rules, global rationality, representative agents or market equilibrium 
constraints, all of which are generally required within “top down” approaches such as computational 
general equilibrium models (Happe and Balmann 2003).  In equilibrium models, the inclusion of these 
assumptions is usually required in order to analytically determine a solution, while solutions quickly 
become intractable as the level of system complexity increases. As a direct result of the comparatively less 
restrictive assumptions required for iterating a solution within an agent-based model, the researcher can 
endow individual agents with a more complete and realistic spectrum of properties and behavioural rules. 
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Ultimately, the attraction of traditional analytical economic models is their ability to yield stable, 
equilibrium solutions. However, many solutions fail to provide the researcher with an adequate 
understanding of the transition period between equilibrium states (Nelson 1995).  Mathematicians and 
economists now recognize that it may not be the case that an economic system will always reach a stable 
equilibrium.  For instance, frequent internal and external shocks may hinder identifying the equilibrium.  
The existence of a fixed or moving economic equilibrium needs to be viewed as an attractor9, or desired 
state, rather than a description of the system state (Nelson 1995).  In contrast, agent-based models permit 
quasi-equilibrium sinks or states to evolve from the interactions of individual actors without explicitly 
incorporating restrictive equilibrium constraints.  This not only provides improved understanding of the 
transition period between equilibrium states, it also leaves open the opportunity for the equilibrium state to 
be altered prior to the system fully adjusting.   
 
 3.3.1.2 Emergent Characteristics 
 
Emergent properties in systems analysis are those characteristics of a dynamic system (in equilibrium or 
not) that could not readily have been predicted before the experiment or simulation (Parker et al., 2003). 
Furthermore, emergent properties are the direct result of synergism between individual system components 
and are not simply additive affects of the system components (Manson 2001).  The notion of aggregate 
system characteristics emerging from the interactions of individual actors is deeply embedded within 
traditional economic theory.  Economists have long regarded market processes as being the result of 
unguided interactions between rational individuals, including most notability the Smithian “invisible hand” 
paradigm used to describe self-coordination within a market economy (Happe and Balmann 2003).   
 
Parker et al (2003) argue that emergent phenomenon can only be practically modeled with computational 
tools such as agent-based models.  This is due to the difficulty of constructing analytical spatial equilibrium 
models that can incorporate all relevant microscopic interactions.  To date, a number of researchers have 
identified useful examples of emergent system properties in dynamic models in this context.  These include 
land use patterns (Parker and Meretsky 2004) and the overall distribution of farm sizes in Europe (Balmann 
                                                 
9 An equilibrium state can be thought of as an attractor in the sense that it is the state the system will reach if it is allowed to fully 
adjust, but full adjustment may not necessarily occur due to a number of internal and external factors. 
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1997) both of which are best described as emergent properties of systems of individuals interacting within a 
spatial market.  
 
 3.3.1.3 The Importance of Time and Space 
 
The primary importance of time and space within any human driven system can be summarized by two 
undeniable physical truths for all matter, save for sub-atomic particles - 1) it is impossible for matter to be 
in two places at a single point in time and 2) time is irreversible.  Past actions cannot be undone, and only 
their long term outcome can be altered by current and future decisions (Happe and Balmann 2003). 
Balmann (1999) among others calls this notion “path dependence”, and refers to the phenomena that in a 
stochastic world, the current state depends upon previous actions and events.  In such a case, agents 
operating within the same system may differ in their actions, even if the same information set is available to 
all agents, as past actions and observations affect their opportunity set and perceptions of the world.  As an 
example of this, two farmers may be aware of a new technology that will potentially improve profitability, 
but a one may opt not to adopt the new technology due to financial constraints that were caused by an 
earlier action. 
   
In many ways human perception of the world is largely shaped by space and geography (Fellmann et al 
1999).  For geographers, the importance of location and the influence of neighbours parallel the 
economist’s reliance on theories of constrained (by resource or budget) utility maximization (Nelson 2002).  
The importance of modeling an agricultural system in a spatially explicit manner becomes increasingly 
evident when one considers the importance of space and location in a number of agricultural decisions.  For 
example, an important factor in farm growth is the cost of internal transportation and the increased cost of 
farming geographically scattered units of land.  As a result, producers with a desire for farm growth are 
generally limited to competing with their neighbours for additional units of land (Berger 2001). 
 
 3.3.1.4 The Importance of Heterogeneous Producers 
 
The individual producer is ultimately the driving force behind and the recipient of the eventual outcomes of 
any agricultural policy.  If agricultural policy makers do not understand the importance of individual 
management and behavioural characteristics, it becomes difficult to design policies to achieve a desired 
outcome.  Furthermore, there are challenges solving any system involving dynamic, independent and 
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intelligent actors with free will.  At present, with only 39% of Canadian farmers self-described as business 
focused and 50% as lifestyle farmers (Short 2004), the development of effective agricultural policy must 
depend in part on understanding the varied management strategies that exist between and within these two 
drastically different groups.  Thus, even under the assumption that all individuals are pursuing the same 
goals (i.e. utility maximization), a large variance in individual behaviour will result unless all individuals 
have identical information, computational abilities, and utility functions. 
 
Within the framework of agent-based modeling, individual agents must be assumed to act according to 
some model of cognition (Parker et al 2003).  At the most basic level, individual agents must also have the 
ability to react to their environment in a manner that is compatible with their individual perceptions of the 
world and their goals.  This somewhat extends the notion of traditional economic theory, based on the idea 
of an “economic man” presumed to behave rationally under the assumption of perfect information (Simon 
1955).  While rational choice models developed under the assumptions of the “economic man” provide 
significant explanatory power, they may fail to accurately predict behaviour under realistic assumptions of 
imperfect information (Parker et al, 2003).  Simon (1955) and others argue that even under assumptions of 
imperfect information, the “economic man” paradigm overstates the computational capacities actually 
possessed by many individuals.  
 
The primary advantage agent-based models offer over traditional economic modeling approaches with 
regard to modeling human behaviour is the ability to readily incorporate a significant degree of 
individualism in the decision making process.  The ability to design a multitude of individual agents also 
allows the researcher to incorporate a number of varied decision making models.  And while not followed 
in this thesis, the researcher is not actually limited to assuming that all individuals follow the same decision 
making process.  In fact, agent models can de designed to endow each individual with a unique decision 
making algorithm. 
 
 3.3.2 Challenges and Limitations 
 
Economic models are designed to understand issues as part of a more complex economic system.  Agent-
based models have a unique characteristic in that their flexibility of specification and design is both a great 
advantage and a potential problem (Parker et al 2003).  As these models become increasingly more 
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realistic, they also increase rapidly in complexity, which can result in the loss of an ability to draw direct 
cause and effect conclusions (Happe and Balmann 2003).  The inability to assign a direct causal link may 
pose a significant problem for theoretical research, but the point may be less important for policy analysis 
based on simulation models that are developed using empirically grounded assumptions.  In addition, 
model verification and validation10 become increasingly more difficult as the level of complexity increases 
(Kelton et al 2004).  Kelton et al (2004) concede that it is “almost impossible to verify totally a model for a 
complex system” and it seems the only option is to rigorously test the simulation model under multiple 
scenarios to verify that it behaves correctly for a reasonable set of potential scenarios.   
 
In addition, to move beyond replicative and predictive validity11 based on comparing simulated and 
observed data is rather difficult.  This is often accomplished in a qualitative context by agreement of 
participating stakeholders that the modeled behaviour is an acceptable theory that cannot be rejected based 
on current knowledge.  Note that this is not a situation unique to agent-based modelling, as the scientific 
method is based on rejecting false hypothesis and theories rather than directly accepting true ones. 
 
The wider acceptance of agent-based models as a tool for economic and policy analysis is currently 
hindered by a number of concerns that must be overcome.  The greatest challenge facing researchers in this 
emerging field is the communication of model constructs and results without a standardized toolkit or a 
common base of knowledge.  The lack of a standardized toolkit is further aggravated by the complex nature 
of agent-based problems, which often require long and detailed documentation.   In contrast, while possibly 
misleading, agricultural models that have been widely accepted as tools for policy analysis seem to be 
appealing due to their reliance on neoclassical economic theory (Happe and Balmann 2003).  Researchers 
must be aware that additional time and resources are currently required to outline underlying model 
assumptions and theories compared to researchers engaged in traditional economic research. 
 
A number of the challenges and limitations identified within this section are not inherent to agent-based 
methods themselves, but rather result from a lack of understanding about underlying system dynamics.  
                                                 
10 Verification ensures that the encoded model accurately represents the researcher’s abstraction from the real world, while validation 
is concerned with comparing the model results to real world data and expectations (Parker et al 2003). 
11 Troitzsch (2004) identifies three types of validity; 1) Replicative Validity: the model matches data already acquired from the real 
system; 2) Predictive Validity: the model matches data before data are acquired from the real system; 3) Structural Validity: the model 
represents the manner in which the real system operates to produce the behaviour.  
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This point becomes increasingly obvious when attempting to model the behaviour of individual agents, 
while standard economic analysis has generally sidestepped issues related to the mechanisms used by 
agents to make choices in a perpetually novel world (Holland and Miller 1991).  Current models of 
individual behaviour based on optimization techniques are often justified by postulating that adaptive, 
market driven, mechanisms result in agents acting ‘as if’ they are optimizing (Holland and Miller 1991). 
While this may in fact be a valid argument, it does little to address the structural behaviours driving the 
broader economy.  Applications of the agent-based ‘toolkit’ stretch the boundaries of existing economic 
models and have the potential to dramatically alter the discipline of economics and the related field of 
farm-level modeling.     
 
3.4 Summary  
 
In any field of research, it is important to re-examine the methods of study from an alternative viewpoint or 
theoretical base.  Agent-based simulations, combined with spatially explicit behavioural models, provide 
researchers interested in agricultural policy analysis the opportunity to view social and economic processes 
from an alternative perspective (Balmann 2000).  Researchers must be aware of the advantages, as well as 
the limitations, of emerging research methods such as agent-based modeling when evaluating the available 
strategies for assessing both new and old issues and problems.   
 
The modeling paradigm selected by a researcher must be driven by the objectives of the study and 
characteristics of the system under study.  Systems that can be characterized as complex may be well suited 
for the application of agent-based methodologies.  The ability of agent-based models to explicitly capture 
the complexity and emergent characteristics of economic systems in turn gives its application to farm-level 
modeling the potential to overcome the limitations of the previous generation of farm-level analysis. 
 
The importance of understanding the limitations of any modeling paradigm should not be overlooked, 
particularly in the case of an emerging field.  Without a standardized toolkit or knowledge base available, 
researchers utilizing agent-based models and complexity theory must ensure that all model assumptions and 
constructs are carefully documented and empirically and/or theoretically justified.  While it is clear that the 
use of agent-based models results in some validity and verification problems, these problems can usually be 
distilled as problems associated with the specific research question rather than the methodology (Balmann 
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2000).  The use of agent-based models also provides a significant degree of flexibility, particularly through 
incorporating individual behaviour and decision making characteristics.  Like any new methodology that 
questions existing theories and ideas, agent-based modeling faces a number of challenges, but recent 
developments within the field should encourage other researchers interested in this newly emerging field of 
study.       
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
MODEL FRAMEWORK 
 
 
 
4.0 Introduction   
 
In the previous chapter, I argued that agent-based models are suitable for analyzing the structure of 
complex economic systems.  In this light, there are now several agent-based models in the economics 
literature that have incorporated market-based agent interactions (Happe, Kellerman and Balmann 2004). 
The economic landscape of an agrarian region can be modeled as a result of local interactions between 
three primary components of agriculture: farms, land and markets (for products and land) (figure 4.1).  
 
farm 1
farm 4 farm 2
farm 3
Farms Land / 
space
Markets
 
 
Figure 4.1: Conceptual Model of a Regional Agricultural System (Happe, Kellerman & Balmann 2004) 
 
 
This representation of a regional agricultural system as an agent based model is appealing for two 
additional reasons.  Rule based interpretation of farms as individually acting agents is a primary strength of 
agent based modeling methodologies.  And a spatial issue like the allocation of a scarce and immobile 
resource, such as agricultural land, among a geographically dispersed set of farms can be dealt with in a 
relatively tractable manner in the agent framework.       
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4.1 Central Model Assumptions 
Independent farming operations evolve based on the opportunities and constraints presented by their 
constantly changing environment.  In this thesis, the farmer is considered to be engaged in two related but 
separate activities - producing and marketing field crops, and investing in agricultural assets.  In the former, 
farms are essentially independent and annual production and marketing decisions are not directly 
constrained by the actions of neighbouring farms.  In contrast, a farm’s ability to increase asset investment, 
specifically in land, is directly constrained by the actions of all farms within a limited geographical area. 
The inability of a farm to produce output independently from the scarce land resource results in direct 
competition between farms for agricultural land.   
 
Competition for agricultural land is organized in this model through the assignment of property rights and 
the continued functioning of well-defined agricultural land markets.  An individual farm’s production is 
constrained by the availability of additional crop land which is affected directly by the collective actions of 
all farms in the local land market.  It is assumed that the farm manager’s ability to acquire additional land 
for a price that is not in excess of its true future return is the key to the long term profitability of the farm 
operation.   
 
A number of non-farming individuals, including retired farmers and speculators, are also assumed to be 
active within the agricultural land market.  In fact, it is the presence of non-farming land owners in the land 
market that leads to the establishment of a lease market.  It is assumed that the non-farming land owner will 
sell land when the return from selling outweighs the expected return from owning land, and will purchase 
land if the market price is less than the present value of the expected lease return.    
 
In order to assess the impact of agricultural stabilization and support programs of the past few decades in 
Canada, the spatial and producer profile is initialized to represent an agricultural region typical of one that 
would be found in the dark brown soil zone of Saskatchewan in the year 1960.  In addition all farms are 
assumed to be limited by the crop production technology of the initial time period for the duration of the 
model.  In order to adjust for this assumption of constant technology, real commodity prices and production 
costs are also de-trended.  Non-land capital investment stocks are assumed to be constant over farm size 
and between individual farms.  Farms require a constant investment stock of machinery and equipment per 
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acre for crop production.  By assuming that technology and non-land capital stocks are constant, the role of 
managerial attributes on the evolution of regional agricultural structure can be studied in isolation from the 
effects of non-land capital variability and technological advancement. 
 
Finally, the effect of income and property taxation over time is ignored and is not explicitly modelled.  
Income taxation is an important consideration for farm planning and cash flow, and can be assumed to be 
implicitly modelled as part of the annual farm household living/managerial withdrawal.  Property tax is 
incorporated into the farm agents land bid value.  The exclusion of property taxes results in a higher 
expected land rent (return to land) which results in a higher bid value compared to scenarios including 
property taxes.            
  
4.2 Netlogo© Platform  
NetLogo© is one of the several software packages that is currently available to facilitate the study of agent 
based systems research and model development.  The NetLogo© software package was developed and is 
continually updated by the Center for Connected Learning and Computer-Based Modeling in the Dept. of 
Computer Science at Northwestern University in Evanston, Illinois.  Its flexibility means that NetLogo© 
has a wide range of applications as both a research and a teaching tool.  The program is useful to 
researchers because it contains a modeling environment suitable for simulating complex natural and social 
phenomena.  The NetLogo© software readily permits the representation of thousands of independent agents 
all acting and interacting contemporaneously in a spatial environment.  It is flexible and powerful enough 
to enable detailed study of the relationships that emerge from these individual actions and interactions, both 
at the micro and macro level (Wilensky 1999). 
 
The Netlogo© ‘world’ is composed of multiple agents, each with the ability to carry out individual 
instructions and activity in a simultaneous manner.  Within the software package, three general classes of 
agents are used (Wilensky 1999): 
 
o “Turtles” - are a class of agent that can move around the environment 
o “Patches” - each patch represents a piece of ‘ground’ over which the turtle agents move 
o “Observer”  - the observer is a ‘god-like’ agent, controlling all other classes of agents 
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Within the context of this model, individual farm operators are represented by the turtle agent class, while 
the patch class of agents is utilized to represent individual units of agricultural land used for crop 
production.  Finally, the observer class of agents can be thought of as representing government and 
institutional agencies, which administer farm activities such as financial constraints, market mechanisms 
and government transfers.  The observer class of agents also controls the timing of all activities within the 
model that are not directly controlled by individual turtle or patch class agents. 
 
4.3 Model Logic and Organization 
The basic logic of the simulation model is summarized in figure 4.2.  The NetLogo© simulation consists of 
two phases: an initialization phase, and a simulation phase.  In the initialization phase, the model structure, 
including all farm agents and land plots, is created.  The initial attributes of all farm agents and land plots 
are also assigned during this phase.   
 
Following the completion of the initialization phase, the simulation phase begins by initiating the crop 
production module.  Following crop production, the observer agent effectively surveys all farm agents to 
sum up the gross revenue (determined in the crop production module) from all plots they currently control, 
while deducting all expenses in order to determine current financial state (farm results).  Prior to initiating 
the land auctions, all farm agents are asked by the model to make management adjustments, which may 
include exiting the industry or transferring the farm to a new generation.  The observer agent then proceeds 
to allocate available land to the remaining farm agents - initially through the purchase auction and any 
remaining land through the rental auction.  Once both auctions are completed, the farm agents are again 
queried to make any addition capital investment requirements or divest of excess capital stocks.  The 
simulation phase is repeated until a specific number of time periods are completed.        
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Figure 4.2: General Model Procedure Flow Chart (adapted from Happe, Kellermann and Balmann 2004) 
 
 
4.4 Production Factors 
 
The individual farm agent requires land, labour and capital inputs for annual crop production.  Like the 
popular perspective of farming on the Canadian Prairies, it is assumed in this model that field crop 
production dominates the farming landscape.  The importance of land as an input cannot be understated in a 
region characterised by field crop production as the sole form of agricultural activity.        
 
 4.4.1 Land 
 
The spatial representation of the model utilizes the patch class of agents.  A single patch agent represents an 
individual 160-acre plot of agricultural land.  Note that just as in reality, total acres suitable for crop 
production on a given plot may be less than the total plot acreage.  The simulated region used here consists 
of 1296 individual plots, and is equivalent to an idealized Rural Municipality in the province of 
Saskatchewan.  Plots differ in three respects: productivity, land-use, and ownership.  While this ‘world’ 
appears as a single two-dimensional grid in the model, the underlying characteristics and data structure can 
be simplified by separating the grid into multiple data and algorithmic layers (figure 4.3).  The combination 
of five critical layers and their underlying characteristics form the physical and institutional spatial 
environment where the farm agents co-exist and alter their production decisions. 
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Layer 1: Farm Location
  - location of individual farmer's home quarter
Layer 2: Land Tenure
   - owned    - unfarmed
   - leased
Layer 3: Land Use / Cropping
   - crop 1    - crop 3
   - crop 2    - crop 4
Layer 4: Annual Growing Conditions
low   high
Layer 5: Land Quality 
low   high
 
 Figure 4.3: Spatial Data and Characteristics of the Simulation 
 
 
The top two layers control institutional characteristics with respect to land control and tenure.  Layer 1 
maps out the spatial location of all agricultural plots available to an individual farm agent for productive 
activities.  Note that the initial location of a given farm agent is determined randomly through each 
replication of the model.  The second layer is essentially a regional map that identifies the owner and/or 
lessee (in the case of a non-farming land owner) of each individual plot of land, which is initially allocated 
based on the location of the farm agents.  With respect to the top two layers, a given plot of land may exist 
in the following set of states:  
o Plot is owned by farm agent k; 
o Plot is leased by farm agent k; 
o Plot is a farmstead; 
o Plot is currently not managed (idle). 
 
The land use/crop cover layer (layer 3) captures a producer’s annual production decisions, and is the model 
equivalent of an aerial photograph of the region.  Related research on the dynamics of land use and cover 
change utilizing the ABS framework typically focuses on this layer (Parker et al 2001).  Annual crop 
production achieved from an individual unit of land is dependent on a number of exogenous factors, 
including soil productivity and annual weather patterns.  The model algorithm incorporates these factors in 
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a parsimonious way, yet the model consistently captures many of the subtleties of crop production.  The 
impact of annual weather patterns and soil productivity are captured within layers 4 and 5, respectively.  
While overall weather conditions can differ dramatically between growing seasons, soil quality tends to be 
relatively constant over the relatively short geologic time period considered in the simulations.  Therefore, 
soil quality is assumed to be stable within the simulation.  Annual weather patterns and constant soil 
productivity are captured by a simple index value, where a value of unity corresponds to the average.  Thus, 
a plot of land with average soil productivity and annual weather patterns (corresponding to index values of 
unity) realizes an average level of production.  The exact meaning of an “average level of production” will 
be discussed again in section 4.6.1.1, which focuses directly on crop production. 
 
4.4.2 Farm Labour and Capital 
 
Farm agents are assumed to supply the majority, but not all, of the required labour for the farm operation. 
In turn, labour costs consist of both a family/managerial withdrawal and a charge for hired labour/custom 
work12.  In addition, it is assumed that equipment and facilities inputs are fixed in constant proportions 
relative to the land input13.  As a result, a farm agent who desires to double their farm acreage would also 
be required to double his/her equipment and facilities investment value.   
 
4.5 Risk Preference/Entrepreneurial Classification/Farm Goals 
A farm business deals with three primary types of risk – production/marketing, financial and asset risk.  In 
this model, the farm manager’s willingness to assume risk has a well defined impact on both annual crop 
production and long-term growth decisions.   
 
Willingness of a farm manager to assume risk is a function of a number of factors, including personal 
goals/objectives, coupled with the entrepreneurial characteristics of the individual.  I assume here that the 
life cycle of a farm business means operating in one of three life phases, where each phase is characterized 
by different levels of risk aversion: an entry and establishment phase, a development and growth phase, and 
an exit and retirement phase (Keatings and Munro 1989).  The objectives of the farm business evolve as the 
                                                 
12 The per acre cost of hiring additional non-family labour and/or custom work is assumed to be characterised as a logistic growth 
function and will be discussed further in chapter 5.   
13 While it is noted that farm machinery investments are often characterized as ‘lumpy inputs’, the existence of well functioning 
markets for machinery rental and custom operators will result in relatively constant economies of scale with regard to equipment and 
facility investment.   
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farm progresses through the three phases, while a farms’ progression through the phases is strongly 
correlated with the age of the farm manager (Bennet and Kohl 1982).  Throughout the development and 
growth stage, the farm manager will be primarily concerned with farm growth14 and thus will be less risk 
averse than a farm manager in the exit and retirement phase, a time when equity protection and avoiding 
risk become the primary objectives (Olson 2004).   
 
While it is possible to predict general patterns of behaviour based on age and other demographic 
characteristics (Foot 1996), the behaviour of individuals within a demographic group may still vary 
significantly.  It would be naive to assume that all farms in the same business phase would have the same 
willingness to assume risk, and it can be expected that the risk profile will vary significantly among 
producers.  Yet on aggregate, there are observable consistencies in risk behaviour.  Tractability and data 
limitations mean that for my purposes, farm managers are segregated into four distinct managerial classes 
with correspondingly different (but equal within each category) risk preferences: 
 
o Exit and Retirement phase manager (most risk averse) 
o Lifestyle farm manager 
o Cautious expanding farm manager 
o Expanding farm manager (least risk averse) 
 
All farm agents are assumed to enter the Exit and Retirement phase at a pre-determined age, after which 
they will no longer place bids on additional farm land15.  During this phase, retirement planning and asset 
protection replace farm growth as the farms primary objective.  Prior to shifting into the Exit and 
Retirement phase, farm agents belong to one of the three alternative classes for the entire farm development 
and growth phase16.   
 
Farm agents are assumed here to be concerned with farm expansion and will attempt to increase the number 
of plots managed throughout the growth and development phase.  The farm agent’s willingness to assume 
risk corresponds directly with their risk aversion factor.  In this model, a risk neutral farm agent would have 
                                                 
14 Farm growth includes both growth in the size of the farm through land acquisition and the growth of farm equity. 
15 The farm agent will still attempt to renew previous lease agreements 
16 The farm growth period occurs from the age the farm agent begins managing the farm to the age when the farm manager enters the 
exit and retirement phase. 
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a risk aversion factor set to unity and values land based on their undiscounted land rent expectations.  
Alternately, risk averse farm agents discount their land rent expectations with a risk aversion factor less 
than one, meaning the probability of purchasing land at a price that overestimates its true earning potential 
is reduced.  And an increase in the level of risk aversion will lead to a reduction in a farms’ land valuation 
(Harris and Nehring 1976).  The less risk averse a farm agent is, the greater their risk aversion factor is, and 
the less their land rent expectations are discounted.   
 
4.6 The Farm Agent - Farm Actions 
 
Over the course of a single simulation year cycle, a farm agent engages in a number of distinct activities as 
shown in figure 4.4. 
  
start stop
no
yes
Re-New Land Leases?
Rental Agreement
Land Purchase Auction
Purchase
Land Rental Auction
Rental Agreement
Crop Production Farm Accounting Managerial Adjustments
Expectation Formation
Financial Statements
Land Market
 step influence
capital requirement per acre
Capital Investment
Calculate Offer
Calculate Bid
Calculate Offer
continue 
farming?
 
 
Figure 4.4: Individual Farm Agent Flowchart of Activities (based on Balmann 1997) 
 
 
The activities undertaken by a farm agent include producing and marketing field crops, farm accounting, 
management decisions, renewing existing leases and acquiring control over additional land and capital 
assets.    
 
4.6.1 Crop Production 
 
Sale of crops produced generates gross cash income and variable cash expenses which becomes part of 
cash flows.  Additional cash outflows include fixed production expenses and family living and managerial 
withdrawals.   
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 4.6.1.1 Gross Crop Revenue 
 
Annual crop production is characterised by gross revenue uncertainty, which can be separated into yield 
and price risks. The stochastic nature of annual crop production and commodity prices results in a varying 
short term profit and long term viability of each individual farm operation.  Randomness within price and 
crop yield is composed of both global and local effects.  On a global scale, commodity price is affected by 
world supply and demand dynamics - individual producers can have no impact on prices.  However at the 
local level, individual producers may choose to market their crops at different times or to different 
locations, a strategy that may generate a price different from that of a neighbours’ identical crop.  Crop 
yields are determined by both global weather patterns applied to the region as well as local variations 
within the region of study.  As an example, a drought will reduce the crop yields for all producers in the 
region, but localized weather patterns and other agronomic factors within the region determine the degree 
of yield reduction for individual plots of land.  
 
The variability inherent in average annual world prices is exogenous to the simulation and is captured by an 
array of crop prices for all crops in a given year.  Local variation among farmers is not permitted in this 
model, meaning that all producers receive the annual average world price for their production17.  The global 
variability of crop yields is captured in the same manner as the global commodity prices.  While the global 
price refers to a world market price, the global yield refers to the general yield pattern of the region.  
 
Within the simulation, varied weather patterns and soil productivity lead to variation in the individual plots’ 
actual crop yield.  The relative production yield of an individual plot is determined by both fixed 
productivity factors such as soil quality, and annual productivity factors including weather.  This 
combination of both fixed soil productivity and annual growing conditions determines the relative yield of 
the plot (see figure 4.5).     
                                                 
17 This is probably not an onerous oversight. Local revenue effects will likely average out over the entire region, making this a rent-
seeking issue, not a productivity issue.  
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 Figure 4.5: Relative crop yield, soil productivity, and annual growing conditions 
 
 
A plot with soil productivity and annual growing condition index values both equal to 1 would produce a 
crop yield equivalent to the mean yield value for the current production period.  Plots with a higher soil 
productivity index value have a higher probability of realizing a crop yield above the annual regional 
average crop yield than a plot with a lower soil productivity index value.  A plot of land possessing a less 
than average soil productivity value (< 1) would require annual growing conditions exceeding the regional 
average growing conditions in order to produce a crop above the regional yield average for the same 
period.   
 
The farm agent’s realized gross revenue from crop production is a function of the global variability of 
commodity prices/yields and local yield variability.  Global commodity prices and yields are input into the 
simulation as an array of values for each crop year, remaining consistent over all model replications18.  
Simply, the gross revenue of an individual farm agent is equal to the summation of the revenue generated 
by all crops grown on land controlled by the farm agent (equation 4.1).  
 
∑
=
=
I
i
iGRGR
1
                                                                                                 (4.1) 
where GR = gross revenue of farm agent k 
 GRi = gross revenue from crop i 
 
                                                 
18For example if the price of wheat is set at $2/bushel for crop year 1, and $3/bushel for crop year 2, these values would remain 
constant for all replications of the model.  
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 Crop revenue is computed based on the global commodity price and yield, which are the same for all farm 
agents, as well as the individual farm agent’s adjustment factor and the area of land allocated to production 
of the crop in question (equation 4.2).   
 
   
iiii APFYPGR ⋅⋅⋅=                                                                                             (4.2) 
where Pi¯   = mean price of crop i 
 Yi¯  = mean yield of crop i 
 PF = productivity factor of farm agent k 
 Ai = area (acres) of crop i seeded/harvested by farm agent k  
  
 
The productivity factor for each farm agent is the mean value of the productivity index (soil productivity 
index multiplied by annual growing conditions index) of all owned and leased plots weighted by the 
number of cultivated acres (equation 4.3). 
 
∑ ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ ⋅=
K
K
PIPF xyxy
                                                                                                  (4.3) 
where PIxy = productivity index of plotxy 
 Kxy = crop acres of plotxy 
 K = crop acres managed by farm agent k 
 
 
By computing the gross revenue in this manner, it is further assumed that each farm agent produces the 
same crop mix on all plots they manage.   
 
 4.6.1.2 Variable Production Costs 
Variable crop production costs are dependent on both the area of cultivated land and the production level.  
For example, the cost of seed and fuel for planting and tillage operations are independent of the production 
level realized19, but the cost of harvesting is related to the volume of production.  In order to capture these 
cost relationships, the variable crop production costs are modelled as a function of both realized production 
level and the area of land employed.  The total variable crop production costs for the farm agent are the 
sum of variable costs for all crops grown in the current period and the total non-family labour cost 
(equation 4.4). 
 
                                                 
19 The possibilities that a farm agent may reduce input use when the production level is expected to be poor are ignored. 
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                                                                       (4.4) 
where VC = variable production costs of farm agent k 
 VCiacre = variable production costs per acre of crop i 
 W = non-family labour cost per acre of farm agent k 
 Vi = production volume of crop i 
 VCivol = variable production costs per volume of crop i 
 
 
Crop production costs are also dependent on distance, due to the cost of transporting farm products and 
machinery.  Thus, holding all other factors constant, the cost of producing a crop on a given plot of land 
increases as the distance from the farm agent’s farmstead increases.  The relationship between production 
costs and distance can be expressed by the cost of transporting machinery20 and the cost of transporting 
farm product by truck.  Therefore, this model assumes that all crop production is marketed from the 
farmstead, with no farmstead-to-deliver-point freight variability between farm agents.  As a result, the cost 
of transporting farm production is just the cost of moving product from the field to the managing farm 
agent’s farmstead.   
 
The total transportation cost of a farm agent is simply the sum of transportation costs of all plots currently 
managed.  In turn the annual transportation cost for an individual plot of land is dependent on the distance21 
to the managing farm agent’s farmstead and the volume of production realized (equation 4.5). 
 ( )TruckVTravelDTE xyxyxy ⋅+⋅=                                             (4.5) 
where TExy = transportation costs associated with plotxy 
 Dxy = distance between plotxy and managing farm agent’s farmstead 
 Travel = annual cost of transporting farm equipment per unit of distance 
 Vxy = production volume (all crops) of plotxy 
 Truck = annual cost of transporting crop production per unit of distance 
 
 
 4.6.1.3 Fixed Production Costs 
Fixed production costs include the two categories of fixed inputs used in the simulation – 
machinery/equipment, and land.  Total annual fixed costs are composed of machinery and equipment 
replacement charges and land lease payments (equation 4.6).   
                                                 
20 The cost of transporting machinery consists of machinery operating expenses (fuel, depreciation), and the opportunity cost of travel 
time. 
21Distance is measured as the summation of the east-west and north-south distances between the farmstead and the plot.  
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LPCFC replace +=                                                                                                                         (4.6) 
where FC = fixed production costs of farm agent k 
 Creplace = machinery and building replacement charge of farm agent k 
 LP = land lease payment cost of farm agent k 
 
 
Machinery and equipment replacement charges are assumed to equal annual economic depreciation.  This 
implies each farm agent makes an annual cash investment in machinery and equipment equivalent to the 
annual reduction in machinery and equipment value due to economic depreciation.  The net result is a 
constant machinery and equipment value per crop acre over time.  Annual land lease expense is calculated 
as the sum of the annual per acre lease payment multiplied by the number of crop acres of all farm plots 
leased by the farm agent. 
 
 4.6.1.4 Family/Management Withdrawal 
The farm agent requires a minimum level of “cash” that must be withdrawn annually for family living and 
managerial expenses22.  All farm agents are given the same minimum withdrawal requirement and marginal 
propensity to consume from gross revenue.  Annual withdrawals increase with farm size due to the 
additional labour and managerial requirements of producing on additional plots.  When the farm agent’s 
annual cash flow is unable to meet the producer’s withdrawal value, the deficiency is made up by the equity 
built up in previous periods (or initially endowed).  The annual withdrawal is evaluated as: 
 
KGRWDWD ⋅+⋅+= σβmin                                                                                         (4.7) 
where WD = family/management withdrawal of farm agent k 
 WDmin = minimum family/management withdrawal amount 
 β = marginal propensity to consume from gross revenue 
 σ = management cost adjustment factor for an additional acre of crop land managed 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
22 While it is noted that off-farm income currently may be used to meet a significant portion of the family living requirement of many 
farm households, this was historically not the case.  In order to remain consistent with the assumptions of constant technology and 
purchasing power and a 1960’s base period in these simulations the farm household’s farm/non farm labour allocation decision is 
ignored.  
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4.6.2 Farm Accounting 
 
Like their real world counterparts, many of the decisions made by producers within the simulation are 
influenced by financial constraints.  In order to fully capture reality, a set of basic accounting rules and data 
structures are implemented.  While some producers may be unaware of the true financial state of their 
farming operation and may sometimes make decisions that are not conducive to financial success, large 
capital and land purchases are ultimately constrained by credit availability.  This in turn is based on the 
financial solvency of the producer.  As a result of the large investments required to expand a given farm, 
and the general requirement of credit procurement by individual producers, producer decisions can be 
influenced by financial constraints even in cases where producers are unaware of their true financial health. 
 
Farm agents are concerned with both their short-run profitability and the long-run growth of equity in the 
farm operation.  In the short-run, a farm must be able to generate cash flow levels capable of covering all 
production costs and family living withdrawals.  This coverage ensures the long term sustainability and 
growth of the farm.  The long-term financial health of each agent in the simulation is tracked continuously 
via a simplified balance sheet (figure 4.6). 
 
$5,000
Crop Inventories b $0     payments remaining 15         
    annual payment $463
Principal balance $4,500
    adjusted acres c 310       
    average market value $45 Debt # 2
Land Value $13,950     payments remaining 18         
    annual payment $462
$4,800 $5,000
$9,500
$14,250
$23,750 $23,750
a Cash includes all non-land and machinery/building assets
b crop production is assumed to be sold in the same period it is produced, resulting in zero inventories at year end
c cultivated acres pro-rated by soil productivity (i.e. 1 acre with a soil productivity index value of 0.85 = 0.85 adjusted acres)
Total Assets
Principal balance 
Total Liabilities
Liabilities + Equity
Equity
Smith Farm
Balance Sheet
December 31, 1960
Machinery/Equipment
Debt # 1
Assets Liabilities
Cash a
Land
 
 Figure 4.6: Representative producer balance sheet 
   
The cash account can be thought of as a residual account that tracks the accumulated annual net cash flow 
of the farm.  The land assets are valued at market levels, which is equivalent in the simulations to the 
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average selling price (adjusted for soil productivity) from the most recent period in which at least one plot 
of land was purchased  through the land auction23.  Machinery and equipment assets are also valued at their 
market value.  Due to the assumption that annual replacement expense is equivalent to annual economic 
depreciation, this is calculated simply as the product of the total number of crop acres managed by the farm 
agent and the required per acre capital investment value.   
 
In addition to the farm agent’s long run financial indicators, annual net cash flow is also tracked within the 
model.  Net cash flow is determined as the farm agent’s net increment to their cash account after all farm 
and family living expenses, including investment and financing flows, have been calculated (equation 4.8).   
 
FINANCEINVEST NCFNCFWDFCTEVCGovGRNCF ++−−−−+=         (4.8) 
 
where NCF = net cash flow of farm agent k 
 Gov = net government transfers received by farm agent k 
 TE = annual transportation cost of farm agent k 
 NCFINVEST = equipment and facilities sale proceeds less purchases of farm agent k 
 NCFFINANCE= new borrowing less principal and interest payments 
   
 
While an individual farm agent has the ability to cover negative annual cash flow with built up equity in the 
operation, prolonged periods of negative cash flow will erode the equity of the farm and may result in the 
farm agent eventually exiting the industry.  At a minimum, in the simulation a prolonged period of negative 
cash flow and an erosion of farm equity will limit the future credit availability and land purchasing ability 
of a farm agent.     
 
4.6.3 Expectation Formation 
 
Individual farm agents make a number of important managerial decisions based on their expectations of 
future production margins.  Land and family labour/management are modelled as the residual claimants of 
farm profit; as a result a farm manager’s willingness to pay for addition farm land (rent) is a direct function 
of both future production margin expectations and family/managerial withdrawal requirements (figure 4.7).    
 
                                                 
23 Only land sold through the land market is used to evaluate the market value of land.  This eliminates “non arms-length” sales 
between family members that result when farms are transferred to a new generation.  In the scenario where no farm agents purchase 
farm land the minimum acceptable land bid is used; when no land is available for sale in a period, and thus no land bids are calculated, 
the value from the previous period is used. 
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Figure 4.7: Production Margin, Fixed Labour Allowance and Rent  
 
Farm agents form individual production margin expectations in this model based on a simple adaptive 
expectations scheme.  This is defined as a weighted average of prior expectations and the production 
margin, adjusted for soil productivity, from the previous crop year (equation 4.9).   
 
 [ ] ( ) [ ] lttt PMPMEPME −− ⋅+⋅−= λλ 11                                                                               (4.9) 
where λ = expectation weight 
 PM = production margin (per acre) of farm agent k 
 
The production margin of farm agent k is: 
 ( ) CRdKWDWDVC
Q
GRPM ⋅−÷⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ −−−= min                                   (4.10)   
 
where Q = mean soil productivity of all plots managed by farm agent k 
 d = annual rate of economic depreciation on machinery and buildings 
 CR = machinery and buildings stock requirement per crop acre  
 
       
The evaluated production margin is based upon land located at the farmstead, and soil productivity having 
an index value of one.    
 
 Farm agents are also required to form production volume expectations in order to estimate transportation 
cost when bidding on plots of land.  The production volume expectations are formed using the same 
adaptive expectations weighting.  The annual production volume per acre is evaluated as total production 
volume, adjusted for soil productivity, divided by total crop acres.    
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4.6.4 Farm Management 
 
Farm management in the context of this research refers to the farm agent’s decision to exit the industry or 
to continue farming and select a crop mix for the next production period.  The decision to quit farming is 
the most drastic management adjustment any farm agent can make.  In reality, it can be the result of a 
number of factors, including financial and family pressures.   
 
 4.6.4.1 Farm Exits 
Farm exits are triggered as either an early forced exit due to financial factors or a more orderly exit due to 
old-age retirement/succession.  In the case of forced exits, operations cease and all farm assets are released 
when either of the early shutdown conditions is met:  
 
o Insolvency (forced exit)  
farm liabilities  ≥  0.9 · farm assets24                                              (4.11) 
 
o Prolonged Equity Erosion (voluntary exit) 
 NCF < 0 for 5 continuous periods25                         (4.12) 
 
Farming is typically a lifetime commitment, and exits from farming are often less responsive to market 
conditions than many non-farm industries (Gale 1996).  As a result, a farm manager will likely continue to 
operate, in the short-term, even if the full value of their labour input is not realised (see equation 4.12). 
 
The farm agent’s probability of a voluntary exit due to old-age retirement increases as the farm agent ages26 
and is based on probabilities common to all farm agents.  When the decision to discontinue farming is made 
as part of an old-age retirement/succession plan, the farm has the potential to be transferred to an heir of the 
current farm agent as a transaction between family members.  The possibility of a transfer of the complete 
farm to a non- family member is ignored here since most farms in North America have historically been 
transferred from parent to child (Bennet & Kohl 1982).  The decision of the next generation to continue the 
operation of the farm is captured as a likelihood occurring at the time of retirement of the original farm 
                                                 
24 A farm is deemed to be insolvent when total liabilities exceed total assets, but in general a farm is vulnerable when their debt to 
asset ratio exceeds 0.7:1 (Olson 2004).   
25 While it is unrealistic to assume that all farmers will exit after exactly 5 continuous years of negative cash flow, on average the 
assumption of five years seems reasonable and tends to fit real data with reasonable accuracy.  
26 The probability of retirement increases as the farm agent moves into a new 5 year age bracket and remains constant while in the 
same bracket. 
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agent.  All farms operated by farm agents that are exiting due to old-age retirement and have a strong 
current net worth, with a debt to asset ratio no greater than 0.4:1 (Olson 2004), have the same probability (a 
parameter value between 0 and 1) of being taken over by the next generation.  The new farm agent is 
assumed to gain control over all existing farm assets, including all lease agreements.  The new agent is also 
assumed to “buyout” the original farm agent by assuming all existing liabilities and a cash buyout of a 
proportion of the equity value of the farm (equation 4.13). 
 
buyout value = farm liabilities + α · farm equity         (4.13) 
where α = proportion of farm equity debt financed when farm is transferred to new generation 
 
 
The next generation farm agent is assumed to finance the purchase of farm equity by financing over a 
twenty-year amortization period27.  In a situation where the farm is not transferred to a new generation, all 
land assets are released for other farm agents to acquire through the land market.   
 
 4.6.4.2 Crop Mix Adjustment 
 
Farm agents select their annual crop mix from a discrete set of available crop alternatives.  Producers are 
assumed to maximize their total expected utility ( E[U ] ) based on the simple summation of the expected 
utility of the individual crops ( E[Ui] ) that are included in the selected crop mix, subject to land and 
agronomic constraints (equation 4.14). 
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where ai = proportion of farm agent k’s crop acres allotted to production of crop i 
 bi = maximum proportion of farm agent k’s crop acres allotted to production of crop i 
 
 
                                                 
27 A twenty year amortization period corresponds with Farm Credit Canada’s (FCC) general lending terms (Guide to Farm Practice in 
Saskatchewan 1960). 
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The expected utility of an individual crop is evaluated as a linear function of mean crop return28  and the 
variance of crop return (Selley 1984), where each is computed based on the five previous production 
periods.  The individual crop options can then be ranked based on an expected utility value, evaluated as: 
( ) ( ) 21
2
1][
iii
UE ∏Φ−−Π=Π σ              (4.15) 
where ∏
i
 = mean crop return (GR - VC) of crop i 
 Φ = risk aversion factor of farm agent k 
 σ2∏
i
 = variance of crop return of crop i 
 
 
As a net result of the computed individual crop utility values, crop options can be ranked in an ordinal 
manner.  The farm agent will then proceed to allocate his total crop acres in a manner that maximizes the 
production of crops with the highest rankings, subject to agronomic constraints.  Note that while the 
functional form of the farmer’s expected utility function ignores the covariance between the returns of crop 
alternatives, it significantly reduces the complexity of this part of the model.  Due to the limited number of 
crops commonly produced in the study region and the strong correlations of crop returns29, this is not likely 
an onerous over-simplification.    
 
A risk neutral agent (Φ = 1) would behave in a pure profit maximizing manner and would select a crop mix 
that maximizes their expected total crop return.  The risk averse (Φ < 1) farm agent will evaluate the 
individual crops based on a trade off between expected returns and variances.  The more risk averse an 
individual farm agent is the lower the value of the risk parameter (Φ) will be.  Intuitively this would mean 
that a more risk averse farmer would require a greater expected crop return than a less risk averse farm to 
take on the same level of risk (Hadar & Russell 1969).    
 
4.6.5 Farmland Market 
 
Farm agents can expand either by purchasing or leasing additional land, and they compete in two 
segmented farmland markets.  All farmland tracts are based on a fixed plot size, and this defines the 
smallest unit by which farm acreage can change.  In each period, land available for sale and leases are 
                                                 
28 Crop return (π) = P x Y - VC (fixed costs are equivalent across all crops and are ignored in the analysis).    
29 The covariances of returns for the four crop alternatives modelled all exceed 0.7.  This simplification may need to be revisited if the 
modelled crop alternatives are expanded in subsequent research. 
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allocated to farms through two separate iterative auctions,30 with the lease auction occurring subsequent to 
the purchase auction.  The order of the two land auctions attempts to capture the belief that farm agents 
have a strict preference for purchasing relative to leasing additional land. 
       
Land becomes available for sale/lease when a farm agent exits (forced or voluntary) from the industry or 
continuing farm agents do not renew existing lease agreements.  The manner in which land becomes 
available for re-allocation directly determines the land market in which the plot becomes available for farm 
agents to bid on.  Available land is re-allocated based on the following rules: 
 
o Forced Exit   - Land owned by the exiting farm agent enters the ‘for sale’ market; 
     land leased by the exiting farm agent enters the ‘for lease’ market. 
 
o Voluntary Exit - Land owned by the exiting farm agent enters the ‘for lease’ market; 
      land leased by the exiting farm agent enters the ‘for lease’ market. 
 
o Non-Renewed Lease - Land enters the ‘for sale’ market. 
 
 
o No Buyer Found - Land failing to find a buyer in the ‘for sale’ market enters the ‘for 
                                              lease’ market. 
 
 
In order to participate in either of the land markets, an individual farm agent must meet certain eligibility 
requirements.  In this simulation, the requirements for purchasing land are more restrictive compared to the 
land lease market.  In order to purchase additional farm plots, a producer requires debt financing and must 
be deemed credit worthy.  Credit worthiness is tracked via a simplified credit scorecard.  Credit can only be 
obtained if the farm agent meets each of the following requirements: 
 
o Liquidity     Cash > ( Λ· K + Kxy · PL · Ω )            (4.16) 
o Solvency     Debt to Asset Ratio < 0.4: 1 (Olson 2004)       (4.17) 
o Repayment31       [ ] 1min >+
−⋅
DPLP
WDKPME                        (4.18) 
 
 
where Λ = minimum cash balance per acre  
 PL = mean price of land per crop acre (adjusted to reflect unitary soil productivity) 
 Ω = proportion of new investment equity financed (required down payment) 
  
 
                                                 
30 The iterative auction algorithm is based on the algorithm developed in Balmann (1997) 
31 Equation 4.18 is approximately equivalent to the formula ((gross revenue – cash expenses + inventory change – family labour + 
interest)/annual debt payment) (Olson 2004). 
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Liquidity refers to the ability of the farm to meet short term liabilities using short term assets.  The farm is 
financially vulnerable when the value of current liabilities exceeds the value of short term assets (Olson 
2004).  In the simulation, a farm agent is in a liquid financial position provided that their short term assets 
(cash value) are greater than their current liabilities, which include an allowance for covering the cash 
production costs for a single production period (Λ · K) and the expected cash outlay required for the 
purchase of an additional plot of land (Kxy · PL · Ω).  Second, an upper limit is placed on the total amount of 
debt.  Finally, the last constraint restricts credit to farm agents whose current debt and lease payments can 
be serviced based on current land rent expectations and minimum living deductions (see figure 4.7).  
Repayment capacity is concerned with the ability of a farm to generate an annual cash flow capable of 
covering the annual debt payment (principal + interest).   
 
Farm agents are also screened before participating in the land lease auction based on the first restriction on 
the credit scorecard, minus the cash down payment portion.  A second requirement restricts bidding to 
those farm agents whose expected land rent is positive.  
 
The next stage in both land allocation procedures requires all eligible farm agents to determine which 
available plot of land they have the greatest interest in managing.  The mechanism for determining the 
optimal plot of land available is identical for both land auctions, but the evaluated set of plots is different.  
Farm agents select land to bid on by computing the highest expected annual land rent (equation 4.19). 
                  
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
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xyxyxyxy KK
WDDTEEGovEQPMErentE +−⋅−+⋅=
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                                               (4.19)  
 
where rentxy  = rent value for of plotxy in subset A (available land)  
 Qxy   = soil productivity of plotxy 
 
 
Due to uncertainty that is present surrounding government transfer payments to western Canadian grain 
producers, the expected government transfer is assumed here to be zero32 (equation 4.20).  Note that while 
it is assumed that farm agents have no expectation of future government transfers, this does not rule out 
actual payments occurring. 
 
                                                 
32 While it is unlikely that future government transfer expectations are in fact zero, this assumption is a reasonable starting point.  
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Farm agents determine their individual land bid value based on expected annual rent and the value of the 
optimal plot at the end of the planning period (N).  The bid is formulated by capitalizing the expected land 
rents, adjusted by a risk aversion factor, as the present value of an ordinary annuity plus the present value 
of the expected land value at the end of the planning period (equation 4.21).  A risk averse farm agent (Φ < 
1) will discount the expected annual land rent, resulting in a lower bid than a risk neutral farm agent (Φ = 
1), all else equal.  
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where Bidxy = bid value (per acre)  of farm agent k on plotxy 
 rent*xy = return to land (per acre) of optimal plot in subset A 
 r = capitalization/interest rate 
 n = number of years (planning period) 
 VN = value of plotxy (per acre) at period N 
 
 
Future farmland values are inherently difficult to predict resulting in a significant level of asset risk for land 
purchasers.  Due to the importance of meeting annual cash flow requirements, the farm agent is assumed 
here to set their bid value at the minimum of equation 4.21 and the present value of expected annual cash 
flows over the planning period (leading to equation 4.22)   
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The land auctioneer agent determines successful bids in the land purchase market.  In addition, the land 
auctioneer agent adjusts all land bids to an equivalent set of bids with plots of mean soil productivity.  This 
adjustment allows the auctioneer to compare bids on land with varied soil productivity (equation 4.23). 
 
xyxyxy QBidBidAdjusted ÷=                           (4.23) 
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The land auctioneer sorts all current adjusted bid values and allocates the unit of land selected by the farm 
agent with the maximum adjusted bid value, provided the maximum bid is greater than a minimum value.  
The minimum bid for a single representative landlord agent is set as the weighted value of leasing out the 
land at the current mean lease rate and the mean value of current period purchase bids (equation 4.24).  The 
value to the landlord of leasing out farmland is evaluated using an income capitalization method (Olson 
2004).  
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛⋅⋅Ψ=
r
leaseBidBidMinimum           (4.24) 
 
where Ψ = risk aversion factor of representative non-farming agent 
 Bid¯¯¯  = mean bids in current land auction 
 lease¯¯¯¯  = mean annual lease payment for all plots currently leased 
 
  
As constructed, a risk neutral landlord agent (with Ψ = 1) would accept a bid that is equivalent to the 
expected return from leasing out the land at their current weighted land valuation.  A risk averse landlord 
agent (with Ψ < 1) would accept a land bid that was less than the expected return from leasing out the land. 
 
The final price paid by the successful farm agent in the land purchase auction does not correspond directly 
with their evaluated bid value.  Farm agents are assumed to adjust their bids based on the best available 
land market information available to them, namely the mean value of all current period land bids33.  Bids 
are adjusted to represent an equal weighting of the current periods mean land bid and the farm agent’s 
individual land valuation34 (equation 4.25). 
 
xyxyxy QBidBidprice ⋅⋅=            (4.25) 
 
where pricexy = final price paid for plotxy by purchasing/leasing farm agent 
 
 
 The down payment proportion of the land purchase is deducted directly from the farm agent’s cash 
account, while the balance is debt financed based on the same amortization period and interest rate utilized 
to calculate the bid. 
                                                 
33 The mean bid, is the same value for all participating farm agents and is only set during the first auction iteration and remains 
constant for the remainder of the current period.   
34 The bid adjustment is similar to Happe, Balmann and Kellermann (2004).  The mean bid is set separately for the purchase and lease 
auction, and is set only during the first iteration of the two auctions and remains constant, in the respective auctions, until the next 
model year.       
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The dynamics of the individual farm agents and the land auctioneer agent are illustrated below through a 
simple example with 3 farms and 2 available plots, with average soil productivity (figure 4.8). 
 
3-farm Land Auction Iteration # 1
Farmer Land Bid On E[RL*xy] Valuation Factor Bid a
Purchase Price 
c
1 B # 1 B $3.00/acre 0.90 $30.97 / acre $30.39/acre
3 # 2 A $2.90/acre 0.85 $28.27 / acre $29.03/acre
A # 3 B $3.10/acre 0.85 $30.22 / acre 30.02/acre
2 Minimum Bid:   $29.49/acre b
High Bid:   $30.97/acre (farmer # 1 on land B)
Outcome:   Farmer # 1 purchases land unit B for $30.39/acre
3-farm Land Auction Iteration # 2
Farmer Land Bid On E[RL*xy] Valuation Factor Bid a
Purchase Price 
c
1 # 1 A $2.75/acre 0.90 $28.38/acre $29.09/acre
3 # 2 A $2.90/acre 0.85 $28.27/acre $29.03/acre
A # 3 A $2.85/acre 0.85 $27.79/acre $28.79/acre
2 Minimum Bid:   $29.47/acre b
High Bid:   $28.38/acre (farmer # 1 on land A)
Outcome:   High bid rejected, Land A enters lease market 
a bid values based on r = 6%, n = 20 years
b Minimum bid base on mean lease rate = $1.75 / acre and Ψ = 1 (land seller is risk neutral)
c purchase price if bid is successful; based on an mean land bid $29.82/acre  
 Figure 4.8: 3-person, 2 available plots land auction  
 
In the example, note that in the second iteration of the land auction, farmer # 1 is the high bidder but is 
unsuccessful in purchasing land unit A due to the bid being less than the reservation price.  Due to 
utilization of this iterative auction algorithm, individual bids compete against all land bidders and not only 
against those bids on the same unit of land.   
 
Rental auction bid formation follows the same structure as the purchase price bid.  Farm agents are 
assumed to be willing to pay an annual lease rate equivalent to 80% of annual debt payment they would 
accept if they were bidding to purchase the same plot of land35.  The successful farm agent will be entered 
in a lease agreement at an annual lease rate equivalent to their bid value and for an upper-bound random 
lease period.  In the example, assuming that the three farmers represent all producers in the lease market, 
                                                 
35 Based on a 20 year planning horizon and a 6% discount (interest) rate the farm agent’s annual cash lease bid is equivalent to 
approximately 7% of their individual land valuation.  A reasonable cash lease for farmland is estimated at 6-8% of the land’s value 
plus the cost of property taxes which are ignored in the simulation (Guide to Farm Practice in Saskatchewan 1960). 
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and land unit A is the only unit of land available for lease, farmer # 1 would sign a lease agreement to rent 
the plot for an annual lease payment of $1.97/acre36. 
 
At the expiration of all land leases, the farm agent is assumed to attempt to retain control of the land by 
negotiating a new lease agreement.  The farm agent calculates a new rental bid for the appropriate plot of 
land utilizing current “rent” expectations.  If the new lease bid is accepted by the land owner, a new lease 
agreement is signed.  The landlord agent determines if a new lease bid is acceptable by comparing the lease 
offer, which is valued using an income capitalization method, to the expected value the land would 
generate in the land purchase market.  The new lease rate is deemed to be acceptable if: 
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The more risk averse the landlord agent is, the higher the minimum acceptable bid value.  The landlord 
agent will only continue to hold the risky land asset if the farm agent offers some premium over the 
landlord’s expected return from selling the risky asset.    
  
4.6.6 Non-Land Capital Investment 
 
Non-land capital investment by the farm agent concerns the purchase of farm machinery and facilities 
required for crop production.  In reality, individual farms have significant variability in the value of capital 
per acre of cultivated land.  Part of this variability can potentially be explained by 1) differences in their 
machinery lifecycle (replacement timing) and 2) differences in machinery replacement.  While controlling 
non-land capital investments is a key factor in financial success, in this model the process is simplified in 
order to keep the model computationally tractable.   
 
Since differences in capital levels are not central to the objective of the research, capital requirements are 
computed as a simple linear function of the total cultivated plots of the farm agent land base.  Thus all 
individual farm agents are assumed to require a fixed capital investment per plot of cultivated land.  
Investment in farm capital can be separated into two categories - replacement of existing capital and 
                                                 
36 
3
85.085.285.090.290.075.2
45.2
45.290.075.280.097.1$
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⋅⋅⋅=  
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investment in additional capital.  Replacement of existing capital stocks is discussed further in section 
4.6.1.3 and is covered by the assumptions made in the depreciation model.  New investment in non-land 
capital only occurs when the farm agent has expanded their land base either by purchasing or leasing 
additional land.  New non-land capital investment is equal to the fixed per plot non-land capital 
requirement multiplied by the total new cultivated plots acquired.  In turn, all new non-land capital 
expenditures are assumed to be financed with a 25% cash down payment and a 5 year amortization 
period37.  The net new non-land capital investment calculation of a farm agent is: 
 
NCI  = CR ·(C t - C t-1)                                                                                                       (4.27) 
 
where NCI = net investment in machinery and buildings of farm agent k 
 C = stock of machinery and buildings of farm agent k 
 
 
Non-land capital is assumed to be perfectly mobile, meaning that the full per plot non-land capital 
investment is recovered when the farm agent’s total acreage is reduced.  In the event of a net reduction in 
the farm agent’s land base, the net non-land capital investment is negative and the producer will receive a 
cash payment.   
 
4.7 Initializing the Model 
 
Thus far, this chapter has outlined and described the encoded model algorithms and assumptions while 
avoiding a discussion of the initial spatial and population profile and production data utilized in the 
simulations.  The following section contains a detailed summary of the initial profiles and production data.  
In order to initialize the model with a population of farm agents consistent with a 1960’s profile, farm 
agents are assigned a number of attributes based on available census and survey data.  The attributes 
include 1) age, 2) farm size, 3) tenure status, 4) finances, and 5) management.  The success of individual 
farms is partially dependent on the boom-bust cycle of gross crop returns.  As a result, crop yield and 
market price data are important considerations.  Due to the small level of production in the studied region 
relative to the world market, commodity prices are modelled as exogenous to the model and are equivalent 
to real de-trended values for the 1955-2000 crop years.  In addition, to remain consistent with the constant 
technology assumption, variable and fixed production costs and family living/management withdrawals are 
                                                 
37  The assumed loan terms are consistent with the maximum lending terms (75% of asset value and 10 year repayment period) for 
chattel offered by Farm Credit Corporation for the 1960 period (Guide to Farm Practice in Saskatchewan 1960). 
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based on real 1960 values.  In this manner, individual farm agent behaviour and actions play an important 
role in the evolution of the region.  Behavioural data is required in three primary areas, including 1) crop 
mix selection, 2) land valuation and 3) retirement and farm transfer.         
 
 4.7.1 Initial Farm Population Profile 
 
Delineating the demographic characteristics of the relevant farm population is a critical step in the 
simulation process because demographic characteristics are one of the key predictors of the future structure 
of industry (Foot 1996).  Further, the age composition of the initial farm population appears to be the best 
predictor of the number and timing of voluntary farm exits and the resulting transfer of farm assets (Gale 
2003).  Ultimately, an initial population with low farm equity will most likely result in tight credit markets, 
and this will have consequences for future land markets.      
 
 4.7.1.1 Operator Age and Farm Acreage  
 
The initial distribution of farm operators is classified by age and total acreage in table 4.1, and is based on 
data from the 1961 census of agriculture for the province of Saskatchewan.  The simulation is initialized 
with a farm population of 310 primary farm operators with a median age of 46 and an average farm size of 
approximately 4 plots (640 acres).   
 
Table 4.1: Initial Distribution of Farm Agents by Age and Plots Managed  
 
1 2 3 4  5-7  8-10  11-14  15-18  19 & over total
under 25 years 2 3 2 2 1 0 0 0 0 10
25-34 years 5 11 10 9 9 4 1 0 0 49
35-44 years 7 16 15 15 16 8 3 1 1 82
45-54 years 8 17 15 14 15 8 3 1 1 82
55-59 years 4 8 6 5 5 2 1 0 0 31
60-64 years 4 6 5 3 3 1 0 0 0 22
65-69 years 3 5 3 3 2 1 0 0 0 17
70 years and over 4 5 3 2 2 1 0 0 0 17
plots farmed (1 plot = 160 acres)
 
 
Source: Author based on Census of Canada: Agriculture: Saskatchewan (1961) 
 
 
While the distribution of age profile is approximately normal across the age groups, the age profile of the 
initial farm population is assumed to be uniformly distributed within the census age classifications.  A 
minimum operator age of 20 and a maximum age of 80 years are also assumed. 
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 4.7.1.2 Land Tenure 
 
The model is initialized with approximately 30% of all farm land under cash lease agreements.  This total 
corresponds to the proportion of Saskatchewan farm land under either a cash lease or crop share agreement 
as of 1960 (Statistics Canada).  Based on available census data, farm tenure is classified into three 
categories (table 4.2). 
 
Table 4.2: Initial Distribution of Farms by Tenure 
 
under 25 years 3.6% 1.1% 1.5% 0.9% 0.0% 3.2% 1.0% 1.3% 1.0% 0.0%
25-34 years 15.7% 5.4% 3.2% 6.9% 0.1% 15.8% 5.5% 3.2% 7.1% 0.0%
35-44 years 25.9% 11.2% 2.7% 11.8% 0.1% 26.5% 11.3% 2.9% 12.3% 0.0%
45-54 years 25.8% 13.7% 1.5% 10.5% 0.1% 26.5% 14.2% 1.6% 10.6% 0.0%
55-59 years 10.3% 6.6% 0.4% 3.3% 0.0% 10.0% 6.5% 0.3% 3.2% 0.0%
60-64 years 7.5% 5.1% 0.3% 2.1% 0.0% 7.1% 4.8% 0.3% 1.9% 0.0%
65-69 years 5.7% 4.0% 0.2% 1.4% 0.0% 5.5% 3.9% 0.3% 1.3% 0.0%
70 years and over 5.5% 4.3% 0.2% 1.0% 0.0% 5.5% 4.2% 0.3% 1.0% 0.0%
total 100.0% 51.5% 10.1% 38.0% 0.4% 100.0% 51.3% 10.3% 38.4% 0.0%
tenant owner / tenant
owner / 
tenant manager
Provincial Level (census) Rural Municipality Level (author)
manager all farms owner tenantall farms owner
 
 
Source: Census of Canada: Agriculture: Saskatchewan (1961) and author. 
 
 
A farm operator is classified as an owner if the operator owns all land used for crop production.  A farm 
operator is classified as a tenant if all land used for crop production is leased, with the exception of the 
farmstead 38.  A farm characterized by crop production on both leased and owned land is classified as an 
owner/tenant 39.        
 
 4.7.1.3 Assets and Debt 
 
The initial asset value of a farm agent is the sum total of the value of machinery and equipment, owned 
farm land and their residual cash account.  Machinery and equipment investment stocks are initialized at 
$15 per cultivated acre (see table 4.3) and remain at this level for the duration of the simulation.  Land with 
a soil productivity index of one is initially valued at $30 per acre (table 4.3).  The cash account is initialized 
as $15 per cultivated acre.       
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
38 The Census definition does not include the farmstead restriction. 
39 To be classified as an owner/tenant the farm operator must own land in addition to their farmstead. 
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Table 4.3: Value of Farm Assets 1960 
 
Census of Canada Farm Business Review Simulation Model
geographic region Saskatchewan Dark Brown Soil Zone Rural Municipality
Total $41.93 $58.25 $45.00
a includes the value of farm buildings
$30.00 
$15.93 $13.57 $15.00 Machinery & Equipment Investment (per cult.acre)
Land                                                        
(per cult. Acre) $26.00 $44.68
a
 
Sources: Census of Canada: Agriculture: Saskatchewan (1961).  Saskatchewan Agriculture: Farm Business Review 1961 
 
 
Mean farm indebtedness starts at approximately $3400 per farm operator, in accordance with survey results 
for the period 1960-64 for the province of Saskatchewan (Ragush 1966).  The total initial outstanding farm 
debt in the simulation of approximately $1.05M is allocated among the initial farm agents based on 
operator age and farm size attributes (table 4.4).  The farm agent’s ability to take on further debt is limited 
by credit restrictions which limit the amount of borrowed capital. 
 
Table 4.4: Farm Debt of Grain Farms by Age of Operator and Size in the Prairie Region of Saskatchewan 
 
under 34 years 17.0% 68.1% 12.8% 2.1%
34-49 years 37.2% 54.4% 5.1% 3.3%
50 years and over 55.3% 39.9% 2.4% 2.4%
medium size grain farms (480-600 acres) 42.2% 52.9% 2.0% 2.9%
large size grain farms (800-1400 acres) 47.4% 41.2% 7.2% 4.2%
n = 350 $20,000 and over
no         
debt
$1 -        
$9,999
$10,000 - 
$19,999
 
 
Source: Ragush 1966. 
 
 
4.7.1.4 Risk Attitude/Entrepreneurial Classification/Farm Goals  
 
Managerial attributes that dictate the farm manager’s behaviour in both land auctions and cropping 
decisions are modeled by the assignment of farm agents to one of four managerial classes and a 
corresponding risk aversion factor (table 4.5).  The risk aversion factor is thought to be an important 
parameter in the farm agent’s land bid valuation and crop mix selection decision40. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
40 Sensitivity analysis was conducted on risk aversion factor values and model results were found to not be significantly different even 
under assumptions of a 0.25 difference between the expanding and lifestyle farm risk aversion factors. 
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Table 4.5: Managerial Classification and Risk Aversion Factor 
expanding farm least risk averse 0.95
cautious expanding farm intermediate risk aversion 0.90
lifestyle farm most risk averse 0.85
exit and retirement farm includes all farm agents with age ≥ 55   0.85 a
a risk aversion factor used only in crop mix selection
risk aversion factor (Φ)descriptionManagerial Classification
 
Source: Author 
 
 
In reality, the exit and retirement phase generally begins relatively early, when the farm manager is in 
his/her early fifties (Keating & Munro 1989).  All farm agents here are moved into the Exit and Retirement 
phase when they reach the age of 55 and will remain in that managerial class for the rest of their farming 
career.  Due to uncertainty of the actual composition of managerial classes, a set of five alternative 
distributions are implemented at various times in the simulation runs (see Table 4.6). 
 
Table 4.6: Simulated Managerial Distributions  
expanding cautious expanding lifestyle
uniform 33.2% 33.2% 33.6%
normal 15.8% 68.4% 15.8%
skew 10.0% 30.0% 60.0%
all 1 100.0% 0.0% 0.0%
all 3 0.0% 0.0% 100.0%
proportion of all farmsscenario
 
Source: Author 
 
 
 4.7.2 Production Data 
 
Production data is required to generate annual cash flow for individual farm agents.  A separate yield and 
price value is required for each individual crop option for each year of the simulation.  Under the 
assumptions of the base scenario, production costs are estimated for the initial period only and are held 
constant throughout the duration of the simulation.  
 
           4.7.2.1 Crop Yields and Price 
 
Yield and price arrays for the crops included in the simulation are based on Saskatchewan Agriculture Food 
and Rural Revitalization data for the period 1955-2002, which have been adjusted to represent 1960 
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technology41 and purchasing power42.   As a direct result of these adjustments, the long term crop yield and 
real price trends are flat.  Crop prices are based on data at the provincial level, while yields are based on 
data for a representative rural municipality (RM)43 in the dark brown soil zone.  The yield and price data 
utilized within the simulation are presented in table 4.7. 
 
Table 4.7: Detrended Crop Yield and Price 1955-2002  
year yield (bu/acre) price ($/acre) yield (bu/acre) price ($/acre) yield (bu/acre) price ($/acre) yield (bu/acre) price ($/acre)
1955 23 1.42 37 0.64 30 0.90 12 2.80
1956 25 1.27 44 0.50 33 0.80 15 2.58
1957 18 1.28 36 0.49 24 0.76 6 2.52
1958 16 1.32 26 0.54 21 0.73 9 2.58
1959 12 1.30 30 0.62 25 0.74 6 3.06
1960 23 1.57 28 0.59 29 0.79 10 2.76
1961 8 1.66 13 0.64 12 1.05 5 3.37
1962 21 1.64 38 0.59 32 0.92 9 3.12
1963 27 1.76 56 0.55 40 0.95 14 2.98
1964 17 1.59 27 0.63 27 1.01 6 2.96
1965 23 1.67 45 0.68 37 1.02 13 2.75
1966 27 1.69 48 0.65 42 1.01 11 2.72
1967 16 1.54 26 0.62 23 0.81 7 2.97
1968 20 1.26 31 0.47 30 0.74 7 2.78
1969 26 1.21 52 0.49 37 0.64 10 2.46
1970 27 1.34 50 0.49 41 0.72 14 2.16
1971 27 1.25 54 0.48 46 0.19 12 2.17
1972 17 1.47 29 0.73 29 1.02 9 3.40
1973 21 3.15 55 1.09 43 1.82 11 6.66
1974 16 2.72 42 0.98 36 1.46 8 6.33
1975 17 2.18 37 0.86 27 1.42 6 4.26
1976 32 1.76 51 0.68 50 1.16 11 4.19
1977 27 1.46 50 0.51 40 0.86 14 2.96
1978 26 2.04 43 0.57 42 0.98 14 3.93
1979 18 2.28 27 0.69 27 1.18 8 3.89
1980 18 2.41 31 0.81 35 1.37 10 4.04
1981 27 2.06 42 0.69 42 1.15 11 3.62
1982 31 1.80 44 0.56 52 0.92 12 2.87
1983 29 1.79 46 0.61 39 1.00 12 3.31
1984 17 1.74 23 0.61 29 0.99 3 3.21
1985 24 1.44 35 0.54 38 0.88 9 2.83
1986 27 1.24 40 0.50 39 0.74 17 2.29
1987 27 1.29 51 0.59 46 0.73 16 2.47
1988 4 1.69 2 0.73 8 0.95 6 3.32
1989 13 1.48 15 0.51 14 0.89 3 3.21
1990 20 1.27 23 0.44 29 0.74 3 2.41
1991 25 1.24 52 0.49 22 0.77 9 2.22
1992 24 1.29 35 0.53 36 0.42 12 2.52
1993 20 1.30 62 0.52 48 0.73 20 2.61
1994 21 1.56 56 0.54 24 0.87 12 2.87
1995 18 1.79 50 0.67 36 1.08 9 3.01
1996 20 1.53 52 0.63 38 0.92 8 3.19
1997 19 1.49 18 0.63 29 0.91 10 3.25
1998 23 1.51 35 0.56 36 0.84 14 3.11
1999 27 1.60 47 0.54 35 0.87 12 2.75
2000 25 1.48 43 0.55 33 0.90 10 2.89
2001 9 1.60 24 0.74 15 0.98 5 3.23
2002 14 1.66 22 0.76 17 1.02 5 3.49
mean 21.3 1.66 38.4 0.62 33.3 0.94 9.9 3.20
trend valuea 0.190 -0.022 0.560 -0.001 0.312 -0.001 0.239 -0.049
a annual rate of inflation/deflation in crop yield/price
wheat oats barley flaxseed
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from Saskatchewan Agriculture, Food and Rural Revitalization (2004). 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
41 Crop yields were adjusted to remove yield inflation due to technological advancements.  Yield inflation was assumed to be constant 
over time, but varied between crops.  The effects of technology on crop prices were handled in a similar manner.    
42 Crop prices are evaluated in constant 1960 dollars based on Statistics Canada CPI data. 
43 Rural Municipality of  Wood Creek (#281) 
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 4.7.2.2 Variable Costs 
 
Variable costs include all cash production and transportation expenses.  Due to data availability, all 
production costs are assumed to be dependent on crop acreage, with no adjustment for realized crop 
production volume (i.e. the cost of producing a crop does not increase with yield).  In addition, the 
increased cost of farming plots at a greater distance from the farmstead is assumed to be captured through 
grain transportation costs alone44.  The cost of transporting grain produced on individual plots of farm land 
to the farmstead of the managing farm agent is based on a flat per tonne/mile charge of $0.1045.  As a result 
larger farms generally have a higher per acre transportation costs due to the need to farm land at a greater 
distance from the farmstead than small farms.    
 
Due to a lack of crop enterprise level data, whole farm data for the period 1961-1964 (see table 4.8) for the 
dark brown soil zone of Saskatchewan are utilized to estimate variable crop production costs for the four 
major field crops used in the model.    
 
Table 4.8: Whole Farm Data, Dark Brown Soil Zone, Saskatchewan, 1961-1964 
crop seeded fallow wheat oats barley flaxseed other total wheat oats barley flaxseed wheat oats barley flaxseed
1 1961 342 205 137 1091 112 234 0 979 2416 8 14 12 5 1.60 0.65 0.80 3.25 1948 2241
2 1961 635 345 290 5182 266 303 153 680 6584 8 14 12 5 1.60 0.65 0.80 3.25 1483 2689
3 1961 941 522 419 8368 662 510 1518 906 11964 8 14 12 5 1.60 0.65 0.80 3.25 3472 3269
4 1961 1210 654 556 9336 497 401 2347 973 13554 8 14 12 5 1.60 0.65 0.80 3.25 4209 3993
5 1961 1741 917 824 18043 142 374 2061 661 21281 8 14 12 5 1.60 0.65 0.80 3.25 7734 4562
6 1962 411 277 134 5875 1625 742 434 1370 10046 21 39 33 9 1.60 0.60 0.95 3.10 1881 2773
7 1962 610 328 282 7778 391 156 363 880 9568 21 39 33 9 1.60 0.60 0.95 3.10 2138 3212
8 1962 950 525 425 12296 703 614 663 1411 15687 21 39 33 9 1.60 0.60 0.95 3.10 4024 3780
9 1962 1225 671 554 22126 1109 674 1559 1748 27216 21 39 33 9 1.60 0.60 0.95 3.10 4387 4981
10 1962 1822 948 874 34496 252 1140 0 945 36833 21 39 33 9 1.60 0.60 0.95 3.10 7953 6384
11 1963 409 257 152 8415 995 360 1755 719 12244 28 58 41 15 1.65 0.55 0.90 2.95 2507 3254
12 1963 642 368 274 14987 1202 830 319 540 17878 28 58 41 15 1.65 0.55 0.90 2.95 2397 3564
13 1963 953 516 437 22607 899 1430 552 647 26135 28 58 41 15 1.65 0.55 0.90 2.95 4005 4179
14 1963 1231 714 517 28357 697 930 3027 2081 35092 28 58 41 15 1.65 0.55 0.90 2.95 5128 5180
15 1963 1938 1097 841 49723 478 1395 5918 536 58050 28 58 41 15 1.65 0.55 0.90 2.95 11146 7367
16 1964 385 242 143 4190 296 0 1262 1470 7218 18 29 28 7 1.60 0.55 0.90 2.95 2533 2815
17 1964 657 387 270 12307 395 81 76 632 13491 18 29 28 7 1.60 0.55 0.90 2.95 2794 3449
18 1964 940 509 431 12764 268 166 728 1735 15661 18 29 28 7 1.60 0.55 0.90 2.95 4769 3770
19 1964 1185 686 499 20519 145 577 1206 1922 24369 18 29 28 7 1.60 0.55 0.90 2.95 6080 4469
20 1964 2118 1167 951 35407 164 539 2734 543 39387 18 29 28 7 1.60 0.55 0.90 2.95 12159 6178
a Rural Municipality # 281
Labour (operator 
and family)
b crop production expenditure = cash operating expenditure - $5 x fallow acres
n
crop production 
expenditures 
(CPE) b
year
acres yield a (bushels/acre) price ($/bushel)gross revenue ($/acre)
 
Source: Farm Business Review (various years) and Saskatchewan Agriculture, Food and Rural Revitalization (2004; 2005) 
 
 
                                                 
44 The cost of transporting machinery between plots of land is assumed to be negligible. 
45 A study by John R. Meyer for the United states for the period 1952-55 estimated the long-run marginal cost of truck transportation 
to be 8.80¢ (USD) per ton-mile, or 9.70¢ per tonne-mile (Purdy 1972).  Glaeser and Kohlhase (2004) estimate the real cost of truck 
transportation remained constant at approximately 38¢ (in 2001 USD) per ton-mile, or 41.89¢ per tonne-mile.  In 1960 Canadian 
dollars (1 USD = 0.91 CDN), the cost of truck transportation is approximately equivalent to 7.25-10.66¢ per tonne-mile. 
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The variable production costs for the four individual crops are proportional to the weighted mean variable 
production cost per seeded acre, based on the values reported in table 4.9. 
 
ii RVCVC ˆ⋅=              (4.28) 
 
where VC¯¯  = estimated weighted mean variable production costs per seeded acre 1961-1964 
 Ri^   = estimated relative production cost of crop i 
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where CPE = crop production expenditures, 1961-1964 
 acresi = estimated acreage of crop i, 1961-1964 
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ˆˆ/                          (4.30) 
where Pi^   = estimated price of crop i, 1961-1964 
 Yi^   = estimated yield of crop I, 1961-1964 
 seeded = total seeded acres of all crops, 1961-1964 
 
 
Due to a lack of data, the relative variable production costs ( iRˆ ) for the individual crops were estimated 
based on crop enterprise data for the dark brown soil zone of Saskatchewan for the period 1994-200446 
(Table 4.9).   
 
Table 4.9: Estimated Crop Production Variable Costs (excluding non-family labour) 
     wheat $8.00
     oats $6.80
     barley $7.60
     flaxseed $8.40
     fallow $5.00
variable production cost (per 
acre)
a
a based on Saskatchewan Agriculture Food & Rural Revitalization crop planning guides dark brown soil 
zone (1994-2004).
1.00
0.85
0.95
1.05
iRˆ
 
Source: Author 
                                                 
46 It is assumed that technological development has been crop neutral and has not altered relative crop production expenditures among 
the four modeled cropping options. 
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The estimated variable production costs are reasonably close to the reported mean variable production cost 
of $7.50 per acre for fallow seeded crops (Guide to Farm Practice in Saskatchewan 1960).  And the annual 
cost of leaving a plot in fallow is estimated at $5.00/acre (Guide to Farm Practice in Saskatchewan 1960). 
 
In addition to the variable production costs per acre outlined in table 4.9, farm agents are faced with cost of 
hiring non-family labour and/or custom work.  The cost of non-family labour is assumed here to be 
characterized by a logistic growth function, with increasing per acre costs as farm acreage increases up to a 
maximum cost per acre at a minimum acreage threshold.  The logistic function was selected due to the 
reality that small farms are able to supply the majority of the required labour, while the non-family labour 
requirement increases drastically as the farm expands up to a size where the majority of labour is non-
family.  The per acre cost of non-family labour for an individual farm agent was estimated utilizing 
equation 4.31.  
 
Ke
W ⋅−⋅++= 009.0145001
8.003.0        (4.31) 
   R2 = 0.95 
 
The maximum cost of non-family labour is $0.83 per acre and is incurred by all farms that manage a total 
land base in excess of approximately 1800-1900 cultivated acres.  While it is recognized that non-family 
labour requirements are likely correlated with operator age47, data restrictions make it difficult to estimate 
such a relationship.  
 
 4.7.2.3 Fixed Costs and Debt Servicing 
 
Fixed costs include farm machinery and equipment replacement costs and land lease payments.  Due to the 
assumption that total machinery and equipment investment remain constant per cultivated acre, the annual 
machinery and equipment replacement charge is computed as $15 multiplied by the rate of economic 
depreciation.  The base scenario of chapter five assumes a fixed annual rate of economic depreciation of 
10%48.  The annual machinery and equipment replacement charge of $1.50 per cultivated acre is in line 
                                                 
47 The supply of family labour will decline as the farm agent ages due to both 1) offspring leaving the household and 2) the physical 
abilities of the agent declining over time. 
48 Based on a 10 year useful life, the salvage value is approximately 35% of the purchase price which is consistent with American 
Society of Agricultural Engineers estimates of 36% for farm tractors (ASEA 2003). 
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with actual depreciation expenditures estimates for the period (Saskatchewan Agriculture, various years).  
Annual lease payments are determined within the model through the land lease auction, with the exception 
of land under a lease agreement at the initial period.  Land leases are initialized with an annual lease 
payment of $2.25 per cultivated acre49 multiplied by the soil productivity index of the plot in question.  The 
initial cash lease payment is in line with a reasonable cash lease allowance of 6%-8% of the current land 
value (Guide to Farm Practice in Saskatchewan 1960). 
 
The annual debt servicing cost of individual farm agents is determined by their initial level of debt and any 
new debt acquired over the duration of the study period.  Farm agents are assumed to finance new land 
purchases with a 25% cash down payment, with a 20 year amortization period.  Interest is assumed to 
accrue at a rate of 6.0%50, compounded annually, on all outstanding principal balances.  
 
 4.7.2.4 Family/Managerial Withdrawal 
 
The family living and managerial deduction from farm revenue is based on data in Table 4.8 and was 
estimated as: 
 
    KGRWD ⋅+⋅+= 834.0068.01882  51                                                                              (4.32) 
   
   R2 = 0.98 
 
The family living and managerial deductions are characterized by an L-shaped cost curve; indicative of 
significant economies of scale.     
 
 4.7.3 Behavioural Data 
 
Setting agent behavioural parameters is one of the most important and challenging aspects of agent based 
models.  Within this framework, farm operator agents are assumed to make three primary types of 
managerial decisions: they select a crop mix, determine a value for farm land, and decide when to exit the 
industry. 
     
 
                                                 
49 $2.25 = $30.00 x 7.5%.  
50 7.5% (mean Bank of Canada rate 1960-2000) - 3.0% (inflation adjustment) + 1.5%  = 6.0% 
51 T-statistics available upon request. 
 
 
70
 4.7.3.1 Crop Mix  
 
Farm agents here are restricted to the production of four field crops, wheat52, oats, barley and flaxseed.  
These four field crops represent the major production options available to Saskatchewan grain producers 
located within the dark brown soil zone in the 1960’s (Table 4.10).  It should be noted that rapeseed 
(canola), which is now an important crop, was not recommended for production in the dark brown soil 
zone, due to its low drought tolerance (Guide to Farm Practice in Saskatchewan 1960).   
 
Table 4.10: Crop Acreages (percent of total), Saskatchewan, 1960-1964  
1960 40.6% 6.5% 6.3% 0.7% 3.1% 1.4% 41.4%
1961 42.2% 3.9% 4.8% 0.6% 2.5% 1.0% 45.0%
1962 43.8% 6.8% 4.1% 0.7% 1.0% 0.4% 43.1%
1963 44.8% 5.5% 4.8% 0.8% 1.3% 0.5% 42.2%
1964 48.0% 3.7% 3.5% 0.8% 1.3% 0.8% 42.0%
mean 43.9% 5.3% 4.7% 0.7% 1.8% 0.8% 42.7%
max 48.0% 6.8% 6.3% 0.8% 3.1% 1.4% 45.0%
min 40.6% 3.7% 3.5% 0.6% 1.0% 0.4% 41.4%
flaxseed rapeseed fallow
note: percentages are based on harvested acres of included field crops and fallow acres 
all wheat oats barley rye
 
Source: Saskatchewan Agriculture Food and Rural Revitalization (2004) 
 
 
Based on relative production acreages of the four primary field crops (see table 4.10), all farms in the 
simulation are assumed to determine their annual crop mix based on the following cropping constraints: 
 
o Fallow acres  = 0.40 x cultivated acreage 
o Wheat acres  ≤ 0.55 x cultivated acreage 
o Oat acre  ≤ 0.10 x cultivated acreage 
o Barley acres  ≤ 0.10 x cultivated acreage 
o Flaxseed acres  ≤ 0.05 x cultivated acreage 
 
 
 4.7.3.2 Land Valuation  
 
Interaction through the land auctions requires all farm agents to form individual valuations of available 
plots of agricultural land.  In turn a farm agent’s land valuation is dependent on two factors; the agent’s 
expectations of rent generated from a given plot of land, and their level of risk aversion.  A farm agent’s 
expectations are based on both their prior expectations and the most recent realized rent from land.  The 
                                                 
52 For simplicity all wheat (including spring, winter and durum) is classed as a single crop alternative. 
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farm agent is also assumed to place a greater weight on their prior expectations than their recent outcome (λ 
= 0.1).  As a result expectations cannot be significantly altered by a single time period of production.     
 
Agents with a greater level of risk aversion possess a greater risk discount value when bidding on 
additional plots of farm land.  A risk neutral agent would have a risk discount of zero and would value a 
plot of land based on its full expected return.  Risk averse agents have a positive discount value and their 
land rent expectations are weighted using a value less than one when valuing land (see table 4.11).                  
 
Table 4.11: Land Valuation and Management Classification 
 
Managerial Classification Risk Aversion Factor (Φ) 
expanding farm 0.95
cautious expanding farm 0.90
lifestyle farm 0.85
exit and retirement farm 0.00
landlord 1.00
a initial lease payment
$8.25
$2.25 a
Expected Production Margin
$8.25
$8.25
$8.25
 
 
Source: Author 
 
 
A farm agent that is part of the exit and -retirement manager class is assumed to no longer be interested in 
controlling additional land resources.  This corresponds to a full discount of their land rent expectations.  A 
farm agent in the exit and retirement managerial class will still attempt to renew land leases when the 
current agreements expire.  In turn, they will evaluate the current value of the plots based on their prior 
managerial classification and their corresponding risk aversion factor.  
 
 4.7.3.3 Retirement and Intergenerational Transfers 
 
Farm agents are assumed to be able to voluntarily exit the industry (for non-financial reasons) only after 
they have reached a minimum age of 55 years.  Prior to this point, all exits, either forced or voluntary, are 
restricted to be due to financial considerations.  Old-age retirements are modeled as a simple function of 
age and random chance.  The simulation is designed so that the probability of a farm agent retiring 
increases as the farm agent moves into a new age class (table 4.12).   
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Table 4.12: Net Exit of Farm Operators by Age Cohort (1961-1986) 
 
55-59 years 25% 6%
60-64 years 40% 10%
65-69 years 64% 18%
70 years & over 30% a
80 years 100% a
a author's estimate
5-years period Annual Probability of Exit
 
 
Source: Author’s calculations.  Census of Canada: Agriculture: Saskatchewan  
   
 
The net exit of farm operators within an age cohort is calculated as the net change in the number of farms in 
an age cohort over a five year period53 relative to the initial age cohort size (equation 4.34). 
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When a farm agent voluntarily exits from the industry, it is assumed that the farm will continue to be 
operated with the next generation54 taking over as the farm manager.  The new generation is in turn 
assumed to buyout the exiting generation by assuming all existing farm assets and debts and purchasing 
40%55 of the existing farm equity with additional debt financing. 
 
 4.7.4 Using the Model: Assessing the Impact of Farm Stabilization and Support Programs 
 
Government intervention, with goals of stabilizing and supporting the farm sector, has played a significant 
role in the evolution of farm structure in Canada.  Fulton et al. (1989) argue that without these farm 
programs the health of the prairie economy and farm sector would have been significantly worse since 
1985.  Beginning in the late 1950’s, and reaching its peak in the mid-1980s, significant transfer payments 
have come from federal and provincial governments to agricultural producers.  Over the duration of the 
period of study selected for simulation, a number of significant programs and payments to Saskatchewan 
                                                 
53i.e. farms in the 55-59 age cohort in the current time period will make up the 60-64 age cohort in five years.  
54 The model assumes a 30 year age gap between generations (i.e. if the retiring farm agent is 60 years old the new farm agent will 
have an initial age of 30 years. 
55 Due to the private and often complex nature of intra-family farm transfers, a crude estimate of the buyout rate had to be used.  Based 
on the survey data of Ragush (1966), the debt carried by the successor is on average approximately double that of the retiring farm 
agent.  A transfer price based on new debt financing of 40% of the equity capital (all existing debt is also assumed), and the injection 
of new equity capital equal to 25% of the total transfer price by the successor, results in the farm assets being transferred for 53-85¢ 
on the dollar.   After the transfer, the farms total debt is increased to a level that is 1.6–4.6 (0.4:1– 0.1:1 debt to asset ratio) times the 
pre-transfer debt level.    
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producers have occurred.  While not all transfers occurring over the 1960-200 period are included within 
this simulation, an effort was made to incorporate all the major programs and transfers in the base scenario 
of chapter five (see figure 4.9).    
 
1958 - Agricultural 
Stabilization Act introduced
2000
1991 - Farm Income 
Protection Act introduced
1998 - Agricultural Income 
Disaster Assistance
1986 - Special Canadian 
Grains Program I
1984 - Western Grain 
Stabilization Act amended
1976 - Western Grain 
Stabilization Act introduced
1958
1986 - Prairie Crop 
Drought Assistance 
Program
1987 - Special Canadian 
Grains Program II
1988 - Canadian Crop 
Drought Assistance 
Program
 
 
Figure 4.9: Agricultural Stabilization and Support Programs 1958-2000. 
 
  
 4.7.4.1 The Agricultural Stabilization Act 
In 1958 the federal government implemented the Agricultural Stabilization Act, and introduced the first 
significant program aimed at stabilizing the Canadian farm sector (Schmitz et al. 2002).  The program was 
designed with the primary objective of stabilizing the prices of specific farm commodities including those 
grains typically grown on the prairies.  Under the Agricultural Stabilization Act, farmers where guaranteed 
90 percent of a three-year moving-average commodity price.  In the event that the market price fell below 
the guaranteed price, farmers received a per-unit subsidy payment equivalent to the price deficiency 
(Schmitz at al. 2002).  Western grains were removed from the Agricultural Stabilization Act in 1976 with 
the introduction of the Western Grains Stabilization Act.        
 
 4.7.4.2 Western Grain Stabilization Act 
 
Unlike the Agricultural Stabilization Act, which focused on stabilizing commodity price, the Western 
Grains Stabilization Act (WGSA) aimed to stabilize the net cash flow from the major grain and oilseed 
crops on the Prairies (Fulton et al. 1989).  Individual producers voluntarily entered into the program, which 
was funded through both producer levies and government contributions.  Participating farmers contributed 
a percentage of their gross sales56 to the stabilization fund, an amount that was matched by the federal 
government in addition to a further contribution equivalent to 2 percent of gross sales (Fulton et al. 1989).  
                                                 
56 The producer levy ranged between 1 an 4 percent of gross sale depending on the balance of the stabilization fund (Fulton et al 
1989). 
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Payments to producers under the WGSA where triggered when net cash flow from the major grains grown 
in the Prairie region fell below 90 percent of the previous five-year average net cash flow (Fulton et al. 
1989).  In response to criticism directed at the program, Bill C-33 was passed to amend the WGSA.  The 
amendment was intended to make the program more responsive to crop production volume changes 
(Schmitz et al. 2002).  Under this program, when a payment was triggered, individual producers received a 
payout proportional to their contributions to the stabilization fund in the current and two previous program 
periods (Fulton et al. 1989). 
 
Within the simulation, all farm agents are assumed to be enrolled in the WGSA.  A farm agent’s net annual 
cash flow from the WGSA program is evaluated as the difference between program payments received and 
levy contributions to the stabilization fund (equation 4.35). 
 
WGSA
k
WGSA
k
WGSA
k LevyPaymentNCF −=             (4.35) 
 
where NCFkWGSA = net cash flow from WGSA to farm agent k 
 PaymentkWGSA = gross WGSA payment to farm agent k 
 LevykWGSA = total WGSA levy paid by farm agent k 
 
 
 k
WGSA
k GRLevy ⋅= 02.0                                (4.36) 
 
As a result of the program’s design, the payouts received by individual producers are based on the 
aggregate net cash flow of the entire region.  The total payout received within the region is based on the 
aggregate net cash flow of all farms (equation 4.37).  
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where PayoutWGSA = Total WGSA payments made to the aggregate region 
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where NGP  = net grain proceeds (all farms) in current production period 
 NGP¯¯¯    = 5-year moving average net grain proceeds 
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where NGPT  = net grain proceeds per tonne (all farms) in current production period 
 NGPT¯¯¯¯   = 5-year moving average net grain proceeds per tonne 
 tonnesk = total grain production (all crops) by volume of farm agent k 
 
 
Once the aggregate regional payment has been determined, it is allocated among all farm agents in direct 
proportion to their current and historic contributions to the stabilization fund through producer levies 
(equation 4.40). 
⎟⎟
⎟⎟
⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜⎜
⎜⎜
⎜
⎝
⎛
⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡⋅= ∑ ∑
∑
=
−
=
−
K
p
WGSA
ptk
p
WGSA
ptk
WGSAWGSA
k
Levy
Levy
PayoutPayment
2
0
)(
2
0
)(                                      (4.40)  
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 4.7.4.3 Special Canadian Grains and Drought Assistance Programs 
 
In 1986 the government of Canada paid out $1 billion to grain producers under the Special Canadian Grains 
Program (SCGP) to cushion the impact of the subsidy war between the United States and the European 
Economic Community (Agriculture Canada 1986a).  Additional payments were made in the subsequent 
crop year, bringing the total assistance to just over $2 billion (in nominal dollars).  Payments to individual 
producers were based on seeded acreages of eligible crops, regional yields, and assistance rates57.  The 
payment received by an individual farm agent in the model is the sum of acres seeded to eligible 
commodities multiplied by the subsidy rate (equation 4.41).  In addition, payments to individual producers 
are capped at $25,000 ($5,500 in 1960$). 
 
( )⎥⎦⎤⎢⎣⎡ ⋅= ∑=
4
1
,5500min
i
acre
ii
SCGP
k SubsAPayment                   (4.41)  
 
 
 where PaymentkSCGP = SCGP payment to farm agent k  
 Subsiacre = SCGP assistance rate per acre of crop i 
 
 
In the simulation, the assistance rates are set at: wheat $0.11, oats $0.04, barley $0.06 and flax $0.1158 for 
both crop periods (1986, 1987) covered by the program. 
 
In addition to the payments made under the Special Canadian Grains programs, prairie producers also 
received significant direct payments from the federal government for drought assistance (DAP) in 1986 and 
1988 (Agriculture Canada 1986b, 1988).  The payment received by individual farmers under these 
programs is evaluated as: 
 
∑
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i
acreDAP
k ASubsPayment                          (4.42) 
 
where PaymentkDAP = DAP to farm agent k 
 Subsacre = DAP assistance rate per seeded acre 
 
 
                                                 
57Commodity specific assistance rates are proportional to the relative price decline attributed to the subsidy war (Agriculture Canada 
1986a)  
58 Payouts in 1960$ based on reported rates of: wheat $0.48, oats $0.18, barley $0.06 and flax $0.50 (Agriculture Canada 1986a).   
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Under the Prairie Crop Drought Assistance Program, farmers in areas worst hit by drought conditions 
received $15 ($3.30 in 1960$) per seeded acre.  In 1988, prairie farmers received an additional $40 ($8.80 
in 1960$) under the Canadian Crop Drought Assistance Program. 
  
 4.7.4.4 Farm Income Protection Act 
 
As a result of a sharp decline in world grain prices in 1985 and the subsequent large payout, the WGSA 
program was in a significant deficit position and only offered farmers limited income support by the 
closing years of the 1980’s (Schmitz et al. 2002).  As a result new federal legislation, entitled the Farm 
Income Protection Act, was passed in 1991 to replace the WGSA.  In addition to crop insurance59, the Farm 
Income Protection Act encompassed two farm stabilization programs: the Gross Revenue Insurance Plan 
(GRIP) and the Net Income Stabilization Account (NISA) programs (Schmitz et al. 2002).   
The short lived GRIP provided farmers with revenue protection through guaranteed per-acre gross returns.  
Within 18 months of its implementation, the government of Saskatchewan significantly altered the program 
and by 1992 withdrew completely from GRIP (Schmitz et al. 2002).  Under the GRIP a farm agent’s net 
program annual cash flow is evaluated as: 
 
GRIP
k
GRIP
k
GRIP
k IndemPaymentNCF −=                          (4.43) 
 
where NCFkGRIP = net cash flow from GRIP to farm agent k 
 PaymentkGRIP = gross GRIP payment to farm agent k 
 IndemkGRIP = total GRIP indemnity paid by farm agent k 
 
 
GRIP payments and indemnity costs are calculated based on the long term average yields (LTAY) for the 
individual crops reported in table 4.7.  The guaranteed price under the GRIP was set as a 15-year indexed 
moving average price (IMAP), lagged by two crop production periods60.  Under the revised Saskatchewan 
GRIP, introduced for the 1991-92 crop production period, the payouts received and premiums paid by an 
individual producer were based on their risk area and its corresponding premium rate and per acre payment.  
Under the revised program the payouts and premiums were based on total seeded acres with no individual 
crop differentiation at the farm level.   
                                                 
59 While crop insurance programs may offer participating producer’s a significant source of income stabilization, due to the 
complexity of modelling the individual nature of coverage and premiums, it has been omitted from simulation.  Due to the historic 
levels of relatively low participation rates in the program, its omission is likely trivial. 
60 Under the GRIP program, individual IMAP were set for each of the eligible crops as an average from the previous fifteen years, 
lagged by two years, indexed by a farm input price index (Schmitz et al. 2002).  Due to the fixed variable costs assumption of the 
simulation, the simulation does not index the historic crop prices and uses a simple arithmetic mean price. 
 
 
78
 
  
([ )( ) ]
( )( )
⎟⎟
⎟⎟
⎟⎟
⎟⎟
⎟⎟
⎟⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜⎜
⎜⎜
⎜⎜
⎜⎜
⎜⎜
⎜⎜
⎝
⎛
⋅
−⋅⋅⋅
=
⋅⋅⋅−⋅=
=
∑∑∑
∑∑
∑
=
=
=
=
4
4
4
1
4
1
4
1
,1992
0,max,1991
i
iK
i
i
K
i
iiii
i
iiiii
GRIP
k
A
A
PIMAPQLTAYA
tif
QALTAYIMAPprodnPtif
Payment
                     (4.44)     
 
 
where prodni  = total production (volume) of crop i on land managed by farm agent k 
 IMAPi  = indexed moving average price of crop i 
 LTAYi  = long term average yield of crop i 
 
 
The farmer was responsible for one-third of the total GRIP premium, with the balance paid by the 
provincial and federal government (Schmitz et al. 2002).  The total indemnity costs are based on indemnity 
rates61 published by Agriculture Canada for the 1991-92 program year.  
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where Indem%i = indemnity rate of crop i 
 
 
The Net Income Stabilization Account (NISA) program was introduced along with GRIP in 1991, and 
unlike the latter, remained as the major stabilization program for many Canadian producers through the 
year 2001 (Schmitz et al. 2002).  The basic mechanism of the NISA program was the establishment of a 
government matched savings account from which producers where able to withdraw funds during period of 
decreased farm income.  Individual producers voluntarily joined the NISA program by opening up a NISA 
                                                 
61 Wheat 18.55%, Oats 11.26%, Barley 16.51% and Flaxseed 18.42% (Agriculture Canada 1992) 
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account (Fund 1) into which they had the ability to deposit up to 3%62 of their annual eligible net sales 
(Schmitz et al 2002).  In addition to the producer’s deposit, a matching deposit, a cost shared by the 
provincial and federal governments, was made into a separate account (Fund 2).  The balance of the 
combined NISA accounts was capped at three-times the three-year moving average eligible net sales.   
Producers earned a rate of interest equal to the rate on a short-term deposit63 on the combined balance, as 
well as an additional 3% on the balance of Fund 1.  For the purpose of the simulation, all farm agents are 
assumed to maximize their matching deposit by depositing a cash amount equivalent to 3% of their gross 
revenue into Fund 1. 
 
Under the program, producers were able to withdraw funds from their NISA account if farm income fell 
below 70 percent of the previous three year average64 (Schmitz et al. 2002).  When a withdrawal is 
triggered, the producer was able to withdraw funds65 to bring farm income up to the 70 percent of the three 
year average, provided their NISA account did not go into a deficit position.  In this model, the maximum 
annual withdrawal an individual farm agent can make from their NISA account is determined by their 
annual and historic farm income and combined NISA balance (equation 4.46). 
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where TWDNISA = maximum triggered withdrawal from NISA account for farm agent k 
 NI NISA  = net income for NISA program of farm agent k 
 NI¯¯ NISA  = 3-year moving average net income for NISA program of farm agent k 
 Fund 1 = balance of NISA fund 1 of farm agent k 
 Fund 2 = balance of NISA fund 2 of farm agent k 
As in reality, farm agents are able to manage their NISA accounts individually, and may not always 
withdrawal NISA funds up to the maximum allowable level.  All farm agents are assumed to manage their 
                                                 
62 The Saskatchewan NISA program falls under the enhanced NISA guidelines which allows for government matching deposits of 3% 
of eligible net sales versus the standard NISA maximum of 2%.  Individual producers were able to make addition deposits over and 
above the 3% level, but additional deposits were not matched by the government. 
63 For the purpose of the simulation, the short term rate has been set as one-half the interest rate charged on debt capital. 
64 In addition to this withdrawal trigger, a withdrawal is also triggered if farm net income falls below $10,000 (increased to $20,000 in 
1999) (Schmitz et al. 2002). 
65 Withdrawals must first be made from Fund 2 (government deposits), as withdrawals from this fund are taxable.  Due to the 
assumption of a tax-free region this separation is not significant, but has been included to aid in future model extensions.  
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NISA accounts using a simple rule based on meeting annual cash flow requirements.  Farm agents can only 
withdraw NISA funds when two conditions are met: 1) a withdrawal has been triggered and 2) annual net 
cash flow, prior to additional land investment, is negative.  The farm agent will withdraw funds up to the 
level where either net cash flow is zero, or the total triggered withdrawal is made (equation 4.47). 
[ ]NCFTWDWD NISANISA −= ,max                                      (4.47)  
 
where WDNISA  = actual withdrawal from NISA account of farm agent k 
 
 
 
 4.7.4.5 Agricultural Income Disaster Assistance 
 
In 1998 the federal government unveiled the Agricultural Income Disaster Assistance (AIDA) program, a 
new support program structured according to WTO guidelines (Schmitz et al. 2002).  AIDA remained in 
place until 2001 when it was replaced by the Canadian Farm Income Program (CFIP).  Producers became 
eligible for a payout from AIDA when their net income (not including depreciation) fell below 70 percent 
of their reference net income (Schmitz et al. 2002).  The farm agent’s payout here is calculated as 70 
percent of their three-year average net income less current net income (equation 4.48). 
⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −⋅= AIDAAIDAAIDAk NINIMaxPayment 7.0,0                                     (4.48) 
where PaymentkAIDA =  AIDA payment to farm agent k 
 NI¯¯ AIDA  = 3-year moving average net income for AIDA program of farm agent k 
 NI AIDA  = net income for AIDA program of farm agent k 
  
 
A farm agent’s net income is calculated for AIDA as their gross revenue (GR) less variable production 
costs (VC).  The farm agent’s reference net income is equivalent to the arithmetic mean of the farm agent’s 
net income from the previous three production periods.   
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4.8 Summary 
 
Regional structural change is dependent on not only the independent actions of individual farm households, 
but also the interaction of the same through land and product markets.  The application of agent based 
methods to study such changes is intuitively attractive, as it allows for the development of models that 
incorporate both the heterogeneity of the farm household, or decision making unit, and the inherent 
interactions that exist between individual farms.  In turn, the farm household is assumed to be engaged in 
the two related, but separate, activities of producing and marketing field crops and investing in agricultural 
assets.  It is the second activity, namely investment in farmland, which incorporates the interactions 
between individual farm households through the assignment of property rights and well-defined land 
markets.  
 
This regional model of farming activity is initialized with a base scenario representative of the 1960-2000 
time period.  Farm agents are endowed with a number of attributes including 1) age, 2) farm size, 3) tenure, 
4) finance and 5) management, based on available census and survey data.  Production costs correspond 
with 1960 cost levels and are held constant throughout the model duration.  In addition, real commodity 
prices and yields are de-trended to a 1960 base period to adjust for constant production technology and 
practices.  Finally, transfer payments from the federal and provincial government beginning in the late 
1950’s, and reaching a peak in the mid-1980’s have played a prominent role in the annual cash flow of 
many farm households.  In order to replicate and assess the impact of government intervention into the 
farming sector, the most significant farm stabilization and support programs are modelled as part of the 
base simulation framework. 
 
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
82
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER FIVE 
 
 DISCUSSION OF RESULTS 
 
 
 
5.0 Introduction 
 
A profile of 310 farms is initialized to represent a proto-typical RM in the dark brown soil zone of 
Saskatchewan.  The profile contains the following structural farm characteristics: 1) age, 2) farm size, 3) 
tenure, 4) finance and 5) management.  Farm costs and returns are set up to represent those of the 1960 
time period.  This agent based model simulates farm expansion and contraction in the region through 
farmland ownership and leasing markets.  The model starts in the year 1960 and runs to the year 2000; each 
scenario is replicated 200 times to achieve statistically useful results.  In addition to the base scenarios 
described earlier, zero government transfer scenarios are also simulated.  The first set of scenarios test the 
sensitivity of the final structural predictions to initial assumptions as to the distribution of varied 
managerial classes.  The second set of counterfactual scenarios examines the impact of removing 
government programs on structural change in the region.  The simulation environment was implemented 
using NetLogo © version 2.1 on a Windows XP platform66.  
 
 The model results reported illustrate a limited number of structural characteristics of the study region 
including: 1) the number of farm units, 2) mean farm size, 3) the distribution of farm size, 4) land values, 5) 
proportion of farm land leased from non farming owners, and 6) farm debt.  The results presented in this 
chapter provide evidence of the ability of agent-based models to generate patterns and trends that closely 
mirror the historic structural evolution of a Saskatchewan region dominated by crop production agriculture.  
Model validity has been tested through direct comparison to available census and survey data.  While 
model validation of results is important when dealing with “proof of concept” issues, it also allows the 
researcher to draw conclusions from the model that can be used to improve understanding of the system of 
                                                 
66 A copy of the NetLogo © source code is included in Appendix C  
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study.  To move beyond the scope of simply validating model results based on direct comparisons to actual 
data, a number of the drivers of structural changed discussed in chapter two are revisited and discussed in 
the context of the simulation results.       
 
5.1 Simulation Results: Base Scenario 
Under the base scenario, the model is executed as outlined in chapter 4.  Two hundred replications are 
simulated for each of the 5 managerial distributions outlined in table 4.6.  The base scenario results are 
evaluated based on their ability to mirror historic structural adjustments over the study period of 1960-
2000.    
 
 5.1.1 Number and Mean Size of Farms 
The trend towards fewer and larger farm units has a number of important implications for agricultural 
policy.  As farm production becomes more consolidated, the aggregate response of the sector may also shift 
in a significant manner.  The simulated consolidation of farm land among a declining number of farm 
agents are compared to actual farm numbers and mean farm size data (figures 5.1 and 5.2). 
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Figure 5.1: Simulation Results (base scenario) - Number of Farm Agents  
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Figure 5.2: Simulation Results (base scenario) - Mean Farm Size (cultivated acres) 
 
 
Over the simulated period, the number of farms decreased at an annualized rate between 1.59 - 1.72%, as 
compared to an actual rate of 1.53%.  The corresponding mean farm size increased at an annualized rate of 
between 1.61 - 1.76%, as compared to an actual rate of 1.58%.  While the model closely approximates 
overall trends, a more interesting comparison occurs with respect to sub-periods.  There are five distinct 
periods of simulated farm numbers and mean size observations: 1960-1970, 1970-1972, 1972-1992, 1992-
1997 and 1997-2000.  Prior to 1970, the model under-estimates the rate of consolidation with an annualized 
decline in farm numbers ranging from 0.38 - 0.86% (1.97% actual) and the rate of growth in farm size 
ranging from 0.38 - 0.88% (2.11% actual).  During the 1970-72 period, the simulation makes an over 
adjustment resulting in a two period annual rate of decline of farms of 9.64 - 11.26% (1.39% actual) and a 
growth of 10.61 - 12.70% (1.78% actual) in mean farm size.  For the combined 1960-1972 period, the 
model results estimate a 2.25 - 2.39% (1.88% actual) annual decline in farm numbers and a 2.39 - 2.45% 
(2.05% actual) increase in farm size.  For the period of 1972-1992, the number of farms is relatively 
constant with an estimated annual rate of decline between 0.06 - 0.09% (1.15% actual) and annual growth 
in farm size of 0.06 - 0.16% (1.16% actual).  The simulated period 1992-2000 is characterised by an annual 
decline in farms of 4.12 - 4.88% (1.96% actual) and an annual increase in farm size of 4.31 - 5.14% (1.77% 
actual).  Like the previous time period, this latter period is characterized by rapid consolidation followed by 
a period of relatively little restructuring.  The number of farms declined rapidly during the period 1992-
1997 with an annual rate of decline between 5.89 - 7.20% (1.77% actual) and a corresponding increase in 
mean farm size of 6.28 - 7.80% (1.53% actual).  The rate of decline slows significantly for all managerial 
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classification distributions evaluated for the final period (1997-2000).  The annual rate of farm decline is 
estimated at 0.76 - 1.09% (2.34% actual) and growth in mean farm size is estimated at 0.77 - 1.09% (2.18% 
actual).  And all five distributions of managerial characteristics tested returned results that closely replicate 
the actual decline in farm operators (figure 5.1) and increase in farm size (figure 5.2) over the study period.   
 
 5.1.2 Distribution of Farm Size 
The changing distribution of farm size is of greater importance than summary characteristics such as mean 
farm size.  Over the course of the period under study, the relative amount of farms smaller than 400 acres 
remained relatively constant, ranging from a high of 35% of all farms in 1960 (Census of Canada: 
Agriculture: Saskatchewan 1961) to 29% in 2000 (Census of Canada: Agriculture: Saskatchewan 2001).  In 
direct contrast, the proportion of farms occupying the largest size class (≥ 2880 acres) has increased 
significantly from 1% in 1960 to 9% of all farms in 2000.  Over this same period, the distribution of farm 
size has flattened compared to the situation in 1960, where 87% of all farms operated less than 1120 acres.  
By 2000 this had fallen to only 60%.   
 
After a simulation period of 10 years, the proportion of farms operating less than 400 acres is over 
estimated by the model at 49 - 51% of all farms (27% actual) under all the assumed initial distributions of 
the managerial types (see table 4.6).  While not as well defined as in the actual distribution, a small bulge in 
the distribution begins to emerge in the simulated 760-1119 acre size class (see figure 5.3).           
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Figure 5.3: Simulation Results (base scenario) - Distribution of Farm Size (year 10) 
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After 20 years, while the simulation still over represents the less than 400 acre size class, the results appear 
to be converging closer to census data.  Here 38 - 39% (figure 5.4) of all farms are contained in this size 
class (26% actual).  In addition, the bulge of farms in the 760-1119 acres class continues to become more 
prevalent and accounts for 14 - 16% of all farms (20% actual).  The model results also over estimate the 
proportion of farms in the 2880 acres and over class at 4% of all farms (3% actual).   
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Figure 5.4: Simulation Results (base scenario) - Distribution of Farm Size (year 20) 
 
 
The number of farms operating farms less than 760 acres are over estimated after 30 years, and farms of 
size 1120 - 2879 acres are under estimated, while farms of a size 2880 acres and over are over represented 
in the simulation (see figure 5.5).  The small bulge of farms in the 760 - 1119 acre class continues to show 
representing 14 - 16% of all farms (19% actual).   
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Figure 5.5: Simulation Results (base scenario) - Distribution of Farm Size (year 30) 
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After 40 years (figure 5.6), corresponding to the end of the time period studied, the proportion of farms 
occupying the less than 400 acre class has adjusted to a level (20 - 22% of all farms) that under estimates 
the census data observation for the period (29%).  The model results for all five managerial distributions 
estimate the proportion of farms managing a land holding of 400-1119 cultivated acres at 53 - 55% (31% 
actual) of all farms.  The proportion of farms managing 1120-2879 acres is estimated to be 18-19% (31% 
actual) of all farms.         
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Figure 5.6: Simulation Results (base scenario) - Distribution of Farm Size (year 40) 
 
 
The result shown here show that in spite of the inherent limitations within the simulation environment, the 
model closely replicates the dynamic distribution of farm size actually observed during the relevant 
timeframe67.  This gives confidence that the assumptions made to conduct this simulation are a 
parsimonious, yet robust, characterization of individual level behaviour in Saskatchewan agriculture 
.    
 5.1.3 The Land Market 
Farmers interact in this agent based environment and land is allocated among individual farm operators and 
absentee land owners through direct competition in land market auctions.  This interaction and the bidding 
behaviour of agents results in varying value for farmland and the proportion of farmland owned by non-
farming individuals.  All farmland values reported here are listed in constant 1960s dollars. 
 
                                                 
67 The simulated distributions were tested against the actual distribution using a non-parametric Kruskal-Wallis test statistic with K-1 
degrees of freedom.  The null hypothesis, that all of the all of the tested distributions are equivalent, could not be reject with a critical 
region of 0.05 for years 10 and 40 and a critical region of 0.01 for years 20 and 30.   
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Farmland prices fluctuated significantly from a low of $26 in 1960 to a high of $120 in 1981 (see figure 
5.7).  The model correctly replicates the trend of increasing farmland values from 1960 through 1968, with 
a total growth in farmland value of $16.84 - 25.27 per acre ($28.46 actual).  With the exception of an 
increase in 1970, the model also correctly replicates the trend of decreasing farmland values over the 1968-
1972 period, with land values decreasing by $5.07 - 6.56 per acre ($11.96 actual).  From 1972 through 
1981, farmland values increased at a rapid rate, resulting in a $78 per acre increase in a nine year period 
(Saskatchewan Agriculture, Food and Rural Revitalization 2004).  While the model does capture this rapid 
increase in farmland value, the simulated peak lags by four years the actual peak.  As well, simulated 
farmland values increased by $42.81 - 50.15 per acre over a 13 year period, an amount somewhat less than 
reality.  This actual rapid growth in farmland values was followed by a period of rapidly declining farmland 
values compared to their peak in 1981 through to 1993.  Over this period farmland values declined by $75 
per acre, thereby returning farmland values to their earlier levels.  The simulation replicates this rapid 
decline in farmland values, again lagged by four years, with farmland values falling by $31.47 - 49.05 per 
acre through 1998.              
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Figure 5.7: Simulation Results (base scenario) - Land Value per Cultivated Acre 
 
 
All replications are initiated with less leased farmland (27.6%) relative to the actual proportion of farmland 
under a cash or crop share lease agreement (32%) at the provincial level in Saskatchewan.  Throughout all 
simulations, the level of leased farmland remains below the proportion observed in the census of 
agriculture (figure 5.8).  As a result, the absolute level of leased land can not be directly compared.  The 
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change from one census year to the next (5 year intervals) is of greater importance in evaluating the 
model’s ability to capture historic shifts.   
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Figure 5.8: Simulation Results (base scenario) - Proportion of Land under Lease Agreement 
 
 
Under all initial distributions of the managerial types, the model correctly replicates the trend in the 
proportion of farmland leased from 1960 to 1965.  However, it over estimates the actual reduction in leased 
land -leased land is estimated to decline by 9.01 - 9.32% compared to an actual reduction of only 4.5%.  
From 1965 to 1970, the actual level of leased farmland increased by 1.5% as compared to a simulated 
change in leased land between -0.25 - 1.02%.  Only the “all 3” distribution of managerial attributes 
replicated the increase in leased land during the period.  During the period 1970-1975, the simulated 
proportion of leased land increased by 3.86 - 4.72% as compared to an actual increase of 2.0%.  In the 
subsequent 1975-1990 period, simulated land tenure is relatively stable (leased land increasing by only 0.01 
- 0.03%), in sharp contrast to actual increases of 8.54%.  The rapid growth in leased farmland (5.90%) that 
occurred between 1980 and 1985 does not show up in any of the simulations until the period 1990-1995, 
when the proportion of leased land increases by 6.12 - 7.48%.  The trend of an increasing level of leased 
farm land continues for the final 1995-2000 period with the proportion of leased farm land increasing by an 
additional 4.50 - 5.83%.   
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 5.1.4 Farm Debt 
The level of farm debt is an important factor in the financial health of the farm sector.  A significant 
proportion of a farm’s revenue must be used to service debt principal and interest payments.  From 1970 to 
1985, actual total farm debt more than doubled, from $10.32 to $22.06 per acre (Saskatchewan Agriculture, 
Food and Rural Revitalization 2004).       
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Figure 5.9: Simulation Results (base scenario) - Farm Debt per Cultivated Acre 
 
 
Under all initial distributions of the managerial types, the model correctly replicates the trend of increasing 
total farm debt from 1970 to 1985, with simulated total farm debt increasing from $8.65 - 9.68 to $25.17 - 
27.44.  In contrast, the actual reduction in farm debt to $12.79 per acre by 1990 is not replicated by any of 
the simulations; in fact simulated farm debt continues to grow during this period reaching a peak of $29.14 
- 31.60 per acre.  Simulated farm debt declines from 1990 to 1995, but remains substantially above the 
actual observed levels (see figure 5.9).  The actual increase in farm debt that occurred between 1995 and 
2000 (2.03%) is replicated by all simulations with farm debt increasing by 1.50 - 2.24% over the same 
period.  However, farm debt is estimated by simulation to be approximately double the actual level (see 
figure 5.9).   
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 5.1.5 Farm Exits 
One of the outcomes from the consolidation of farm production on a declining number of farms is the 
exodus of farm families.  Policy makers need to concern themselves with the distribution effects of 
structural adjustments and the varied impacts these shifts have on the farm population.  The agent based 
results generated shed light on a number of these distributional issues with regard to the characteristics of 
farm closure over the duration of the period studied.  
 
Policy makers concerned with the rate of decline in farm numbers need to understand the reasons 
individual farm operations cease production.  In the simulation, the significant majority (97.7%) of all 
farms that ceased operating did so due to a prolonged period of equity erosion and cash flow short fall.  
Only a small proportion of farms exited when the current manager retired (0.3%).  While intuitively 
correct, this result suggests that the intergenerational farm transfer algorithm incorporated into the model 
needs to be developed and extended in further research.      
 
Table 5.1: Simulation Results (Base Scenario) - Farm Exits by Exit Type 
a farms transferred to a new generation are not counted as exits
exit type
mean percentage of all 
exits 97.7% 2.0% 0.3%
Equity Erosion 
(eq 4.12)
Insolvency      
(eq 4.11)
Old-Age 
Retirementa
 
 
One of the more interesting results that emerges from the simulations concerns the farm agent’s managerial 
attribute and the probability of an individual farm discontinuing production over the course of the period 
studied.  A farm agent in the Lifestyle managerial class is 2.6% more likely to exit when compared to an 
Expanding farm agent (table 5.2).     
 
Table 5.2: Simulation Results (Base Scenario) - Farm Exits by Managerial Class 
 
 
a probability of farm exit = exits / initial number of farms
managerial class
48.7%
Lifestyle Cautious Expanding Expanding All 
probability of farm exita 49.0% 48.6% 46.4%
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Balmann (1997) argued that the success of an individual farm depends, at least partially, on their initial 
state.  These results add some support to this statement by examining the initial endowment of agricultural 
land among farms.  While the average farm was initialized with approximately 4 (640 total acres) plots of 
farm land, farms that ceased operation during the period of study possessed, on average, an initial 
endowment of just over 2 plots (table 5.3).     
 
Table 5.3: Simulation Results (Base Scenario) - Farm Exits and Initial Farm Attributes 
 
 
farm size (cult. acres)
debt (per cult. acre)
a Farms that discontinue farm operations during the simulation period
Exit Farmsa All Farms
357 627
initial farm characteristic
5.50 5.45
 
 
 
Farm agents initialized with less than average land holdings are at a significant bidding disadvantage as 
compared to farms operating on a larger scale, due to the need to generate greater cash flow per acre to 
cover fixed family living costs (see equation 4.32).  This results in a disproportionate number of small 
farms exiting during prolonged periods of tightening production margins (table 5.4). 
 
 
Table 5.4: Simulation Results (Base Scenario) - Farm Exits by Farm Size 
 
 
less than 400
400-559
560-759
760-1119
1120-1599
1600-2239
2240-2879
2880 and over 0.04%
0.13%
0.09%
0.02%
0.02%
Farm Size                     
(cult. acres)
1.88%
89.92%
7.80%
mean percentage               
of all exits
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5.2 Simulation Results: Zero Transfer Scenario 
 
Building on the results obtained from the base scenario, the model is then utilized to estimate the net impact 
of the historic package of agricultural stabilization programs and payments made over the study period 
(figure 5.10).  Simulations are re-estimated assuming zero transfer payments to farm agents, for each of the 
five managerial distributions.  These results and are compared to the base scenario in the next sections.     
-500
0
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40
year
to
ta
l n
et
 tr
an
sf
er
 p
ay
m
en
ts
 (t
ho
us
an
d 
do
lla
rs
)
 
Figure 5.10: Simulation Results (base scenario) - Net Aggregate Stabilization Transfers   
 
 
The zero transfer scenario simulates the structural evolution of the idealized study region in the absence of 
any government intervention through stabilization programs and ad-hoc stabilization payments. 
 
 5.2.1 Number and Mean Size of Farms 
 
With regards to the number of farm agents populating the study region and government transfer payments, 
two critical time periods are identified: 1960-1987 and 1987-2000 (year 0-27 and 27-40).  Prior to the year 
1987, there is no significant difference between the number of farm agents in either the base or zero 
transfer scenarios (figure 5.11).      
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Figure 5.11: Simulation Results (zero transfer scenario) - Number of Farm Agents  
 
 
While the 1960-1987 period does not exhibit any significant difference in the rate of farm decline over the 
base scenario, in contrast the 1987-2000 period is characterized by a significant increase in the rate of farm 
consolidation.  By the end of the simulated time period, the number of farms declined to a level of 64 - 68% 
of the base scenario results (figure 5.11).  Both the base and zero transfer scenarios exhibit a period of rapid 
farm consolidation after 1987.  Under the zero transfer assumption, the number of farm agents in the region 
undergoes a period of rapid decline from 1987-1993, with an annualized rate of decline of 11.02 - 12.80%.  
This period of decline is followed by a period of moderate decline (1.15 - 1.51% annual drop for the period 
1987-2000).  In contrast, the base scenario exhibits a period of rapid decline (mean annual rate of 6.78%) 
from 1992-1997 which is preceded and followed by periods of relatively constant farm numbers.   
 
The growth rate in farm size is inversely related to the fall in farm numbers.  As a result the rate of change 
in mean farm size in the simulations is observed to be approximately proportional to the rate of decline in 
farm numbers.  Like the observed trends obtained concerning farm numbers in the simulations, the rate of 
growth in mean farm size is not observed to be significantly different from the base scenario prior to 1987.  
In addition, the delayed period of farm decline found in the base scenario compared to the zero transfer 
scenario is mirrored by the varied periods of rapid growth in farm size.   
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 5.2.2 Distribution of Farm Size 
 
The distribution of farms by size (cultivated acres) is not found to be significantly different from the base 
scenario results for two initial observation periods (year 10 and 20).  It is only by the third observation 
period (year 30) that the distribution of farm size diverges from the base scenario results68 (figure 5.12).    
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Figure 5.12: Simulation Results (zero transfer scenario) - Distribution of Farm Size (year 30)  
 
 
Under the zero transfer scenario, the number of farms managing less than 400 cultivated acres is 
considerably less after thirty years, accounting for 24.16 - 26.10% of all farms (vs. 38.80% in the mean 
base scenario).  As a result of significant reductions in the smallest size class, all other classes are estimated 
to account for a greater proportion of farms over the base scenario.  Farms managing 400-1119 cultivated 
acres make up 51.47 - 53.50% of all farms (vs. 44.02% in the mean base scenario) while those managing 
1120-2879 acres account for 15.56 - 16.79% (vs. 13.11% in the mean base scenario).  Farms in the largest 
size class are also estimated to account for a greater proportion of farms at 5.36 - 6.05% (vs. 4.07% in the 
mean base scenario).      
 
By the end of the zero transfer simulation (year 40) the distribution of farms by cultivated acres converges 
back to the distribution generated in the base scenario (figure 5.13).  Farms in the largest size class (2880 
acres and over) comprise a greater proportion of farms (8.24 - 9.00%) compared to the base scenario 
(6.68%).  With a single exception69, the proportions of farms in all other size classes are, on average, only 
marginally less than their base scenario values. 
                                                 
68 Note that it is only after year 27 (1987), when the decline in farm agents increases over the base scenario results.   
69  Farms in the 400-559 acres class account for 13.84 - 14.76% of all farms (13.77% mean base scenario).  The values for all other 
classes are(mean base scenario in parentheses): less than 400 acres; 19.93 - 20.59% (20.80), 560-759 acres; 17.13 - 18.06 (17.96), 
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Figure 5.13: Simulation Results (zero transfer scenario) - Distribution of Farm Size (year 40) 
 
 
 5.2.3 The Land Market 
 
The effects on the land markets of the package of stabilization programs and ad-hoc payments are 
measured by comparing farmland values and the proportion of land under a lease agreement for both the 
base and zero transfer scenarios.  The effect of government transfers on farmland values are reported as 
either a premium or discount over the base scenario values based on mean values over five year periods 
(figure 5.14).  Prior to the 1986-1990 (year 26-30), government transfers do not result in either a significant 
premium or discount in the farmland market.      
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Figure 5.14: Simulation Results (zero transfer scenario) - Net Transfer Payments and Land Premiums 
 
 
Over the 1986-1990 period, farmland values are estimated to be at a $0.27 - $0.65 per cultivated acre 
premium over the base scenario values.  Farmland continues to be valued at a premium ($1.70 - $3.30) over 
                                                                                                                                                 
760-1119 acres;  21.19-22.43% (22.06%), 1120-1599 acres; 11.10-12.29% (12.18%), 1600-2239 acres; 4.61-4.95% (5.15%), 2240-
2879 acres; 0.97-1.35% (1.42%). 
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the base scenario during the 1991-1995 (year 31-35).  During the final five year time period (year 36-40) 
land values are on average discounted over the base scenario by between $1.62 - $1.66 per cultivated acre. 
 
Like the other structural characteristics, land tenure under zero transfer does not show significant 
divergence from the base scenario prior to year 27 (figure 5.15).  Under zero transfer, the proportion of 
farmland under a lease agreement increases both earlier and more rapidly than the base scenario.    
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Figure 5.15: Simulation Results (zero transfers scenario) - Proportion of Land under Lease Agreement 
 
 
Over the 1987-1991 (year 27-31) period, the proportion of farm land under lease agreement increases at an 
annualized rate of 7.26 - 10.55% (vs. 0.12% in the mean base scenario).  Under the base scenario, the 
number of lease agreements increases rapidly at a mean annual rate of 7.41%, but this is substantially less 
than the 20.43 - 23.60% annual growth estimated within the zero transfer scenario.  Unlike the base case 
(3.79% mean) the prevalence of lease agreements increases only marginally (0.16 - 0.23%) for the duration 
of the simulation. 
 
 5.2.4 Farm Debt 
 
As might be expected, the level of farm debt per acre does not show any significant variation from the base 
scenario prior to 1987 (figure 5.16).  Under the zero transfer scenario, farm debt per acre does not reach the 
same peak level ($31.27 mean in 1991) as the base scenario and is estimated to $3.91 - $4.64 per acre less 
in 1990 (iteration 30).  Farm debt per acre remains less than the base scenario after year 35 ($4.54 - $5.47 
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per acre), but converges to the base scenario level after year 40, with debt levels only marginally less per 
acre ($0.32 - $1.68).  
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Figure 5.16: Simulation Results (zero transfers scenario) - Farm Debt per Cultivated Acre 
 
 
5.3 Model Drivers and Structural Change 
 
The forces driving structural adjustment in the farm sector have generated significant debate and research 
within the field of agricultural and regional economics.  While a significant amount of time and effort has 
been exerted on understanding the drivers of structural change, no general consensus has been achieved and 
a strikingly varied number of explanations and policy recommendations exist.  A number of the driving 
forces of structural change outlined in chapter two are revisited next and briefly discussed within the 
context of the simulation framework.  The drivers on which I will focus include 1) entrepreneurial 
behaviour and farm household expectations, 2) cost of production and productive efficiency, 3) path 
dependency and the farm life-cycle and 4) government transfers.   
 
 5.3.1 Entrepreneurial Behaviour and Farm Household Expectations 
 
Underlying differences between farm household management strategies and styles has been suggested as a 
potential driver of structural change.  It seems that the fundamental and intrinsic difference between 
management styles could have a measurable impact on the behaviour of individual farm households.  While 
it was implicitly assumed that all farm households held the same fundamental goal about farm growth, they 
were classified into three management classes.  This affected their behaviour in both land markets and crop 
mix selection.  It is interesting to note that even though the simulations were set up so that all farm 
households had an inherent desire for farm growth, a significantly skewed distribution of farm size still 
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emerged.  While growth aspirations seem to be a necessary condition for an increase in farm size, land and 
credit resource constraints appear to play a much greater role at the individual farm level.    The simulation 
results suggest that while the probability of a given farm exiting increases marginally with an increased 
level of risk aversion (table 5.2), resource and personal constraints play a more significant role.   
 
The farm household labour input is an important factor determining the sustainability of the farm operation.  
A number of studies (Kislev and Peterson 1982; Goetz and Debertin 2001; Huffman and Evenson 2001) 
focused on the mobility of labour between farm and non-farm industries, along with the relative wage rate 
as important factors in the consolidation of farm assets.  While this model framework ignores the labour 
market, the researcher found that the farm household’s required return to labour is an important factor for 
the sustainability of individual farms and the aggregate regional structure.  This is due to the fact that 
within the simulation, farm households are assumed to require a minimum annual living/management 
withdrawal from the farm operation.  And the farm household’s withdrawal is assumed to increase as the 
farm grows, as a result of the increased labour and management costs of operating on a larger scale.  As a 
direct result, the total annual living/management withdrawal increases with farm size, but the required 
withdrawal per acre decreases with farm size (figure 5.17).     
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Figure 5.17: Farm Agent Family Labour Costs 
 
 
Farms operating on a small scale of production (less than 400 cultivated acres) require relatively high crop 
revenues to meet their annual withdrawal requirements.  As a direct result of a high per acre return to 
family labour inputs, small farms are unable to withstand prolonged periods of low crop revenue.  The 
inability of small farms in the simulation to consistently meet their annual withdrawal requirements is an 
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important driver of structural change.  Periods of low crop revenue result in the transfer of farm assets from 
small farms to larger operators who are able to meet their withdrawal requirements more consistently.      
 
 5.3.2 Cost of Production and Productive Efficiency 
 
The changing structure of the farming sector is often thought to be the consequence of heterogeneous 
production efficiency among farms.  The argument is that the most efficient farms acquire the assets of the 
less efficient producers, resulting in the consolidation of farm assets among the most efficient (Harrington 
and Reinsel 1995).  Economists often acknowledge the relationship between economies of scale in 
purchasing inputs and marketing output and the consolidation of farm assets.  It is often assumed that by 
expanding the area of production, the farm can benefit from economies of scale.  While economies of scale 
in purchase inputs and marketing products may in fact be a sufficient condition to explain the structural 
shifts that have occurred, this study finds they are not necessary.  This series of simulations explicitly 
assumes that farms operate with constant economies of scale with respect to non-labour costs of producing 
a crop (before transportation costs).  When non-family labour is included, small farms actually have a cost 
advantage over large farms that are required to hire a greater level of non-family labour (figure 5.18).      
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Figure 5.18: Farm Agent Production Costs (excluding Family Labour) 
 
 
The observed variation in production costs in the simulation among farms of the same size (figure 5.18) is 
the direct result of transportation costs.  Farms with land spread out over a larger area have higher 
production costs, attributable to the incremental cost of moving crop production to the farmstead to be 
marketed.  In general, larger farms are found to have a higher transportation cost per acre compared to 
small farms.  Larger farms must farm land at a greater distance from their farmstead than small farms.   
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Ultimately, it can be concluded that the distribution of farm size that emerged in the simulations under the 
assumption of constant (decreasing) returns to scale for crop production undermines the traditional 
argument that economies of scale and producer efficiency are the only significant drivers in the observed 
consolidation of farm assets in this chapter.           
 
 5.3.3 Path Dependency and the Farm Life-Cycle 
 
Structural change at the individual farm level is affected not only by the economic situation faced by 
individual farms, but also the interdependencies between farms (Balmann 1999).  Farms wanting to expand 
are faced with the reality of competing with neighbouring farms for the control of limited resources.  As a 
direct result, the spatial location of a farm may be a key factor in the long term sustainability of a given 
farm.  The ability of any farm to expand is directly related to the availability of land within a reasonable 
distance from an existing land base.  In addition, the ability of a given farm to acquire an available plot of 
land is affected by the actions of other farms within the same general geographic region.  This situation is 
defined by Balmann (1999) in the farming context as path dependence, whereby, in a stochastic world, the 
current state of a system is directly dependent on historic actions and events.  Given the results obtained 
here, in particular the consistency with regard to changes in distributions of management classes and the 
marginal variation between exit rates among the three management classes considered, factors other than 
varied risk preference must be important in determining the growth path of individual farms.          
 
In this light, it is found that one of the most important factors in determining the sustainability of a given 
farm appears to be its initial land base.  The mean initial size (cultivated acres) of farms that discontinued 
production during the simulation period was found to be approximately one-half that of the mean initial 
size of all farms.  Based on simulation results, the study found that farms which declined over a five year 
period managed, on average, a total land base of only 76% (std dev = 28%) of the average for the region.  
In direct contrast, those farms that expanded over a given 5 year interval operated on a scale that was 
significantly greater, with a mean size advantage of approximately 450% (std dev =270%) over the regional 
average.  Thus while farms operating on a large scale have significant advantages in the land market, this is 
not a guarantee of growth in a given time period.  Farms that experienced zero growth over a given five 
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year interval had an average scale of production of 94% (std dev = 91%) of the regional average, with 
approximately 7% of this group operating on a scale at least three times the regional average.    
 
On average, a farm operation in the simulation with an initial land holding greater than the regional mean is 
significantly more likely to realize their growth aspirations.  In addition, due to the spreading of the 
family/management withdrawal over a greater number of acres, the large farm is better able to withstand 
periods of reduced crop revenues.  Finally, while operating on a large scale effectively reduces the risk of 
continued operation, it is not a guarantee of success.  On average 4% of the total exits over the simulated 
period were by farms operating within the largest size classification measured (see table 5.4).                                     
 
 5.3.4 Government Transfers and Regional Structure 
 
Government policies and support programs are commonly discussed concurrently with issues of structural 
change and the resulting reallocation of resources (Fulton et al 1989).  In fact it is prudent that policy 
makers understand the relationship between stabilization/support programs and structural change.  Goddard 
et al (1993) identified public programs as one the eight factors affecting structural change in the agriculture 
sector.  In the simulations, it is found that prior to the rapid decline in farm land values throughout the late 
1980’s, simulated government transfers aimed at stabilizing the income of farm agents played no 
significant role in the evolution of regional farm structure.  In fact, prior to the mid 1980’s, no significant 
difference is found between the base and zero transfer scenarios.   
 
The period that overlaps the late 1980’s and early 1990’s is characterized in the simulations by a rapid 
downward trend in farmland values and an increased rate of consolidation.  Fulton et al’s (1989) 
supposition that without the significant transfers farmers received from stabilization and support programs, 
the rate of decline in the farm population would have been significantly greater is supported by the results 
obtained in this research.  A significant level of divergence occurs for the observed farm number trends 
between the base and zero transfer scenarios.  It is also interesting to note that while the number of farms 
declined at a significantly faster rate in the zero transfer scenario, the distribution of farms by cultivated 
acres at the end of the simulation did not differ significantly from the base scenario.  Thus, the ability of 
governments to alter the rate of structural change must not be dismissed.  But, whether the increased rate of 
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consolidation that would surely have occurred in the absence of direct government transfers in Canadian 
agriculture would have led to a more productive agricultural sector in the long run is still open for debate.                  
 
5.4 Summary 
The application of an agent-based framework to study structural change at the regional level allows the 
issue to be analyzed with a focus on the decisions made at the individual or farm level.  The drivers of 
structural change discussed in chapter two all focus on the incentives and decisions of farms at this level.  
As a result, a study of structural change at the regional level is well suited for the application of this new 
modeling paradigm.   
 
The simulation environment was designed to attempt to replicate the actual structural shifts that occurred in 
Saskatchewan agriculture over the period from1960 to 2000, under the assumption that technology and 
farming practices remained constant throughout the simulated period.  To do this, five distributions of 
farms among three primary managerial classes are simulated.  Relatively consistent results are obtained 
from all distributions.  All five distributions closely replicate the trend of declining farm numbers and 
increasing farm size.  The distribution of farms by number of acres managed generated by all our 
simulations closely replicate the actual distribution observed over the time period.  In addition, the 
simulations replicate the sharp increase in farmland values during the 1970’s as well as the subsequent 
decline throughout the 1980’s, albeit with a time lag.  The decline in the proportion of farmland managed 
under a lease agreement that occurred between the 1961 and 1966 census periods, as well as the later trend 
of increased farm land owned by non-farming individuals, is correctly replicated by all simulations.    
 
A second simulation scenario was run to estimate the structural evolution of the region under the 
assumption of zero government stabilization transfers.  By comparing the results estimated for both the 
base and zero transfer scenarios, the net results of the package of stabilization programs and ad-hoc 
payments can be estimated.  The package of stabilization programs and payments do not show a significant 
impact on the regional structural characteristics in the simulation prior to 1987.  However, significant 
divergence begins to emerge between the base and zero transfer scenarios in the post 1987 time period.  In 
the absence of government transfers to grain operations, the simulated number of farms is significantly 
reduced by the end of the simulation compared to the base scenario.  This result is consistent with the 
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earlier findings of Fulton et al (1989) and the post 1985 impact of government farm programs.  As a direct 
result, the mean area cultivated by individual farm agents increased substantially without transfers, but 
interestingly, we found that the distribution of farms does not vary significantly from the base scenario.  I 
conclude that while transfers have certainly had an effect on the agricultural sector, the consequences of 
transfers have not necessarily transpired as originally intended by policymakers.  The simulations show that 
transfers tend to have minor impacts on the small farm, and instead have contributed to the growth of the 
larger farms in the region.     
 
In the sense described in Chapter 3, a number of key insights about agriculture in this region emerged from 
this research.  For example, while economies of scale in purchasing inputs and marketing production may 
work in reality for larger producers, they are not necessary to replicate the structural shifts that occurred 
over the period studied.  Instead, the ability of the farm agent to fully employ their labour and management 
input emerges as an important factor in the sustainability and growth of an individual farm.  Those farm 
agents that were unable to expand their farm to a sustainable scale are found to be incapable of consistently 
meeting their annual living/management withdrawal requirements during periods of depressed crop returns.  
Finally, it appears that opportunity and luck often play a more important role than individual ability.  In 
fact, it is possible that a less productive farm agent may succeed while a more productive farm agent may 
fail, and this is due to the immobility of farmland.   
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CHAPTER SIX 
 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
 
6.1 Summary 
 
The Saskatchewan farm sector continues to be a dynamic industry, faced with the reality of significant 
structural adjustment.  While structural adjustment can result in more efficient production, the 
consolidation of farm assets among a decreasing number of farm operations also has a significant impact on 
the population base of rural regions.  Structural change continues to one of the most important issues for 
both the farm sector and rural regions, but the process and its underlying drivers continue to be weakly 
understood.  Farm characteristics like operator age, land tenure, farm type, farm size, debt level and 
motivation vary widely across Canada (Statistics Canada), and it is clear that these factors are key drivers 
of farm industry structure.  Given the economic difficulties now inherent in rural Saskatchewan, there has 
never been a more important time to improve our understanding of the structural dynamics of the farming 
sector.   
 
The desire to understand farming and farm structure has led to the development of a number of well 
documented farm-level models, including FLIPSIM in the U.S. and CRAM (Canadian Regional 
Agricultural Model) in Canada (Klein and Narayanan 1992).  To their credit, the previous generation of 
farm-level models were not designed to capture complexity or emergent behaviour, yet complexity is 
arguably one of the most important characteristics of any dynamic economic system.  It is argued that 
adaptive farm models based on individual interactions are necessary to help unravel the intricate interplay 
among natural and economic developments in the farming sector.  Part of the motivation for this research is 
the realization that farming behaviour possesses characteristics of a complex system in the computational 
sense, and complex systems often generate large-scale behaviour that cannot readily be predicted by simply 
examining components of the system.  It is the potential to reveal emergent farm level behaviour that 
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distinguishes new generation behavioural farm models from the older generation of atomistic farm level 
policy models. 
 
The rigidity that generally characterizes previous farm-level modeling methodologies limited their ability 
to incorporate and predict structural change.  Through the application of an agent-based simulation 
framework, the potential of incorporating structural change as an endogenous factor to the farm model can 
be realized.  The developed model of an idealized agricultural region in the Canadian province of 
Saskatchewan was then evaluated on its ability to replicate historic structural shifts for the period 1960-
2000. 
 
6.2 Conclusions 
 
Agent-based methods exhibit a strong potential to overcome one of the major limitations of current farm 
level modeling frameworks.  The highly heterogeneous nature of agricultural production is in sharp contrast 
to the general assumption of a homogenous population required for traditional farm-level models.  The 
highly flexible nature of agent-based models, due to their focus on a building system from the ‘ground up’, 
allows the researcher/policymaker an improved understanding of the interplay between aggregate level 
behaviour and patterns and the underlying characteristics of the individuals that constitute the system of 
study. 
 
I offer that the demonstrated ability of this agent based model of a rural region, characterized by annual 
crop production, to mirror the actual structural adjustments that played out over the study period can be at a 
minimum regarded as a strong “proof of concept”.  The research and model development discussed in this 
thesis offers the potential to provide a fundamental framework for future research focused on structural 
dynamics and policy analysis.   
 
While significant discussion in agricultural and regional economics has been concerned with the 
importance of producer efficiency and economies of scale, the results generated here suggest that this is not 
a necessary condition for structural change.  The ability of a farm household to fully employ their labour 
resource is found to play a far greater role in determining the continued existence of a given farm than the 
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ability to produce a crop efficiently.  As a result, I find that a less efficient producer70 operating on a large 
scale is more likely to remain in the industry than a small, yet more efficient producer.  While a non-farm 
labour market for the farm household’s excess labour was not explicitly considered here, I offer that it is 
highly unlikely that its inclusion would significantly alter the simulation results.             
 
Varied management styles were also incorporated into the simulations, and they only marginally improved 
the mean survival rate of the least risk averse relative to the most risk averse farm households.  While, all 
else constant, the least risk averse farm household has a greater probability of achieving their aspiration for 
farm growth, simple opportunity and timing appear to play a more significant role in the long term 
profitability and sustainability of a given farm.      
 
6.3 Limitations 
 
Agent-based methodologies provide the agricultural researcher with a highly flexible and adaptable toolkit 
for studying complex physical/social interactions and networks.  One of the greatest challenges faced when 
developing the simulation model utilized in this thesis, a challenge faced by all who undertake this type of 
research, was trying to find an appropriate balance between model realism and tractability.  It is a relatively 
simple task to highlight a number of areas in which the model abstracts significantly from reality.  But 
given the multitude of layers of reality that could potentially be incorporated within the basic framework, 
the selection of those key drivers and structures to incorporate was a time consuming and difficult process.  
This study is not unique in making this assessment about agent based simulations (see Robinson 2003). 
 
It is not the purpose of this section to outline all areas where the simulation model abstracts from the target 
system modeled, but rather to highlight those key areas the reader needs to be aware of when interpreting 
the results and conclusions presented.  First, due to the nature of the methodology selected and the 
individual and behavioural level data requirements, data availability proved to be a significant limitation.  
While great care was taken to track down the required data/parameter values, in a number of situations an 
approximation of the actual value was the only viable option.  Significant care has been taken to ensure that 
all approximations are clearly stated and explained.  Second, due to the long standing tradition in economic 
research to focus on the outcome of individual behaviour (i.e. individuals behave “as if” they are 
                                                 
70 Producer efficiency refers to cost of producing a crop excluding the family/management withdrawal. 
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profit/utility maximizing), rather than the underlying behavioural rules being utilized, the modeling of 
sound behavioural rules is a rather daunting task.               
 
Thus, while the level of realism incorporated into the model is an appropriate abstraction from the true 
system, three key areas where the model differs significantly from reality should be noted.  The first 
significant variation deals with the assumption of constant 1960’s farm practices and technology, as well as 
de-trended crop yields and market prices.  Secondly, a lack of an explicit non-farm labour market and 
potential the use of off-farm income to subsidize the farm operation likely resulted in an under-estimation 
of the number of small farms in the final simulated distribution.  The relatively small proportion of farm 
agents who retire due to old age without a new generation continuing to operate the farm also suggests that 
a more realistic algorithm is required to model the intergenerational transfer of farm assets.        
  
6.4 Suggestions for Further Study 
 
One of the underlying objectives of this research was to develop a relatively simple framework on which to 
base future farming model developments.  Of primary importance in this framework is the 
conceptualization of the farmland markets.  While the farmland market mechanisms incorporated within 
the model are justifiable and defendable, it would be interesting to test alternative specifications against the 
results obtained in this study.  Ultimately, due to the flexibility of the toolkit utilized, it is possible to 
outline an almost unlimited number of potential model extensions and improvements.  In an attempt to 
sidestep listing multiple potential model extension, it should be noted that new developments will need to 
be driven by the research problems tackled in the future.  It is not the coding of model constructs that will 
limit future research71, but rather the ability to understand what to code.   
 
In order to improve future research utilizing the agent based model framework, regardless of the issue to be 
studied, research needs to be focused on two inter-related aspects.  There is a stark need to develop an 
improved understanding of the behaviour of individuals and the varied behavioural patterns that exist 
among the relevant agent populations.  This is an area economists have traditionally ignored and would 
benefit substantially form an interdisciplinary approach to future research.  Economists interested in 
                                                 
71 While the author may be nearing the upper limits of his programming skills, it is assumed that more skilled programmers are 
available. 
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utilizing agent-based methodologies may need to seek out collaborators from other academic disciplines.  
In particular for this research considerable efforts need to be made to collect and compile survey data 
describing the managerial and behavioural characteristics of farm decision making units.  By improving our 
understanding of the underlying behavioural and managerial decisions of the farm household, a number of 
the limitations outlined in the previous section can be overcome.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
110
REFERENCES 
 
Agriculture Canada. (1986a) Special Canadian Grains Program.  Communications Branch.  Ottawa: 
December 9. 
 
Agriculture Canada. (1986b) Applications for Crop Drought Assistance in Mail.  Communications Branch.  
Ottawa: January 17 
 
Agriculture Canada (1988) Special Drought Assistance for Crop Producers.  Communications Branch.  
Ottawa: November 10. 
 
Agriculture Canada (1992) Backgrounder: Gross Revenue Insurance Program.  Communications Branch.  
Ottawa.  
 
Agarwal, C., G.Green, J. M. Grove, T.Evans and C. Schwelk.(2002)  A Review and Assessment of Land-
Use Change Models: Dynamics of Space, Time, and Human Choice.  General Technical Report 
NE-297.  Newton Square, PA: U.S. Department of Agriculture, Forest Service, Northeastern 
Research Station. 61 p. 
 
American Society of Agricultural Engineers (2003) “Agricultural Machinery Management Data” American 
Society of Agricultural Engineers, St. Joseph, Michigan. D497.4 February 2003. 
 
Arthur, B.W. (1994) “Bounded Rationality and Inductive Behavior” American Economic Review 84: 406-
411. 
 
Arthur, B.W. (1999) “Complexity and the Economy” Science (April) 284: 107-109. 
 
Balmann, A (1997) “Farm-based Modelling of Regional Structural Change: A Cellular Automata 
Approach”, European Review of Agricultural Economics, 24, 85-108. 
 
Balmann, A. (1999). “The Dynamics of Structural Change and Farmers’ Income in a Maturing Sector” 
Working Paper, Humboldt University of Berlin. 
 
Balmann, A.(2000). “Modeling Land Use with Multi-Agent Systems: Perspectives for the Analysis of 
Agricultural Policies” In IIFET 2000: Microbehavior and Macroresults, Proceedings, International 
Institute of Fisheries Economics and Trade, Oregon State University, Corvallis, Oregon, USA. 
 
Barlett, P.F. (1984) “Microdynamics of Debt, Drought, and Default in South Georgia” American Journal of 
Agricultural Economics December: 836-843. 
 
Bennett, J.W. (1982) Of Time and the Enterprise: North American Family Farm Management in a context 
of Resource Marginality.  Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press. 
 
Bennett, J.W. and S.B. Kohl (1982) “Farms and Family in North American Agriculture” in Of Time and the 
Enterprise: North American Family Farm Management in a context of Resource Marginality.  
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. 
 
Berger, T. (2001) “Agent-based Spatial Models Applied to Agriculture: a Simulation Tool for Technology 
Diffusion, Resource Use Changes and Policy Analysis”.  Agricultural Economics 25: 245-260. 
 
Bollman, R.D., L.A. Whitener and F.L. Tung (1995) “Trends and Patterns of Agricultural Structural 
Change: A Canada-U.S. Comparison” Canadian Journal of Agricultural Economics special issue: 
15-28. 
 
 
 
111
Bonfanti, P.L., Castelli, G., Lazzari, M., Mazzetto, F. and P. Sacco (1998) “Simulation of farmers’ 
decision-making processes based upon agri-environmental policy effects: the IMAGES Project”, 
available on-line at: http://www.uniud.it/cartesio/images/Articoli/rabat.html 
 
Casti, J.L. (1997) Would-Be Worlds: How Simulation is Changing the Frontiers of Science. John Wiley 
and Sons, New York. 
 
Cochrane, W. (1958) Farm Prices Myths and Reality. University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 
Minnesota. 
 
Day, R. H. (1963). Recursive Programming and Production Response.  North-Holland, Amsterdam. 
 
Day, R. H. (1994) Complex Economic Dynamics, Volume 1: An Introduction to Dynamical Systems and 
Market Mechanisms.  MIT Press, Cambridge, MA. 
 
Deadman, P.J. (1999) “Modelling Individual Behavior and Group Performance in an intelligent Agent 
Based Simulation of the tragedy of the Commons” Journal of Environmental Management 56(3): 
159-172. 
 
Durlauf, S. (1998) “What Should Policymakers Know About Economic Policy”, The Washington Quarterly 
21(1): 159-165. 
 
Epstein, J. M. and R. L. Axtell. (1996) Growing Artificial Societies: Social Science from the Bottom Up.  
Cambridge: MIT Press / Brookings Institute. 
 
Fairweather, J.R. and N.C. Keating (1994) “Goals and Management Styles of New Zealand Farmers” 
Agricultural Systems 44: 181-200. 
 
Fellmann, J. D., A. Gettis and J. Gettis. (1999). Human Geography: Landscapes of Human Activity.  WCB 
McGraw-Hill, Boston. 
 
Ferber, J. (1999). Multi-Agent Systems: An Introduction to Distributed Artificial Intelligence. Addison-
Wesley, Harlow. 
 
Fisher, W. D. and P. L. Kelley (1982). Selecting Representative Firms in Linear Programming. in 
Economic Analysis and Agricultural Policy. Iowa State University Press, Ames, Iowa. 
 
Friedman, D. and S. Sunder (1994) “The Emergence of Experimental Economics” in Experimental 
Methods: A Primer for Economists.  Cambridge University Press.  New York, NY.    
 
Foot, D. K. (1996) Boom, Bust & Echo: How to Profit from the Coming Demographic Shift.  Macfarlane 
Walter & Ross. Toronto.  
 
Fulton, M., K. Rosaasen and A. Scmitz (1989) “Canadian Agricultural Policy and Prairie Agriculture” a 
study prepared for the Economic Council of Canada. 
 
Gale, H.F. (2003) “Age-Specific Patterns of Exit and Entry in U.S. Farming, 1978-1997” Review of 
Agricultural Economics 25(1): 168-186. 
 
Gale, H.F. (1996) “Age Cohort Analysis of the 20th Century Decline in U.S. Farm Numbers” Journal of 
Rural Studies 12(1): 15-25.  
 
Giannakas, K., R. Schoney and V. Tzouvelekas (2001) “Technical Efficiency, Technological Change and 
Output Growth of Wheat Farms in Saskatchewan.  Canadian Journal of Agricultural Economics 
49: 135-152.  
 
 
112
Gilbert, N. and K. Troitzsch (2002) Simulation for the Social Scientist.  Open University Press, 
Philadelphia. 
 
Glaeser, E.L. and J.E. Kohlhase (2004) “Cities, Regions and the Decline of Transport Costs” Papers in 
Regional Science 83: 197-228  
 
Goddard, E., A. Weersink, K. Chen and C.G. Turvey (1993).  “Economics of Structural Change in 
Agriculture”  Canadian Journal of Agricultural Economics 41: 475-489. 
 
Goetz, S.J. and D. Debertin (2001) “Why Farmers Quit: A Country-Level Analysis”  American Journal of 
Agricultural Economics 83(4): 1010-1023. 
 
Guide to Farm Practice in Saskatchewan (1960) Published under the authority of The Saskatchewan Co-
operative Agricultural Extension Program. 
 
Gumerman, G., A. Swedlund, J. Dean,and J. Epstein (2002) “The Evolution of Social Behavior in the 
Prehistoric American Southwest”  Santa Fe Institute working paper 02-12-067. 
 
Hadar, J. and W.R. Russell (1969) “Rules for Ordering Uncertain Prospects” The American Economic 
Review 59(1): 25-34. 
 
Happe, K. (2004) Agricultural Policies and Farm Structure: Agent-Based Modelling and Application to 
EU-policy Reform. Institute of Agricultural Development in Central and Eastern Europe (IAMO)  
 
Happe, K and A Balmann (2003) “Agent-based Modeling in Agricultural Economics –Perspectives and 
Challenges”, Institute of Agricultural Development in Central and Eastern Europe (IAMO) 
 
Happe, K, A.Balmann and K. Kellerman (2004) “The Agricultural Policy Simulator (AgriPoliS) - An 
Agent-Based Model to Study Structural Change in Agriculture (Version 1.0)” Discussion Paper 
No. 71.  Institute of Agricultural Development in Central and Eastern Europe (IAMO). 
 
Harrington, D.H. and R.D. Reinsel (1995) “A Synthesis of Forces Driving Structural Change” Canadian 
Journal of Agricultural Economics special issue: 3-14. 
 
Harris, D.G. and R.F. Nehring (1976) “Impact of Farm Size on the Bidding Potential for Agricultural 
Land” American Journal of Agricultural Economics 58(2): 161-169. 
 
Holland, J. and J. Miller (1991). “Artificial Adaptive Agents in Economic Theory” The American 
Economic Review 81(2): 365-370, Papers and Proceedings of the Hundred and Third Annual 
Meeting of the American Economic Association. 
 
Huffman, W.E. and R.E. Evenson (2001) “Structural and Productivity Change in U.S. Agriculture, 1950-
1982” Agricultural Economics 24: 127-147. 
 
Helmberger, P.G. (1972) “Markets, Farm Size, and Integration”  in Size, Structure, and the Future of 
Farms.  The Iowa State University Press, Ames, Iowa. 
 
Jensen, H. (1977) “Farm Management and Production Economics, 1946-1970”, Part I in A Survey of 
Agricultural Economics Literature, L. Martin, Ed. University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis. 
 
Jones, W. and C. Buckley (1980) “Measuring Structural Change in the Canadian Farm Industry” Canadian 
Farm Economics 15(6): 9-41. 
 
Johnson, G.L. (1972) “Theoretical Considerations” in The Overproduction Trap in U.S. Agriculture. The 
Johns Hopkin University Press, Baltimore, Maryland. 
 
 
 
113
Karagrannis, G. and W.H. Furtan (1990). “Induced Innovation in Canadian Agriculture: 1926-87” 
Canadian Journal of Agricultural Economics 38: 1-21.  
 
Keating, N.C. and B. Munro (1989) “Transferring the Family Farm: Process and Implications”  Family 
Relations 38(2): 215-219. 
 
Kelton, W, Sadowski, R. and D. Sturrock. (2004) Simulation with Arena. Third Edition. McGraw Hill. New 
York, NY. 
 
Kislev, Y. and W. Peterson (1982). “Prices, Technology and Farm Size” The Journal of Political Economy 
90 (3): 578-595. 
 
Klein, K.K. and S.A. Narayanan. (1992)  “Farm level models: A review of developments, concepts and 
applications in Canada”, Can. J. Agric. Econ. 40(3):351-368. 
 
Lewin, R. (2000) Complexity: Life on the Edge of Chaos.  Second Edition. University of Chicago Press. 
 
Manson, S. (2001). “Simplifying Complexity: A review of complexity theory”, GeoForum 32(3): 405-414. 
 
Nelson, G. C. (2002). “Introduction to the special issue on spatial analysis for agricultural economists” 
Agricultural Economics 27:197-200. 
 
Nelson, R.R. (1995). “Recent Evolutionary Theorizing About Economic Change” Journal of Economic 
Literature 33(1): 48-90. 
 
Olson, K.D. (2004) Farm Management: Principles and Strategies. Iowa State Press. Ames, Iowa. 
 
Olsson, R. (1988) “Management for Success in Modern Agriculture” European Review of Agricultural 
Economics 15: 239-259. 
 
Parker, D.C. (2000). Edge-effect externalities: Theoretical and empirical implications of spatial 
heterogeneity.  Ph D.diss. University of California at Davis, Davis, CA 
 
Parker, D. C, S. Manson, M. Janssen, M. Hoffman and P. Deadman. (2003). Multi-Agent Systems for the 
Simulation of Land-Use and Land-Cover Change: A Review.  Annals of the Association of 
American Geographers, 93(2): 314-337. 
 
Parker, D. C., and V. Meretsky (2004). “Measuring pattern outcomes in an agent-based model of edge-
effect externalities using spatial metrics” Agriculture, Ecosystems and Environment 101(2-3): 
233-250. 
 
Polhill, J. G., N. M. Gotts, and A. N. R. Law. (2001). “Imitative versus nonimitative strategies in a land-use 
simulation”, Cybernetics and Systems 32 (1): 285-307. 
 
Purdy, H.L. (1972) Transport Competition and Public Policy in Canada. University of British Columbia 
Press.  Vancouver, British Columbia. 
 
Ragush, M. (1966) “Use of Farm Credit in Saskatchewan, 1960-64”  Canadian Farm Economics 1: 18-22. 
 
Rauch, J. (2002) “Seeing Around Corners”  The Atlantic Monthly, April 2002: 35-48. 
 
Raup, P.M. (1972) “Societal Goals in Farm Size” in Size, Structure, and the Future of Farms.  The Iowa 
State University Press, Ames, Iowa. 
 
 
 
114
Robinson, D. T. (2003). Modelling Farmer Household Decision-making and Its Effects on Land use/cover 
Change in the Altamira Region, Párá, Brazil.  Masters Thesis.  University of Waterloo, Waterloo, 
Ontario, Canada. 
 
Rouchier, J., F. Bousquet, M. Requier-Desjardins, and M. Antona (2001) “A Multi-Agent Model for 
Describing Transhumance in North Cameroon: Comparison of Different Rationality to Develop a 
Routine” Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 25: 527-559. 
 
Saskatchewan Agriculture (various years) Farm Business Review for the Year 1960-1964. Statistics 
Branch. 
 
Saskatchewan Agriculture, Food and Rural Revitalization (2005) Historic Crop Yields: Rural Municipality 
# 281.  www.agr.gov.sk.ca.  Regina, SK.  Saskatchewan Agriculture, Food and Rural 
Revitalization. 
 
Saskatchewan Agriculture, Food and Rural Revitalization (2004) Agricultural Statistics Handbook 2003.  
www.agr.gov.sk.ca.  Regina, SK.  Saskatchewan Agriculture, Food and Rural Revitalization.  
 
Saskatchewan Agriculture, Food and Rural Revitalization (various years) Crop Production Guide; Dark 
Brown Soil Zone (1994-2004).  Saskatchewan Agriculture, Food and Rural Revitalization. 
 
Schelling, T. C. (1978). Micromotives and Macrobehavior. W. W. Norton, New York. 
 
Schmitz, A, H. Furtan and K. Baylis (2002) Agricultural Policy, Agribusiness, and Rent-Seeking 
Behaviour.  University of Toronto Press, Toronto.  
 
Schoney, R.A (1997) An Economic Analysis of the 1987-95 Saskatchewan Wheat, Barley and Canola 
Production Costs.  Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada 
 
Selley, R. (1984) Decision Rules in Risk Analysis, in Risk Management in Agriculture.  Edited by P.J. 
Barry.  Iowa State University Press, Ames, Iowa. 
 
Short, C (2004) A Proposal to Develop for A Microsmulation Model of Canadian Farm Households: Risk 
Management, Households and Microsimulation.  Agriculture Canada. 
 
Simon, H. A. (1955). “A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice” The Quarterly Journal of Economics 69: 
99-118. 
 
Sofranko, A., R. Frerichs, M. Samy and B. Swanson (1999). “Will Farmers Organize: Structural Change 
and Loss of Control over Production”  paper presented at the 62nd Annual Meeting of the Rural 
Sociological Society, Chicago, Illinois.  August 4-8, 1999.   
 
Statistics Canada (various years) Census of Canada: Agriculture: Saskatchewan. 1961-2001. 
 
Stoker, T. M. (1993). “Empirical approaches to the problem of aggregation over individuals” Journal of 
Economic Literature 31(4): 1827-1875. 
 
Sycara, K.P. (1998) “Multiagent Systems” AI Magazine Summer 1998, pp 79-92. 
 
Takayama, T. and W. Labys (1986) Spatial Equilibrium Analysis. Ch. 5 in Handbook of Regional and 
Urban Economics, Volume 1: Regional Economics.  Peter Nijkamp. Ed. North Holland, New 
York, NY. 
 
Taylor, J.E., J.E. Norris and W.H. Howard (1998) “Succession Patterns of Farmer and Successor in 
Canadian Farm Families” Rural Sociology 63(4): 553-573. 
 
 
 
115
Tesfatsion, L. (2000) “Agent-Based Computational Economics: A Brief Guide to the Literature”, Working 
Paper, Iowa State University.  Available on-line at: http://www.econ.iastate.edu/tesfatsi/ace.htm 
 
Troitzsch, K.G. (2004) “Validating Simulation Models”, Proceedings 18th European Simulation 
Multiconference.  Graham Horton © SCS Europe. 
 
Vriend, N. (1996) “Rational Behavior and Economic Theory” Journal of Economic Behavior and 
Organizations 29: 263-285. 
 
Walker, L.J.S. (1989) “Farm Management Strategies to Family Style” Canadian Journal of Agricultural 
Economics 37: 747-754. 
 
Welter, F (2002) “Who Wants to Grow? Growth Intentions and Growth Profiles of (Nascent) Entrepreneurs 
in Germany”  Babson College http://www.babson.edu/entrep/fer/Babson2001/I/IH/I_H/i-h.htm. 
 
Wilensky, U. (1999) NetLogo. http://ccl.northwestern.edu/netlogo/. Center for Connected Learning and 
Computer-Based Modeling, Northwestern University. Evanston, IL. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
116
APPENDIX A 
List of Variable Names   
 
 
 
  Farm agent (k = 1,…,K) 
 
 
  GR  Gross revenue of farm agent k 
  PF  Productivity factor of farm agent k 
  K  Crop acres managed (owned or leased) by farm agent k 
  P   Number of plots managed by farm agent k 
  VC  Variable production expenses of farm agent k 
  TE  Transportation expense of farm agent k 
  Travel  Unit cost of transporting farm equipment of farm agent k 
  Truck  Unit cost of transporting farm production of farm agent k 
  FC  Fixed production expenses of farm agent k 
  Creplace  Machinery and building replacement expense of farm agent k 
  DS  Principal and Interest expense of farm agent k 
  LP  Land leasing expense of farm agent k 
  WD  Family living and managerial withdrawal of farm agent k 
  NCI  Net investment in additional equipment and facilities of farm agent k 
  NCFPRODN Net cash flow from crop production of farm agent k 
  NCFINVEST Equipment and facilities sale proceeds less purchases of farm agent k  
  NCFFINANCE New borrowing less principal and interest payments of farm agent k 
  NCF  Net cash flow of farm agent k 
  Gov  Net government transfers received by farm agent k 
  PM  Production Margin (per acre) of farm agent k  
  rent  Residual return to Land of farm agent k 
  Q  Mean soil productivity of all plots managed by farm agent k 
  Bidxy  Bid of farm agent k on plotxy 
  Φ  Land valuation / risk aversion parameter of farm agent k 
  C  Stock of machinery and buildings of farm agent k 
  W  Non-family labour costs per cultivated acre 
  Λ  Minimum cash balance per acre 
  NCFkWGSA  Net cash flow from WGSA of farm agent k   
  PaymentkWGSA Gross payment from WGSA to farm agent k 
  LevykWGSA  Total levy paid under WGSA by farm agent k 
  tonnesk  Total grain production by volume of farm agent k 
  PaymentkSCGP Gross payment from SCGP to farm agent k 
  Ai  Total acreage of crop i for farm agent k 
  PaymentkDAP Gross payment from DAP to farm agent k 
  NCFkGRIP  Net cash flow from GRIP of farm agent k 
  PaymentkGRIP Gross payment from GRIP to farm agent k 
  IndemkGRIP Total indemnity paid under GRIP by farm agent k 
  prodni  Total production by volume of crop i by farm agent k 
  TWDNISA  Maximum triggered withdrawal from NISA account for farm agent k 
  NINISA  Net income of farm agent k for NISA program 
  NI¯¯ NISA  3- year moving average net income of farm agent k for NISA program 
  Fund 1  Balance of NISA account, fund 1, of farm agent k 
  Fund 2  Balance of NISA account, fund 2, of farm agent k 
  WDNISA  Actual withdrawal from NISA account of farm agent k 
  PaymentkAIDA Gross payment from AIDA to farm agent k 
  NIAIDA  Net income of farm agent k for AIDA program 
  NI¯¯ AIDA  3-year moving average net income of farm agent k for AIDA program 
 
   
  Plotxy (x = x co-ordinate, y = y co-ordinate) 
 
 
  Qxy  Fixed soil productivity value of plotxy 
  Rxy  Annual growing conditions value of plotxy 
  PIxy  Productivity index of plotxy 
  Kxy  Crop acres of plotxy   
  TExy  Transportation expense of plotxy 
  Dxy  Distance between plotxy and managing farm agent’s farmstead 
  Vxy  Volume of total crop production on plotxy 
  rentxy  Rent value for plotxy 
  VN  Value of plotxy (per acre) at period N 
  Pricexy  Final price paid for plotxy by purchasing/leasing farm agent 
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  Cropi (i = 1,…,I) 
 
 
  GRi  Gross revenue of crop i 
  Pi¯   Mean price of crop i 
  Yi¯   Mean yield of crop i 
  Ai  Area (acres) of crop i 
  Vi  Volume (bushels) of crop i 
  VCiacre  Variable production costs per acre of crop i  
  VCivolume  Variable production costs per volume of crop i 
  ai  proportion of farm agent k’s crop acres allotted to production of crop i 
  bi  Maximum proportion of farm agent k’s crop acres allotted to production of crop i 
  ∏i  mean crop return (GR - VC) of crop i 
  σ2∏i  crop return variance of crop i 
  VCi  Variable production costs per acre of crop i  
  Riˆ    Relative variable production costs of crop i 
  Piˆ    Estimated price of crop i, 1961-1964 
  Yiˆ    Estimated yield of crop i, 1961-1964 
  Subsiacre  Per acre subsidy rate of crop i (SCGP)  
  Indem%i  Indemnity rate if crop i 
 
 
  Global Parameters 
 
 
  WDmin  Minimum family and managerial withdrawal value 
  ß  Marginal propensity to consume from gross revenue 
  CR  Equipment and facilities stock requirement per crop acre 
  d  Rate of economic depreciation of equipment and facility stocks 
  r  Interest rate 
  n  number of years (planning period) 
  PL  Price of farm land per acre (for Qxy  = 1) 
  Ψ  Land valuation parameter of non-farming land owner 
  λ  expectation weighting 
  α  proportion of farm equity debt financed when farm is transferred 
  σ  labour cost adjustment factor to additional cultivated acre of land managed 
  Ω  proportion of total land purchase price that must be paid out of the cash account 
  Bid¯¯    mean value of current land bids 
  lease¯¯¯¯   mean lease rate 
  VC ¯¯   Mean variable cost per acre  
  CPE  Crop Production Expenditure, 1961-1964 
  acresi  Estimated acreage of crop i, 1961-1964  
  Seeded   Seeded acres 
  PayoutWGSA Total regional payout under WGSA 
  PAYMENT 1 Total regional payout under WGSA based on original trigger 
  PAYMENT 2 Total regional payout under WGSA based on second trigger 
  NGP  Net Grain Proceeds (WGSA) 
  NGP¯¯¯    5-year moving average net grain proceeds (WGSA) 
  NGPT  Net Grain Proceeds per tonne 
  NGPT¯¯¯¯    5-year moving average net grain proceeds (WGSA) 
  Subsacre  Per acre subsidy rate (DAP) 
  LTAYi  Long term average yield of crop i 
  IMAPi  Indexed moving average price of crop i 
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APPENDIX B 
 
Model Initial Values/Distributions 
 
Name in Model Name in Text Description Initial Value
0.834
na
0.068
na
$0.10 
$1,882 
(24.66, 23.75, 15.04, 13.12, 
8.60)
(16.88, 15.20, 10.84, 7.24, 11.8)
$5.00 
na
na
na
$8.00 
$6.80 
$7.60 
$8.40 
marginal propensity to consume from gross farm 
revenue
σ labour cost adjustment for an additional cultivated acre of land managed
β
trucking-rate cost of transporting grain ($/tonne-mile)
min-family-withdrawal mimimum level of cash withdrawn from farm for family and managerial expensesWD
min
per-bu-vc-4 variable production expenses per bushel (flaxseed)
travel-adjustment cost of transporting machinery between plots ($/mile)
crop-1-list historic production margin 1955-1959 (wheat) 
crop-2-list historic production margins 1955-1959 (oats)
crop-3-list
VCi
volume
per-bu-vc-2 variable production expenses per bushel (oats)
per-bu-vc-3 variable production expenses per bushel (barley)
VCi
volume
VCi
volume
per-acre-vc-5 variable production expenses per acre (summerfallow)
per-bu-vc-1 variable production expenses per bushel (wheat)
VCi
acre
VCi
volume
per-acre-vc-3 variable production expenses per acre (barley)
per-acre-vc-4 variable production expenses per acre (flaxseed)
VCi
acre
VCi
acre
per-acre-vc-1 variable production expenses per acre (wheat)
per-acre-vc-2 variable production expenses per acre (oats)
VCi
acre
VCi
acre
price-crop-3 mean barley price value
price-crop-4 mean flaxseed price value
Pi
Pi
price-crop-1 mean wheat price value
price-crop-2 mean oats price value
Pi
Pi
yield-crop-3 mean barley yield value
yield-crop-4 mean flaxseed yield value
Yi
Yi
yield-crop-1 mean wheat yield value
yield-crop-2 mean oats yield value
Yi
Yi
subsidy-ASA-crop-1 annual per bushel subsidy 1960-1975 (wheat)
subsidy-ASA-crop-3 annual per bushel subsidy 1960-1975 (barley)
subsidy-ASA-crop-2 annual per bushel subsidy 1960-1975 (oats)
subsidy-ASA-crop-4 annual per bushel subsidy 1960-1975 (flaxseed)
Travel
Truck
see Table B.1
value embedded in code
value embedded in code
see Table 4.7
historic production margins 1955-1959 (barley) (19.40, 18.80, 10.64, 7.73, 10.90)
crop-4-list historic production margins 1955-1959 (flaxseed) (25.20, 30.30, 6.72, 14.82, 9.96)
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Name in Model Name in Text Description Initial Value
80
0.06
0.10
0.18
0.3
lease-term number of years a lease agreement is in 
effect
rain annual growing conditions index
depreciation-rate rate of economic depreciation of farm 
equipment and facilities
Rxy
Qxy
Kxy
d
interest-rate rate of interest for borrowing capital
expectation-weight weight of most recent observation in 
expectation formation
r
λ
preretirement-age age at which farm agents stop buying land
value embedded in code proportion of debt to assets at which a farm is 
deemed insolvent
retirement-tendency-55-59 probability of a farm agent retiring each year 
when age is between 55 and 59
retirement-tendency-60-64 probability of a farm agent retiring each year 
when age is between 60 and 64
retirement-tendency-65-69 probability of a farm agent retiring each year 
when age is between 65 and 69
retirement-tendency-70-
over
probability of a farm agent retiring each year 
when age is 70 or above
maximum-age age at which farm agents are forced to retire
transfer-sell-rate proportion of equity that must be refinanced 
when farm transferred
α
D-A-ratio maximum ratio of debt to assets a farm agent 
can have in order to obtain credit
discount-value-1 land valuation factor of farm agents with 
attitude = 1
Φ
discount-value-2 land valuation factor of farm agents with 
attitude = 2
discount-value-3 land valuation factor of farm agents with 
attitude = 3
Φ
Φ
discount-value-NA land valuation factor of non-farming land 
owners
capital-per-acre value of machinery and buildings required per 
acre for crop production
Ψ
CR
downpayment land and equipment down payment 
requirement
equipment-amor-period amortization period for equipment purchases
land-amor-period amortization period for land purchases
average-rent intial mean lease payment value 
plots-leased-percent proportion of plots leased
initila mean land value
farms number of farmagents
PL
age age of farm agents
debt initial value of farm agent debt
uniform distribution 1-5 
~N(1,0.02)
~N(1,0.02)quality fixed growing conditions index
K-acres crop acres on a given plot
land-price
0.90
~N(150,5.5), max 160
10%
6%
0.10
55
0.40
0.40
0.95
0.90
0.85
1.00
$15 
25%
see Table 4.4
see Table 4.1
5
20
$2.25/cultivated acre
$30/cultivated acre
27.62%
310
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Name in Model Name in Text Description Initial Value
expanding (0.55, 0, 0, 0.05)
cautious (0.55, 0, 0.05, 0)
lifestyle (0.55, 0.05, 0, 0)
farms 55+ (0.55, 0.05, 0, 0)
$8.25/cultivated acre
0.58 tonnes/cultivate acre
see Table 4.6
$15/cultivated acre
1
see Table 4.1 and Table 4.2
attitude managerial group 
proportion of total cultivated acres alloacted to 
each crop                                                                
(wheat, oats, barley, flaxseed)
Rent
expected-production-volume initial expectation of crop production volume
expected-return-to-land initial expectation of residual return to land
generation current generation managing the farm
cash initial value of farm agent cash
plots-owned intial number of plots owned by a farm agent
plots-leased intitial number of plots leased by a farm agent
crop-mix
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table B.1: Agricultural Stabilization Act Crop Subsidies  
 
year wheat oats barley flaxseed
1960 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
1961 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
1962 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
1963 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
1964 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
1965 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
1966 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.00
1967 0.20 0.12 0.11 0.00
1968 0.14 0.03 0.13 0.08
1969 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.30
1970 0.00 0.00 0.44 0.05
1971 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
1972 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
1973 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
1974 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.66
1975 0.66 0.20 0.25 0.99
per bushel payment
 
 
Source: Author based on data from Saskatchewan Agriculture, Food and Rural Revitalization (2004) 
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APPENDIX C 
 
NetLogo© Source Code 
 
globals  
  [ 
  yield-crop-1                           ;; Array of wheat yields  
  yield-crop-2                            ;; Array of oat yields 
  yield-crop-3                            ;; Array of barley yields 
  yield-crop-4                            ;; Array of flax yields 
  price-crop-1                            ;; Array of wheat prices 
  price-crop-2                            ;; Array of oat yields 
  price-crop-3                            ;; Array of barley yields 
  price-crop-4                            ;; Array of flax yields  
  land-price                                ;; mean purchase price of land (adjusted for quality) sold in most recent auction 
  bids                                         ;; list of successful bids in current auction  
  average-rent                            ;; mean lease rate of all plots currently leased 
  land-unit-sold                          ;; tracking variable, holds ID value of the last plot sold 
  land-unit-rented                        ;; tracking variable, holds ID value of the last plot leased 
  year                                    ;; tracks current simulation  time period 
  plots-leased-percent                    ;; number of plots leased divided by total number of plots  
  plots-not-in-crop-prodn-percent        ;; number of plots not currently managed divided by total number of plots 
  farms                                   ;; total number of farm agents currently managing a minimum of 1 plot 
  crop-1-rank                             ;; used in crop mix selection algorithm to track relative rank of wheat production 
  crop-2-rank                             ;; used in crop mix selection algorithm to track relative rank of oat production 
  crop-3-rank                             ;; used in crop mix selection algorithm to track relative rank of barley production 
  crop-4-rank                            ;; used in crop mix selection algorithm to track relative rank of flax production 
  crop-1-value                            ;; used in crop mix selection algorithm to rank crops (value for wheat) 
  crop-2-value                            ;; used in crop mix selection algorithm to rank crops (value for oat) 
  crop-3-value                            ;; used in crop mix selection algorithm to rank crops (value for barley) 
  crop-4-value                            ;; used in crop mix selection algorithm to rank crops (value for flax) 
  crop-1-list                             ;; holds five years of data on gross return (wheat)  
  crop-2-list                             ;; holds five years of data on gross return (oats) 
  crop-3-list                             ;; holds five years of data on gross return (barley)         
  crop-4-list                             ;; holds five years of data on gross return (flax) 
  mix                                     ;; variable use in crop mix selection algorithm 
  sold                                    ;; number of plots sold in the current auction period 
  bankrupt    ;; total number of farm agents exiting due to bankruptcy condition 
  cashflow    ;; total number of farm agents exiting due to cash-flow condition 
  oldage       ;; total number of farm agents exiting, without an intergenerational transfer 
  transfers     ;; total number of farm agents exiting, with an intergenerational transfer 
  tracking-number   ;; variable used in GRIP algorithms 
  equip-purchase-adjustment  ;; deduction from residual return to land and labour to cover the cost of equipment 
  IMAP-1    ;; GRIP indexed moving average price (wheat)  
  IMAP-2    ;; GRIP indexed moving average price (oats) 
  IMAP-3    ;; GRIP indexed moving average price (barley) 
  IMAP-4    ;; GRIP indexed moving average price (flax) 
  mean-bid    ;; mean bid value of all farm agents, active in the first iteration of the land auction   
  WGSA-NCF-MA   ;; WGSA program net cash flow moving average 
  WGSA-NCFPT-MA   ;; WGSA program net cash flow per tonne moving average 
  WGSA-total-payout   ;; WGSA program total payment to the region 
  WGSA-total-levy   ;; WGSA program total levy amount collected from the region 
  susidy-ASA-crop-1   ;; ASA program subsidy value per bushel of wheat 
  subsidy-ASA-crop-2   ;; ASA program subsidy value per bushel of oats 
  subsidy-ASA-crop-3   ;; ASA program subsidy value per bushel of barley 
  subsidy-ASA-crop-4   ;; ASA program subsidy value per bushel of flax 
  ]     
 
patches-own 
  [ 
  quality                                 ;; relative index value (0-1) of soil productivity 
  rain                                    ;; relative index value (0-1) of annual growing conditions 
  annual-multiplier                       ;; quality * rain 
  farmer                                  ;; ID number of farm agent managing plot 
  renter                                  ;; ID number of farm agent leasing plot  
  owner                                   ;; ID number of farm agent who owns plot   
  k-acres                                 ;; total number of acres suitable for crop production 
  distance-to-farmstead                  ;; distance between plot and farmstead of managing farm agent 
  prodn-volume                            ;; total crop production of plot 
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  lease-payment                           ;; annual lease payment per k-acre  
  lease-term                              ;; number of years remaining on current lease agreement 
  patch-id                                ;; unique ID number for each plot 
  for-sale?                               ;; TRUE if land is available for sale, else FALSE  
  for-rent?                               ;; TRUE if land is available for lease, else FALSE 
  ] 
   
turtles-own  
  [ 
  age                                     ;; age of farm agent                       
  generation                              ;; family generation of farm agent 
  crop-revenue                            ;; gross crop revenue of farm agent  
  average-multiplier                      ;; mean value of annual multiplier values of all plots managed by farm agent 
  average-soil-quality                    ;; mean value of quality values of all plots managed by farm agent 
  crop-mix                                ;; list of proportion of crops relative to total k-acres of farm agent  
  acres-total-crop                        ;; summation of all crop acres from all managed plots 
  acres-crop-1                            ;; total acres of wheat production 
  acres-crop-2                            ;; total acres of oats production 
  acres-crop-3                            ;; total acres of barley production 
  acres-crop-4                            ;; total acres of flax production 
  acres-crop-5                            ;; total acres of fallow 
  prodn-crop-total   ;; summation of all crop production from all managed plots 
  prodn-crop-1   ;; total production volume of wheat 
  prodn-crop-2   ;; total production volume of oats 
  prodn-crop-3   ;; total production volume of barley  
  prodn-crop-4   ;; total production volume of flax 
  variable-prodn-costs                    ;; total variable costs for farm agent in current production period 
  hired-labour                            ;; total cost of hired labour for farm agent in current production period  
  travel-cost                             ;; total cost of traveling, moving machinery between plots  
  trucking-cost                           ;; total cost of transporting crop production from plots to farmstead  
  capital-replacement-charge             ;; total cost of equipment replacement (assumed to equal economic depreciation) 
  debt-list                               ;; tracks each debt separately [payments remaining, annual payment, principal balance]  
  debt                                    ;; summation of individual principal balances of all outstanding debts 
  debt-payment                            ;; summation of individual annual payments of all outstanding debts 
  cash                                    ;; residual asset account 
  capital-value                           ;; value of farm equipment and facilities 
  land-value                              ;; market value of all land owned by farm agent 
  asset-value                             ;; summation of land-value, capital-value, cash and NISA account      
  equity-value                            ;; asset-value less debt 
  total-lease-payment                     ;; summation of annual lease-payment of all plots leased by farm agent 
  family-withdrawal                       ;; managerial and operator annual withdrawal  
  NCFBI                                   ;; Net CashFlow Before Investment (cashflow prior to purchasing additional land)    
  plots-owned                             ;; number of plots owned by farm agent 
  plots-leased                            ;; number of plots leased by farm agent 
  residual-to-land-labor                  ;; annual residual return to land and labour of farm agent 
  residual-to-land-labor-exp             ;; expected residual return to land and labour of farm agent 
  expected-production-volume             ;; expectation of crop production on an acre of crop land  
  current-plot-bid-on                     ;; used in auctions to track plot interesting in purchasing, leasing 
  attitude                                ;; managerial attitude of farm agent 
  current-bid                             ;; used in auctions to track current bid value of farm agent  
  years-neg-cash                          ;; tracks number of years since farm realized a net positive cashflow 
  prodn-conv-factor                       ;; used to convert bushels to tonnes 
  transfers-received                      ;; tracks value of annual transfer payments to farm agent 
  WGSA-levy   ;; annual levy paid to WGSA program by farm agent 
  WGSA-levy-list   ;; list of levies paid to WGSA program by farm agent in previous periods 
  NISA-MA   ;; NISA program list of historic farm returns over variable costs 
  NISA-ENS   ;; NISA program list of historic farm eligible net sales in previous periods 
  NISA-fund-1   ;; NISA program balance in NISA account fund 1 
  NISA-fund-2   ;; NISA program balance in NISA account fund 2 
  NISA-deposit   ;; NISA program cash deposit into NISA account by farm agent 
  NISA-withdrawal   ;; NISA program maximum triggered withdrawal 
  SCGP-transfer   ;; SCGP program transfers received by farm agent 
  AIDA-MA   ;; AIDA program list of historic farm returns over variable costs 
  AIDA-payment   ;; AIDA program payment received by farm agent 
]  
  
 breeds 
  [farmers]    ;; farm agents 
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------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-------------------------------------------------------- INITIALIZATION PHASE CONTROL --------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------   
 
to initialization-phase-control 
 
if "yes" = (user-choice 
                   "Have Output Files Been Initialized?" 
                   ["no" "yes"]) 
  [ setup ] 
   
end 
 
to setup 
 
  ca 
  clear-output 
  create-plots 
  initialize-farm-agents 
  import-crop-arrays 
  export-data 
  show "initialization complete" 
     
end 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
---------------------------------------------------------------------- CREATE PLOTS ---------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
to create-plots 
 
  assign-patch-id 
  clear-land-tenure 
  set-quality-and-cultivated-acres 
  set land-price initial-land-price 
  set average-rent initial-lease-rate 
   
end 
    
to assign-patch-id 
 
  locals [counter] 
 
  ask patches with [pxcor = screen-edge-x][set patch-id "border"]  
  ask patches with [pycor = screen-edge-y][set patch-id "border"] 
 
  set counter 1 
  ask patches with [patch-id != "border"][without-interruption [set patch-id counter set counter counter + 1]] 
  ask patches with [patch-id = "border"][set pcolor 7] 
 
end       
         
to clear-land-tenure 
 
  ask patches [set owner "NA"  
                      set farmer "NA"  
                      set renter "NA"] 
 
  ask patches with [patch-id != "border"] 
                    [set for-sale? true 
                     set for-rent? true]         
         
end         
 
to set-quality-and-cultivated-acres 
 
  ask patches [set quality random-normal 1 0.05]                                            
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    diffuse quality 0.75  
  ask patches [set quality precision quality 2]    
  ask patches with [patch-id = "border"][set quality 0]  
 
  ask patches [set k-acres random-normal 150 15] 
    diffuse k-acres .75 
  ask patches [set k-acres precision k-acres 0]    
  ask patches with [patch-id = "border"][set k-acres 0] 
  ask patches with [patch-id != "border"][if k-acres > 160 [set k-acres 160]] 
 
end 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------- CREATE FARM AGENTS ------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
  
to initialize-farm-agents 
  
   create-farm-agents 
   assign-farm-agent-attributes 
          
end        
  
to create-farm-agents 
  
   create-farmers 310 
   ask farmers [set color red]    
   ask farmers [set heading random 360] 
   ask farmers [fd random 1000]                                                    
   ask farmers [if any? other-turtles-here  
                  or patch-id-of patch-at 0 0 = "border" [ find-new-spot ]]  
   ask farmers [set xcor pxcor-of patch-at 0 0]   
   ask farmers [set ycor pycor-of patch-at 0 0]  
   ask farmers [set owner-of (patch-at 0 0) who]                                    
   ask farmers [set farmer-of(patch-at 0 0) who]  
   ask patches with [patch-id != "border" and farmer != "NA"][set for-sale? false set for-rent? false]       
      
end 
  
to assign-farm-agent-attributes 
  
   ask farmers [set generation 1] 
    
   file-open "age profile.txt" 
   ask farmers [set age file-read] 
   file-close 
    
   file-open "plots-owned.txt" 
   ask farmers [set plots-owned file-read] 
   file-close 
    
   file-open "plots-leased.txt" 
   ask farmers [set plots-leased file-read] 
   file-close   
    
   ask farmers [own rent] 
                
   file-open "debt-list.txt" 
   ask farmers [set debt-list file-read] 
   file-close   
    
   file-open "initial-cash-value.txt" 
   ask farmers [set cash file-read] 
   file-close 
    
   ask farmers [set attitude 3] 
   ask random-n-of attitude-2-initial farmers with [attitude = 3][set attitude 2] 
   ask random-n-of attitude-1-initial farmers with [attitude = 3][set attitude 1] 
    
   ask farmers with [attitude = 1][set crop-mix (list 0.55 0.0 0.0 0.05)] 
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   ask farmers with [attitude = 2][set crop-mix (list 0.55 0.0 0.05 0.0)] 
   ask farmers with [attitude = 3][set crop-mix (list 0.55 0.05 0.0 0.0)] 
   ask farmers [if age > preretirement-age [set crop-mix (list 0.55 0.05 0.0 0.0)]]    
    
   file-open "residual-to-land-labor.txt" 
   ask farmers [set residual-to-land-labor-exp file-read] 
   file-close 
    
   file-open "expected-crop-volume.txt" 
   ask farmers [set expected-production-volume file-read] 
   file-close 
    
   ask farmers [set acres-total-crop sum values-from patches with [farmer = who-of myself][k-acres]] 
   ask farmers [set capital-value (capital-per-acre * acres-total-crop)] 
   ask farmers [ifelse debt-list != [] [set debt item 2 item 0 debt-list][set debt 0]] 
   ask farmers [set cash 15 * acres-total-crop] 
    
   farm-accounting-module 
    
   set equip-purchase-adjustment precision(capital-per-acre *(interest-rate / (1 - (1 / (1 + interest-rate)^ 20))))2 
    
   set WGSA-NCF-MA [] 
   set WGSA-NCFPT-MA [] 
    
   ask farmers [set NISA-MA []] 
   ask farmers [set NISA-ENS []] 
   ask farmers [set AIDA-MA []] 
   ask farmers [set WGSA-levy-list []] 
    
end 
  
to find-new-spot                                                               
        
  fd random 1000                                                                
  if any? other-turtles-here  
  or patch-id-of patch-at 0 0 = "border"[ find-new-spot]                     
             
end      
  
to own                                                                         
 
  if ((count patches with [owner = who-of myself]) 
        < plots-owned)[find-land] 
 
end 
 
to find-land 
     
  without-interruption [ask min-one-of patches with [for-sale? = true][(abs(pxcor - xcor-of myself) + abs(pycor - ycor-of myself))]            
      [set farmer who-of myself 
       set owner who-of myself 
       set distance-to-farmstead abs((pxcor - value-from turtle (farmer)[xcor]))+ 
                                 abs((pycor - value-from turtle (farmer)[ycor])) 
       set for-sale? false 
       set for-rent? false 
       set pcolor blue 
       ]] 
        
  if ((count patches with [owner = who-of myself])                               
    < plots-owned)[find-land] 
   
end 
 
to rent                                                                        
   
  if ((count patches with [renter = who-of myself]) 
    < plots-leased)[find-land-lease] 
     
end 
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to find-land-lease 
     
  without-interruption [ask min-one-of patches with [for-rent? = true][(abs(pxcor - xcor-of myself) + abs(pycor - ycor-of myself))] 
              
      [set farmer who-of myself 
       set renter who-of myself 
       set lease-term random 5 + 1 
       set lease-payment (initial-lease-rate * quality) 
       set distance-to-farmstead abs((pxcor - value-from turtle (farmer)[xcor]))+ 
                                 abs((pycor - value-from turtle (farmer)[ycor])) 
       set for-sale? false 
       set for-rent? false 
       set pcolor green 
       ]] 
        
  if ((count patches with [renter = who-of myself])                               
    < plots-leased)[find-land-lease] 
   
end         
        
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
---------------------------------------------------------------- ASSIGN PARAMETERS -----------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
         
to import-crop-arrays 
   
  file-open "yield crop 1.txt" 
  set yield-crop-1 file-read 
  file-close 
   
  file-open "yield crop 2.txt" 
  set yield-crop-2 file-read 
  file-close 
   
  file-open "yield crop 3.txt" 
  set yield-crop-3 file-read 
  file-close 
   
  file-open "yield crop 4.txt" 
  set yield-crop-4 file-read 
  file-close 
   
  import-price-arrays 
   
  if ASA = true[import-price-support]   
   
  file-open "crop-1-list.txt" 
  set crop-1-list file-read 
  file-close 
   
  file-open "crop-2-list.txt" 
  set crop-2-list file-read 
  file-close 
   
  file-open "crop-3-list.txt" 
  set crop-3-list file-read 
  file-close 
   
  file-open "crop-4-list.txt" 
  set crop-4-list file-read 
  file-close 
   
end 
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to import-price-arrays 
   
  file-open "price crop 1.txt" 
  set price-crop-1 file-read 
  file-close 
   
  file-open "price crop 2.txt" 
  set price-crop-2 file-read 
  file-close 
   
  file-open "price crop 3.txt" 
  set price-crop-3 file-read 
  file-close 
   
  file-open "price crop 4.txt" 
  set price-crop-4 file-read 
  file-close 
   
end                       
         
to import-price-support 
   
  file-open "subsidy-crop-1-ASA.txt" 
  set subsidy-ASA-crop-1 file-read 
  file-close 
   
  file-open "subsidy-crop-2-ASA.txt" 
  set subsidy-ASA-crop-2 file-read 
  file-close 
   
  file-open "subsidy-crop-3-ASA.txt" 
  set subsidy-ASA-crop-3 file-read 
  file-close 
   
  file-open "subsidy-crop-4-ASA.txt" 
  set subsidy-ASA-crop-4 file-read 
  file-close 
   
end       
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
----------------------------------------------------------- SIMULATION PHASE CONTROL  ---------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
         
to simulation-phase 
 
  set year year + 1 
  crop-production-module 
  farm-accounting-module 
  expectation-formation-module 
  adjust-crop-mix 
  continue-farming-module? 
  update-land-leases       
  land-purchase-auction-module 
  land-lease-auction-module 
  ask farmers [capital-expenditure-module] 
  ask farmers [set age age + 1] 
  export-data 
  ask farmers [set cash cash * 1.02] 
  if year < simulation-length [simulation-phase] 
  show "complete" 
 
end 
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------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
----------------------------------------------------------- CROP PRODUCTION MODULE ------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
to crop-production-module 
 
  simulate-crop-revenue 
  simulate-variable-prodn-costs 
  simulate-hired-labour-cost 
  simulate-transport-cost 
  simulate-capital-replacement-charge 
  ask farmers [simulate-debt-servicing] 
  simulate-lease-payments 
  ask farmers [set transfers-received 0] 
  if ASA   = true [simulate-ASA-transfer] 
  if NISA  = true [simulate-NISA-transfer] 
  if WGSA  = true [simulate-WGSA-transfer] 
  if GRIP  = true [simulate-GRIP-transfer] 
  if SCGP  = true [simulate-SCGP-transfer] 
  if CCDAP = true [simulate-CCDAP-transfer] 
  if AIDA  = true [simulate-AIDA-transfer] 
  set-net-cash-flow-before-investment 
  simulate-living-deductions 
     
end 
 
to simulate-crop-revenue 
 
  ask patches [set rain random-normal 1 0.05]                                            
    diffuse rain 0.75  
      ask patches [set rain precision rain 2]    
      ask patches with [patch-id = "border"][set rain 0]  
 
  ask patches with [patch-id != "border"][set annual-multiplier rain * quality]      
  ask farmers [set acres-total-crop sum values-from patches with [farmer = who-of myself][k-acres]]     
  ask farmers [set average-multiplier (sum values-from patches with [farmer = who-of myself] 
 [annual-multiplier * k-acres]) / acres-total-crop]      
  ask farmers [set average-soil-quality (sum values-from patches with [farmer = who-of myself][quality * k-acres]) / acres-total-crop]               
  ask farmers [set acres-crop-1 (item 0 crop-mix) * acres-total-crop 
              set acres-crop-2 (item 1 crop-mix) * acres-total-crop  
               set acres-crop-3 (item 2 crop-mix) * acres-total-crop  
               set acres-crop-4 (item 3 crop-mix) * acres-total-crop 
               set acres-crop-5 (1 - (sum crop-mix)) * acres-total-crop] 
 
  ask farmers [set prodn-crop-1 acres-crop-1 * average-multiplier * (item (year) yield-crop-1) 
                  set prodn-crop-2 acres-crop-2 * average-multiplier * (item (year) yield-crop-2)     
                  set prodn-crop-3 acres-crop-3 * average-multiplier * (item (year) yield-crop-3)  
                  set prodn-crop-4 acres-crop-4 * average-multiplier * (item (year) yield-crop-4) 
                  set prodn-crop-total prodn-crop-1 + prodn-crop-2 + prodn-crop-3 + prodn-crop-4  ]  
              
  ask farmers [set crop-revenue prodn-crop-1 * (item (year) price-crop-1)        
                  + prodn-crop-2 * (item (year) price-crop-2)  
                  + prodn-crop-3 * (item (year) price-crop-3)  
                  + prodn-crop-4 * (item (year) price-crop-4)] 
 
  ask farmers [ask patches with [farmer = who-of myself] 
                 [set prodn-volume (annual-multiplier / average-multiplier-of myself) 
                   * (prodn-crop-total-of myself / acres-total-crop-of myself) * k-acres]]  
 
end 
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to simulate-variable-prodn-costs 
 
  ask farmers [set variable-prodn-costs precision ( 
                                      acres-crop-1 * per-acre-vc-1 + prodn-crop-1 * per-bu-vc-1 
                                    + acres-crop-2 * per-acre-vc-2 + prodn-crop-2 * per-bu-vc-2  
                                    + acres-crop-3 * per-acre-vc-3 + prodn-crop-3 * per-bu-vc-3  
                                    + acres-crop-4 * per-acre-vc-4 + prodn-crop-4 * per-bu-vc-4 
                                    + acres-crop-5 * per-acre-vc-5)0]  
 
end 
 
to simulate-hired-labour-cost 
 
  ask farmers [set hired-labour precision (((0.8 / (1 + 14500 * exp (-0.009 * acres-total-crop))) + 0.03) * acres-total-crop)0] 
 
end 
 
to simulate-transport-cost 
 
  ask farmers [set prodn-conv-factor (item 0 crop-mix * 36.7437  
                                  + item 1 crop-mix * 64.8418  
                                  + item 2 crop-mix * 45.9296  
                                  + item 3 crop-mix * 39.3683) 
                                  / 0.6 ] 
 
  ask farmers [set travel-cost (sum values-from patches with [farmer = who-of myself][distance-to-farmstead]) * travel-adjustment] 
  ask farmers [set trucking-cost precision (sum values-from patches with [farmer = who-of myself]  
            [prodn-volume * distance-to-farmstead] * trucking-rate / prodn-conv-factor)0] 
 
end 
 
to simulate-capital-replacement-charge 
 
  ask farmers [set capital-replacement-charge capital-value * depreciation-rate] 
 
end 
 
to simulate-debt-servicing  
   
    locals [result  
            result2  
            result3 
            list-index 
           ] 
 
  set result2 add debt-list  
  set debt-payment result2  
     
  set list-index 0 
  foreach debt-list [ 
                              set debt-list replace-item list-index debt-list list (item 0 ? - 1) (item 1 ?)  
                              set list-index list-index + 1]  
 
  set debt-list filter [first ? != 0] debt-list 
  set list-index 0 
  foreach debt-list [ 
                              if item 0 ? = 0 [set debt-list remove (item list-index debt-list) debt-list] 
                              set list-index list-index + 1 
                             ] 
 
  set list-index 0 
  foreach debt-list [ 
                              set debt-list replace-item list-index debt-list (list (item 0 ?)(item 1 ?) 
                              (precision (item 1 ? * ((1 - ( 1 / (1 + interest-rate)^ item 0 ?))/ interest-rate))0)) 
                              set list-index list-index + 1]  
 
  set result3 add2 debt-list  
  set debt result3 
         
 end 
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----------------------------------------------- 
---------- CALCULATORS -------------- 
----------------------------------------------- 
             
              to-report product [lst] 
                 locals[result] 
                 set result 1 
                 foreach lst [set result result * ?] 
                 report result 
              end 
 
              to-report add [lst] 
                 locals [result] 
                 set result 0 
                 foreach lst [set result result + item 1 ?] 
                 report result 
              end 
               
              to-report add2 [lst] 
                 locals [result] 
                 set result 0 
                 foreach lst [set result result + item 2 ?] 
                 report result 
              end 
 
to simulate-lease-payments 
 
  ask farmers [set total-lease-payment (sum values-from patches with [farmer = who-of myself][lease-payment * k-acres])] 
   
end 
 
to set-net-cash-flow-before-investment 
 
  ask farmers [set NCFBI  crop-revenue 
                       + transfers-received 
                       - NISA-deposit 
                       - variable-prodn-costs 
                       - hired-labour 
                       - travel-cost 
                       - trucking-cost 
                       - capital-replacement-charge 
                       - debt-payment 
                       - total-lease-payment] 
                                            
end 
 
to simulate-living-deductions 
   
  ask farmers [set family-withdrawal min-family-withdrawal + 0.068 * crop-revenue + 125 * (plots-owned + plots-leased)] 
                                          
  ask farmers [set NCFBI precision (NCFBI - family-withdrawal)0] 
   
  ask farmers [if (NCFBI < 0 and NISA-withdrawal > 0) [make-NISA-withdrawal]] 
   
  ask farmers [ifelse (NCFBI < 0)  
              [set years-neg-cash years-neg-cash + 1][set years-neg-cash 0]] 
            
  ask farmers [set NISA-fund-1 precision (NISA-fund-1 + NISA-deposit)0] 
  ask farmers [set NISA-fund-2 precision (NISA-fund-2 + NISA-deposit)0]             
               
  ask farmers [set cash precision(cash + NCFBI)0] 
                                      
end 
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to make-NISA-withdrawal 
 
  if NISA-withdrawal > (-1 * NCFBI)[set NISA-withdrawal (-1 * NCFBI)] 
  set NISA-fund-1 precision (NISA-fund-1 - NISA-withdrawal)0 
  if NISA-fund-1 < 0 [set NISA-fund-2 precision (NISA-fund-2 + NISA-fund-1)0 set NISA-fund-1 0] 
  set NCFBI NCFBI + NISA-withdrawal 
 
end                  
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------------------------------------------------- ASA POLICY --------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
           
to simulate-ASA-transfer 
 
  if (year < 17 and ASA = true)[ 
   
  ask farmers  [set transfers-received prodn-crop-1 * (item (year) subsidy-ASA-crop-1)        
                                     + prodn-crop-2 * (item (year) subsidy-ASA-crop-2)  
                                     + prodn-crop-3 * (item (year) subsidy-ASA-crop-3)  
                                     + prodn-crop-4 * (item (year) subsidy-ASA-crop-4)]] 
                               
end 
           
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------------------------------------------  WGSA POLICY -----------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
           
to simulate-WGSA-transfer 
 
  ask farmers [set WGSA-levy 0] 
  if (year >= 12 and year <= 16)[start-track-NCF] 
  if (year >= 14 and year <= 16)[start-levy-list] 
  if (year >= 17 and year <= 24)[WGSA-I] 
  if (year >= 20 and year <= 24)[start-track-NCFPT] 
  if (year >= 25 and year <= 30)[WGSA-II]  
 
end 
           
to start-track-NCF 
 
  set WGSA-NCF-MA fput (precision((sum values-from farmers [crop-revenue - variable-prodn-costs]))0) WGSA-NCF-MA 
   
end   
 
to start-levy-list 
 
  ask farmers [set WGSA-levy-list fput (precision (crop-revenue * 0.02)0) WGSA-levy-list] 
 
end 
 
to WGSA-I 
 
  set WGSA-total-payout precision (max list (0)  
                                            (mean WGSA-NCF-MA - (sum values-from farmers [crop-revenue - variable-prodn-costs])) 
                                            )0 
 
  set WGSA-NCF-MA fput (precision(sum values-from farmers [crop-revenue - variable-prodn-costs])0) WGSA-NCF-MA  
  set WGSA-NCF-MA remove-item 5 WGSA-NCF-MA 
   
  ask farmers [set WGSA-levy precision (0.02 * crop-revenue)0] 
  ask farmers [set WGSA-levy-list fput WGSA-levy WGSA-levy-list] 
  ask farmers [set WGSA-levy-list remove-item 3 WGSA-levy-list] 
   
  set WGSA-total-levy sum values-from farmers [mean WGSA-levy-list] 
   
  ask farmers [set transfers-received precision (((mean WGSA-levy-list / WGSA-total-levy) * WGSA-total-payout)- WGSA-levy)0] 
   
end 
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to start-track-NCFPT 
 
  set WGSA-NCFPT-MA fput (precision(sum values-from farmers [(crop-revenue - variable-prodn-costs)]  
                                  /(sum values-from farmers [prodn-crop-total]))2) WGSA-NCFPT-MA 
   
end  
 
to WGSA-II 
 
  set WGSA-total-payout precision (max (list (0)  
                                            (mean WGSA-NCF-MA - (sum values-from farmers [crop-revenue - variable-prodn-costs])) 
                                            ((mean WGSA-NCFPT-MA * (sum values-from farmers [prodn-crop-total]))  
                                              - (sum values-from farmers [crop-revenue - variable-prodn-costs]))) 
                                            )0 
 
  set WGSA-NCF-MA fput (precision(sum values-from farmers [crop-revenue - variable-prodn-costs])0) WGSA-NCF-MA  
  set WGSA-NCF-MA remove-item 5 WGSA-NCF-MA 
   
  set WGSA-NCFPT-MA fput (precision(sum values-from farmers [(crop-revenue - variable-prodn-costs)] 
                                  /(sum values-from farmers [prodn-crop-total]))2) WGSA-NCFPT-MA 
  set WGSA-NCFPT-MA remove-item 5 WGSA-NCFPT-MA 
   
  ask farmers [set WGSA-levy precision (0.02 * crop-revenue)0] 
  ask farmers [set WGSA-levy-list fput WGSA-levy WGSA-levy-list] 
  ask farmers [set WGSA-levy-list remove-item 3 WGSA-levy-list] 
   
  set WGSA-total-levy sum values-from farmers [mean WGSA-levy-list] 
   
  ask farmers [set transfers-received precision (((mean WGSA-levy-list / WGSA-total-levy) * WGSA-total-payout)- WGSA-levy)0] 
   
end 
           
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------  GRIP POLICY ---------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
           
to simulate-GRIP-transfer 
 
  if (year >= 31 and year <= 32)[calculate-GRIP-transfer] 
 
end           
 
to calculate-GRIP-transfer 
 
  set-IMAPs 
  if year = 31 [GRIP-transfer-1] 
  if year = 32 [GRIP-transfer-2] 
 
end 
  
to set-IMAPs 
 
  set IMAP-1 0 
  set tracking-number 3 
  set-IMAP-1 
  set IMAP-2 0 
  set tracking-number 3 
  set-IMAP-2 
  set IMAP-3 0 
  set tracking-number 3 
  set-IMAP-3 
  set IMAP-4 0 
  set tracking-number 3 
  set-IMAP-4 
   
end 
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to set-IMAP-1 
 
  set IMAP-1 IMAP-1 + item (year - tracking-number) price-crop-1 
  set tracking-number tracking-number + 1  
  ifelse tracking-number <= 17 [set-IMAP-1][set IMAP-1 IMAP-1 / 15] 
  
end  
 
to set-IMAP-2 
 
  set IMAP-2 IMAP-2 + item (year - tracking-number) price-crop-2 
  set tracking-number tracking-number + 1  
  ifelse tracking-number <= 17 [set-IMAP-2][set IMAP-2 IMAP-2 / 15] 
  
end  
 
to set-IMAP-3 
   
  set IMAP-3 IMAP-3 + item (year - tracking-number) price-crop-3 
  set tracking-number tracking-number + 1  
  ifelse tracking-number <= 17 [set-IMAP-3][set IMAP-3 IMAP-3 / 15] 
  
end  
 
to set-IMAP-4 
 
  set IMAP-4 IMAP-4 + item (year - tracking-number) price-crop-4 
  set tracking-number tracking-number + 1  
  ifelse tracking-number <= 17 [set-IMAP-4][set IMAP-4 IMAP-4 / 15] 
  
end  
 
to GRIP-transfer-1 
 
  ask farmers [set transfers-received transfers-received +  
   (max list (0) ((IMAP-1 * 21.3 * average-soil-quality * acres-crop-1) - (prodn-crop-1 * item (year) price-crop-1))) 
               +(max list (0) ((IMAP-2 * 38.4 * average-soil-quality * acres-crop-2) - (prodn-crop-2 * item (year) price-crop-2))) 
               +(max list (0) ((IMAP-3 * 33.3 * average-soil-quality * acres-crop-3) - (prodn-crop-3 * item (year) price-crop-3))) 
               +(max list (0) ((IMAP-4 * 9.90  * average-soil-quality * acres-crop-4) - (prodn-crop-4 * item (year) price-crop-4))) 
                                      ]   
  ask farmers [set transfers-received precision (transfers-received - (((IMAP-1 * 21.3 * 0.1855 * average-soil-quality * acres-crop-1) 
                                                                       +(IMAP-2 * 38.4 * 0.1126 * average-soil-quality * acres-crop-2) 
                                                                       +(IMAP-3 * 33.3 * 0.1651 * average-soil-quality * acres-crop-3) 
                                                                       +(IMAP-4 * 9.9  * 0.1842 * average-soil-quality * acres-crop-4)) 
                                                                       * 1 / 3))0] 
     
end 
 
to GRIP-transfer-2 
 
  locals [per-acre-transfer per-acre-premium] 
   
  set per-acre-transfer (((sum values-from farmers [acres-crop-1] * 21.3 * (IMAP-1 - item (year) price-crop-1)) 
                         +(sum values-from farmers [acres-crop-2] * 38.4 * (IMAP-2 - item (year) price-crop-2)) 
                         +(sum values-from farmers [acres-crop-3] * 33.3 * (IMAP-3 - item (year) price-crop-3)) 
                         +(sum values-from farmers [acres-crop-4] *  9.9 * (IMAP-4 - item (year) price-crop-4))) 
                        / (sum values-from farmers [acres-total-crop - acres-crop-5])) 
                   
  set per-acre-premium (((sum values-from farmers [acres-crop-1] * 21.3 * IMAP-1 * 0.1855) 
                        +(sum values-from farmers [acres-crop-2] * 38.4 * IMAP-2 * 0.1126) 
                        +(sum values-from farmers [acres-crop-3] * 33.3 * IMAP-3 * 0.1651) 
                        +(sum values-from farmers [acres-crop-4] *  9.9 * IMAP-4 * 0.1842)) 
                        /(sum values-from farmers [acres-total-crop - acres-crop-5])) 
                                                                      
  ask farmers [if per-acre-transfer > 0 [set transfers-received precision (transfers-received + 
                                                                ((acres-crop-1 + acres-crop-2 + acres-crop-3 + acres-crop-4) 
                                                                * average-soil-quality * (per-acre-transfer - per-acre-premium)))0]]  
                                                             
end 
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------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
---------------------------------------------------------------------  SCGP POLICY -----------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------           
 
to simulate-SCGP-transfer 
 
  ask farmers [set SCGP-transfer 0] 
  if (year = 26)[SCGP-I] 
  if (year = 27)[SCGP-II] 
   
end 
           
to SCGP-I 
 
  ask farmers [set SCGP-transfer precision ((acres-crop-1 * 21.3 * 0.11) 
                                          + (acres-crop-2 * 38.4 * 0.04) 
                                          + (acres-crop-3 * 33.3 * 0.06) 
                                          + (acres-crop-4 * 9.90 * 0.11))0] 
  ask farmers [if SCGP-transfer > 5500 [set SCGP-transfer 5500]] 
  ask farmers [set cash precision (cash + SCGP-transfer)0] 
  ask farmers [set transfers-received precision (transfers-received + SCGP-transfer)0]                
 
end 
 
to SCGP-II 
 
  SCGP-I 
   
end      
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------------------------------------------- CCDAP POLICY ----------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
        
to simulate-CCDAP-transfer 
 
  if year = 26 [ask farmers [set transfers-received transfers-received + 3.3 * acres-total-crop * 0.6 
                             set cash cash + 3.3 * acres-total-crop * 0.6]] 
                            
  if year = 28 [ask farmers [set transfers-received transfers-received + 8.8 * acres-total-crop * 0.6 
                             set cash cash + 8.8 * acres-total-crop * 0.6]]                            
 
end 
           
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------------------------------------------- NISA POLICY -------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
           
to simulate-NISA-transfer 
 
  if (year >= 28 and year <= 30)[start-track-NISA] 
  if (year >= 31 and year <= 41)[NISA-transfer] 
          
end  
 
to start-track-NISA 
 
  ask farmers [set NISA-MA fput (precision (crop-revenue - variable-prodn-costs)0) NISA-MA] 
  ask farmers [set NISA-ENS fput (precision (crop-revenue)0) NISA-ENS]  
 
end  
 
to NISA-transfer 
 
  ask farmers [ifelse (NISA-fund-1 + NISA-fund-2) < ((mean NISA-ENS) * 1.5) 
  [set NISA-deposit 0.03 * crop-revenue][set NISA-deposit 0]] 
  ask farmers [set NISA-fund-1 precision (NISA-fund-1 * (1 + 0.5 * interest-rate + 0.03))0] 
  ask farmers [set NISA-fund-2 precision (NISA-fund-2 * (1 + 0.5 * interest-rate))0] 
  ask farmers [set NISA-withdrawal precision (min list (mean NISA-MA - (crop-revenue - variable-prodn-costs)) 
  (NISA-fund-1 + NISA-fund-2))0] 
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  ask farmers [if NISA-withdrawal < 0 [set NISA-withdrawal 0]] 
  ask farmers [set NISA-MA fput (precision(crop-revenue - variable-prodn-costs)0)NISA-MA]  
  ask farmers [set NISA-MA remove-item 3 NISA-MA] 
  ask farmers [set NISA-ENS fput (precision(crop-revenue)0) NISA-ENS]  
  ask farmers [set NISA-ENS remove-item 3 NISA-ENS] 
 
end 
         
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------  AIDA POLICY  --------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
           
to simulate-AIDA-transfer 
  
   if (year >= 35 and year <= 37)[start-track-AIDA] 
   if (year >= 38 and year <= 40)[AIDA-transfer] 
  
end 
   
to start-track-AIDA  
    
  ask farmers [set AIDA-MA fput (precision (crop-revenue - variable-prodn-costs)0) AIDA-MA] 
    
end    
 
to AIDA-transfer 
 
  ask farmers [set AIDA-payment (( 0.7 * mean AIDA-MA) - (crop-revenue - variable-prodn-costs))] 
  ask farmers [if AIDA-payment < 0 [set AIDA-payment 0]] 
  ask farmers [set cash cash + AIDA-payment] 
  ask farmers [set transfers-received transfers-received + AIDA-payment] 
  ask farmers [set AIDA-MA fput (precision (crop-revenue - variable-prodn-costs)0) AIDA-MA] 
  ask farmers [set AIDA-MA remove-item 3 AIDA-MA]  
   
end   
                   
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------- FARM ACCOUNTING MODULE --------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
                       
 ;; NOTES  i.   net cash flow before investment calculated in crop production section 
 ;;                ii.  debt values updated in crop production section 
 ;;               iii.  total cultivated acres updated in crop production section 
 ;;               iv.  capital value updates in capital investment section 
  
  
to farm-accounting-module 
 
  ask farmers [determine-land-market-value] 
  ask farmers [refinance-loans?] 
  ask farmers [determine-asset-value] 
  ask farmers [determine-equity-value] 
  ask farmers [determine-land-tenure-state] 
   
end 
   
to determine-land-market-value 
  
  set land-value precision((sum values-from patches with [owner = who-of myself ][k-acres * quality]) * land-price)0 
    
end 
 
to refinance-loans? 
 
  locals [payment] 
 
  if debt > (0.75 * (land-value + capital-value)) 
     [set cash cash - (debt - 0.75 * (land-value + capital-value)) 
      set payment precision((0.75 * (land-value + capital-value)) * ((interest-rate) / ( 1 - ( 1 / ((1 + interest-rate)^ 20)))))2 
      set debt-list [] 
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      set debt-list fput(list 20 payment (precision (0.75 * (land-value + capital-value))0))debt-list 
      update-debt] 
      
end 
     
to determine-asset-value 
 
  set asset-value precision( land-value + capital-value + cash + NISA-fund-1 + NISA-fund-2)0 
   
end 
 
to determine-equity-value 
 
  set equity-value precision (asset-value - debt)0 
                   
end  
                    
to determine-land-tenure-state 
 
   set plots-leased (count patches with [renter = who-of myself and lease-term != 0]) 
   set plots-owned (count patches with [owner = who-of myself])                     
 
end 
 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
----------------------------------------------------------------EXPECTATION FORMATION ----------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
  
;; NOTES  i.   crop revenue is adjusted to represent soil quality of 1 
;;         ii.  travel and trucking costs are removed (will be adjusted for when farmers place bids) 
;;         iii. lease-payments and land debt payments are also removed because they are part of the return to land      
 
to expectation-formation-module 
 
  ask farmers [set residual-to-land-labor precision  
                   (((crop-revenue / average-soil-quality)  
                     - variable-prodn-costs  
                     - capital-replacement-charge 
                     - (0.068 * crop-revenue) 
                     - (125 * (plots-leased + plots-owned)))  
                     / acres-total-crop)2] 
                      
  ask farmers [ifelse residual-to-land-labor >= residual-to-land-labor-exp  
                  [set residual-to-land-labor-exp (residual-to-land-labor-exp * (1 - expectation-weight) 
                                                 + (expectation-weight * residual-to-land-labor))]                     
                  [set residual-to-land-labor-exp (residual-to-land-labor-exp * (1 - (1 * expectation-weight)) 
                                                 + ((1 * expectation-weight) * residual-to-land-labor))]] 
   
  ask farmers [set expected-production-volume precision 
                   ((expected-production-volume * (1 - expectation-weight))  + 
                    (prodn-crop-total / average-soil-quality / acres-total-crop / prodn-conv-factor)* expectation-weight)0] 
                   
end 
       
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-----------------------------------------------------  MANAGERIAL ADJUSTMENT MODULE ----------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
  
to adjust-crop-mix 
 
  expanding-farms-crop-mix-adjustment 
  cautious-farms-crop-mix-adjustment 
  lifestyle-farms-crop-mix-adjustment 
  set-crop-lists 
   
end 
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to expanding-farms-crop-mix-adjustment 
 
  set-crop-value-expanding  
  rank-crops 
  set-crop-mix 
  ask farmers with [attitude = 1 and age <= preretirement-age][set crop-mix mix] 
   
end 
 
to cautious-farms-crop-mix-adjustment 
 
  set-crop-value-cautious  
  rank-crops 
  set-crop-mix 
  ask farmers with [attitude = 2 and age <= preretirement-age][set crop-mix mix] 
   
end 
 
to lifestyle-farms-crop-mix-adjustment 
 
  set-crop-value-lifestyle  
  rank-crops 
  set-crop-mix 
  ask farmers with [attitude = 3 or age > preretirement-age][set crop-mix mix] 
   
end 
 
to set-crop-lists 
 
  set crop-1-list remove-item 0 crop-1-list 
  set crop-1-list lput (item (year) yield-crop-1 * item (year) price-crop-1  
                  - (per-acre-vc-1 + per-bu-vc-1 * item (year) yield-crop-1)) crop-1-list          
 
  set crop-2-list remove-item 0 crop-2-list 
  set crop-2-list lput (item (year) yield-crop-2 * item (year) price-crop-2  
                  - (per-acre-vc-2 + per-bu-vc-2 * item (year) yield-crop-2)) crop-2-list 
 
  set crop-3-list remove-item 0 crop-3-list 
  set crop-3-list lput (item (year) yield-crop-3 * item (year) price-crop-3  
                  - (per-acre-vc-3 + per-bu-vc-3 * item (year) yield-crop-3)) crop-3-list 
 
  set crop-4-list remove-item 0 crop-4-list 
  set crop-4-list lput (item (year) yield-crop-4 * item (year) price-crop-4  
                  - (per-acre-vc-4 + per-bu-vc-4 * item (year) yield-crop-4)) crop-4-list 
 
end 
 
to set-crop-value-expanding 
 
  set crop-1-value ((mean crop-1-list) - (0.5 * (1 - discount-value-1) * (variance crop-1-list)))   
  set crop-2-value ((mean crop-2-list) - (0.5 * (1 - discount-value-1) * (variance crop-2-list))) 
  set crop-3-value ((mean crop-3-list) - (0.5 * (1 - discount-value-1) * (variance crop-3-list))) 
  set crop-4-value ((mean crop-4-list) - (0.5 * (1 - discount-value-1) * (variance crop-4-list))) 
   
end 
 
to set-crop-value-cautious 
 
  set crop-1-value ((mean crop-1-list) - (0.5 * (1 - discount-value-2) * (variance crop-1-list))) 
  set crop-2-value ((mean crop-2-list) - (0.5 * (1 - discount-value-2) * (variance crop-2-list))) 
  set crop-3-value ((mean crop-3-list) - (0.5 * (1 - discount-value-2) * (variance crop-3-list))) 
  set crop-4-value ((mean crop-4-list) - (0.5 * (1 - discount-value-2) * (variance crop-4-list))) 
 
end 
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to set-crop-value-lifestyle 
 
  set crop-1-value ((mean crop-1-list) - (0.5 * (1 - discount-value-3) * (variance crop-1-list))) 
  set crop-2-value ((mean crop-2-list) - (0.5 * (1 - discount-value-3) * (variance crop-2-list))) 
  set crop-3-value ((mean crop-3-list) - (0.5 * (1 - discount-value-3) * (variance crop-3-list))) 
  set crop-4-value ((mean crop-4-list) - (0.5 * (1 - discount-value-3) * (variance crop-4-list))) 
 
end 
 
to rank-crops 
 
  set crop-1-rank 4 
  set crop-2-rank 4 
  set crop-3-rank 4 
  set crop-4-rank 4 
 
  if crop-1-value > crop-2-value [set crop-1-rank crop-1-rank - 1] 
  if crop-1-value > crop-3-value [set crop-1-rank crop-1-rank - 1] 
  if crop-1-value > crop-4-value [set crop-1-rank crop-1-rank - 1] 
 
  if crop-2-value > crop-1-value [set crop-2-rank crop-2-rank - 1] 
  if crop-2-value > crop-3-value [set crop-2-rank crop-2-rank - 1] 
  if crop-2-value > crop-4-value [set crop-2-rank crop-2-rank - 1] 
 
  if crop-3-value > crop-1-value [set crop-3-rank crop-3-rank - 1] 
  if crop-3-value > crop-2-value [set crop-3-rank crop-3-rank - 1] 
  if crop-3-value > crop-4-value [set crop-3-rank crop-3-rank - 1] 
 
  if crop-4-value > crop-1-value [set crop-4-rank crop-4-rank - 1] 
  if crop-4-value > crop-2-value [set crop-4-rank crop-4-rank - 1] 
  if crop-4-value > crop-3-value [set crop-4-rank crop-4-rank - 1] 
 
 
end 
 
to set-crop-mix 
 
  locals [list-acres max-acres] 
 
  set mix [0 0 0 0] 
 
  if crop-1-rank = 1 [set mix replace-item 0 mix 0.55] 
  if crop-2-rank = 1 [set mix replace-item 1 mix 0.10] 
  if crop-3-rank = 1 [set mix replace-item 2 mix 0.10] 
  if crop-4-rank = 1 [set mix replace-item 3 mix 0.05] 
 
  if crop-1-rank = 2 [set list-acres [0.55 0] 
                      set list-acres replace-item 1 list-acres (precision (0.6 - (sum mix))2) 
                      set mix replace-item 0 mix (min list-acres)] 
 
  if crop-2-rank = 2 [set list-acres [0.10 0] 
                      set list-acres replace-item 1 list-acres (precision(0.6 - (sum mix))2) 
                      set mix replace-item 1 mix (min list-acres)] 
                     
  if crop-3-rank = 2 [set list-acres [0.10 0] 
                      set list-acres replace-item 1 list-acres (precision(0.6 - (sum mix))2) 
                      set mix replace-item 2 mix (min list-acres)] 
                     
  if crop-4-rank = 2 [set list-acres [0.05 0] 
                      set list-acres replace-item 1 list-acres (precision(0.6 - (sum mix))2) 
                      set mix replace-item 3 mix (min list-acres)]          
   
  if crop-1-rank = 3 [set list-acres [0.55 0] 
                      set list-acres replace-item 1 list-acres (precision (0.6 - (sum mix))2) 
                      set mix replace-item 0 mix (min list-acres)] 
 
  if crop-2-rank = 3 [set list-acres [0.10 0] 
                      set list-acres replace-item 1 list-acres (precision(0.6 - (sum mix))2) 
                      set mix replace-item 1 mix (min list-acres)] 
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  if crop-3-rank = 3 [set list-acres [0.10 0] 
                      set list-acres replace-item 1 list-acres (precision(0.6 - (sum mix))2) 
                      set mix replace-item 2 mix (min list-acres)] 
                     
  if crop-4-rank = 3 [set list-acres [0.05 0] 
                      set list-acres replace-item 1 list-acres (precision(0.6 - (sum mix))2) 
                      set mix replace-item 3 mix (min list-acres)]                                                                 
   
  if crop-1-rank = 4 [set list-acres [0.55 0] 
                      set list-acres replace-item 1 list-acres (precision(0.6 - (sum mix))2) 
                      set mix replace-item 0 mix (min list-acres)] 
 
  if crop-2-rank = 4 [set list-acres [0.10 0] 
                      set list-acres replace-item 1 list-acres (precision(0.6 - (sum mix))2) 
                      set mix replace-item 1 mix (min list-acres)] 
                     
  if crop-3-rank = 4 [set list-acres [0.10 0] 
                      set list-acres replace-item 1 list-acres (precision(0.6 - (sum mix))2) 
                      set mix replace-item 2 mix (min list-acres)] 
                     
  if crop-4-rank = 4 [set list-acres [0.05 0] 
                      set list-acres replace-item 1 list-acres (precision(0.6 - (sum mix))2) 
                      set mix replace-item 3 mix (min list-acres)] 
 
end     
       
       
 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-------------------------------------------------------- CONTINUE FARMING MODULE?------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
to continue-farming-module? 
 
  exit-industry 
           
end 
       
to exit-industry 
 
  ask farmers [without-interruption[if years-neg-cash >=  5 [                
    ask patches with [owner = who-of myself][ 
          set owner "NA" set renter "NA" set farmer "NA" set for-rent? true]  
    ask patches with [renter = who-of myself][ 
          set renter "NA" set farmer "NA" set for-rent? true] 
          set cashflow cashflow + 1 
              die]]] 
       
  ask farmers [without-interruption[if (debt) > (0.9 * asset-value)[                                         
    ask patches with [owner = who-of myself][ 
          set owner "NA"  set renter "NA" set farmer "NA" set for-sale? true]  
    ask patches with [renter = who-of myself][ 
          set renter "NA" set farmer "NA" set for-rent? true] 
          set bankrupt bankrupt + 1 
               die]]] 
   
  ask farmers with [(age >= 55) and (age < 60)][if (random 100 < retirement-tendency-55-59 * 100)  [retire]]                                      
  ask farmers with [(age >= 60) and (age < 65)][if (random 100 < retirement-tendency-60-64 * 100)  [retire]] 
  ask farmers with [(age >= 65) and (age < 70)][if (random 100 < retirement-tendency-65-69 * 100)  [retire]] 
  ask farmers with [age >= 70]                 [if (random 100 < retirement-tendency-70-over * 100)[retire]] 
  ask farmers with [age >= 80]                                                                     [retire] 
     
end 
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to retire 
   
  locals [payment] 
   
  ifelse (equity-value / asset-value > 0.6)  
            [set age age - 30 
             set transfers transfers + 1 
             set preretirement-age 55 
             set generation generation + 1 
             set payment precision((transfer-sell-rate * equity-value) * ((interest-rate) / ( 1 - ( 1 / ((1 + interest-rate)^ 20)))))2 
             set debt-list fput (list 20 payment (precision (transfer-sell-rate * equity-value)0)) debt-list 
             update-debt 
             determine-asset-value 
             determine-equity-value] 
                          
             [ask patches with [owner = who-of myself] 
                [set owner "NA" set renter "NA" set farmer "NA" set for-rent? true]  
              ask patches with [renter = who-of myself] 
                [set renter "NA" set farmer "NA" set for-rent? true] 
                set oldage oldage + 1 
                  die] 
              
end       
 
to update-debt  
   
  locals [result  
             result2  
             result3 
             list-index 
            ] 
 
     set result2 add debt-list  
     set debt-payment result2  
      
  set list-index 0 
  foreach debt-list [ 
                             set debt-list replace-item list-index debt-list (list (item 0 ?)(item 1 ?) 
                            (precision (item 1 ? * ((1 - ( 1 / (1 + interest-rate)^ item 0 ?))/ interest-rate))0)) 
                             set list-index list-index + 1]  
 
  set result3 add2 debt-list  
  set debt result3 
         
end 
       
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-------------------------------------------------------------- RE-NEW LAND LEASE MODULE ------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
       
to update-land-leases 
   
  ask patches with [lease-term != 0 and patch-id != "border"][set lease-term lease-term - 1] 
  ask patches with [lease-term = 0 and renter != "NA" and patch-id != "border"][set for-sale? true]               
  ask farmers [set current-plot-bid-on "NA"]     
  ask farmers [without-interruption [ ifelse (((cash > 10 * acres-total-crop + 150 * land-price * downpayment)) 
                       and ((debt / asset-value) < D-A-ratio) 
                       and ((lease-payment + debt-payment + min-family-withdrawal) < (residual-to-land-labor-exp * acres-total-crop)) 
                       and (age <= preretirement-age) )    
                        
                           [select-land] 
                           [set current-bid 0]]] 
                            
  set mean-bid (mean values-from farmers with [current-plot-bid-on != "NA"] [current-bid]) 
     
  ask farmers with [current-plot-bid-on != "NA"] 
                       [set current-bid precision(((current-bid * mean-bid)^ 0.5) *  
                       (value-from (random-one-of patches with [patch-id = current-plot-bid-on-of myself])[quality]))2]  
    
  ask farmers [set acres-total-crop acres-total-crop - 150] 
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  ask patches with [lease-term = 0 and renter != "NA" and patch-id != "border"][without-interruption [ask turtle (farmer)  
                      [set current-plot-bid-on (patch-id-of myself) set-bid-rent 
              set current-bid precision((current-bid * (mean-bid / (((1 - (1 / (1 + interest-rate))^ 20)) / interest-rate)))^ 0.5 *  
                                  (value-from (random-one-of patches with [patch-id = current-plot-bid-on-of myself])[quality]))2 
          
  ifelse (current-bid / interest-rate) >= ((((mean-bid * land-price)^ 0.5) * quality) / landlord-discount) 
             [set lease-term-of myself 5  
              set lease-payment-of myself current-bid 
              set for-sale?-of myself false] 
             [set renter-of myself "NA" 
              set farmer-of myself "NA"]]]] 
         
  ask farmers [set acres-total-crop sum values-from patches with [farmer = who-of myself][k-acres] 
              set plots-leased count patches with [renter = who-of myself]] 
  ask farmers [capital-expenditure-module] 
     
  set average-rent mean values-from patches with [renter != "NA" and patch-id != "border"][lease-payment * quality] 
    
end      
       
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-------------------------------------------------------- LAND PURCHASE AUCTION MODULE ----------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
       
to land-purchase-auction-module 
       
  set bids [] 
  check-if-land-available-for-sale 
  ifelse (bids != []) [set land-price mean bids]  
                      [set land-price (average-rent * (((1 - (1 / (1 + interest-rate))^ 20)) / interest-rate))] 
         
end 
       
to check-if-land-available-for-sale 
   
  ask farmers [set current-plot-bid-on "NA"]     
  if (count patches with [for-sale? = true]) > 0 [screen-farmers] 
   
    
end     
 
to screen-farmers 
 
  ask farmers [without-interruption [ ifelse ((cash > (10 * acres-total-crop + 150 * land-price * downpayment)) 
                       and ((debt / asset-value) < D-A-ratio) 
                       and ((lease-payment + debt-payment + min-family-withdrawal) < (residual-to-land-labor-exp * acres-total-crop)) 
                       and (age <= preretirement-age) )    
                        
                           [select-land] 
                           [set current-bid 0]]] 
                            
  set mean-bid (mean values-from farmers with [current-plot-bid-on != "NA"][current-bid])    
    
  ask farmers with [current-plot-bid-on != "NA"] 
                                  [set current-bid precision((current-bid * (mean-bid)) ^ 0.5 *  
                                  (value-from (random-one-of patches with [patch-id = current-plot-bid-on-of myself])[quality]))0]   
   
  if (count farmers with [current-bid > 0] > 0)[auction-land] 
                         
end       
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to select-land 
 
  set current-plot-bid-on value-from (max-one-of patches with [for-sale? = true] 
        [((abs(pxcor - xcor-of myself) + abs(pycor - ycor-of myself)) * -1  
        *((trucking-rate * expected-production-volume-of myself) + travel-adjustment / k-acres))  
        + residual-to-land-labor-exp-of myself * quality]) 
        [patch-id] 
 
  set-bid 
     
end       
    
to set-bid 
 
  locals [expected-value-plot] 
   
  set expected-value-plot ((abs((value-from random-one-of patches with [patch-id = current-plot-bid-on-of myself][pxcor]) - xcor)) + 
                             (abs((value-from random-one-of patches with [patch-id = current-plot-bid-on-of myself][pycor]) - ycor)))      
                           * ((trucking-rate * expected-production-volume) + (travel-adjustment  
                           / (value-from random-one-of patches with [patch-id = current-plot-bid-on-of myself][k-acres]))) * -1 
                           + value-from (random-one-of patches with [patch-id = current-plot-bid-on-of myself])[quality]  
                                * residual-to-land-labor-exp 
   
  if attitude = 1 [set current-bid precision (((expected-value-plot - equip-purchase-adjustment -  
                                                 (min-family-withdrawal / (acres-total-crop + 150)) -  
                                                ((0.8 / (1 + 14500 * exp (-0.009 * (acres-total-crop + 150)))) + 0.03)) 
                                                *  (discount-value-1 )) 
                                                * (((1 - (1 / (1 + interest-rate))^ 20)) / interest-rate)) 2]  
   
  if attitude = 2 [set current-bid precision (((expected-value-plot - equip-purchase-adjustment -  
                                                 (min-family-withdrawal / (acres-total-crop + 150)) -  
                                                ((0.8 / (1 + 14500 * exp (-0.009 * (acres-total-crop + 150)))) + 0.03)) 
                                                *  (discount-value-2 )) 
                                                * (((1 - (1 / (1 + interest-rate))^ 20)) / interest-rate)) 2]  
  if attitude = 3 [set current-bid precision (((expected-value-plot - equip-purchase-adjustment -  
                                                 (min-family-withdrawal / (acres-total-crop + 150)) -  
                                                ((0.8 / (1 + 14500 * exp (-0.009 * (acres-total-crop + 150)))) + 0.03)) 
                                                *  (discount-value-3 )) 
                                                * (((1 - (1 / (1 + interest-rate))^ 20)) / interest-rate)) 2]  
           
  if current-bid < 0 [set current-bid 0] 
        
end 
 
to auction-land 
 
  locals [payment total-bid adjusted-bid counter] 
   
  ask max-one-of farmers [current-bid][ 
                             set adjusted-bid (current-bid / value-from  
                            (random-one-of patches with [patch-id = current-plot-bid-on-of myself])[quality])                                    
                             if adjusted-bid >= ((landlord-discount) * (mean-bid * (average-rent / interest-rate))^ 0.5)[ 
                             set owner-of(random-one-of patches with [patch-id = current-plot-bid-on-of myself]) who                                
                             set farmer-of(random-one-of patches with [patch-id = current-plot-bid-on-of myself]) who                               
                             set renter-of(random-one-of patches with [patch-id = current-plot-bid-on-of myself]) "NA" 
                             set total-bid (current-bid * k-acres-of (random-one-of patches with [patch-id = current-plot-bid-on-of myself]))         
                             set land-unit-sold current-plot-bid-on                                                                                 
                             set payment precision(((1 - downpayment) * total-bid)* (interest-rate / (1 - (1 / (1 + interest-rate)^ 20))))0                 
                             set cash precision(cash - (downpayment * total-bid))0                                                                  
                             set debt-list fput (list 20 payment (precision (0.75 * total-bid)0)) debt-list                                                                          
                             set for-sale?-of (random-one-of patches with [patch-id = current-plot-bid-on-of myself])false  
                             set for-rent?-of (random-one-of patches with [patch-id = current-plot-bid-on-of myself])false  
                             set pcolor-of (random-one-of patches with [patch-id = current-plot-bid-on-of myself])blue                        
                             set debt precision (debt + (0.75 * total-bid))0  
                             set debt-payment precision(debt-payment + payment)0 
                             set plots-owned plots-owned + 1 
                             set acres-total-crop acres-total-crop +  
                                 value-from random-one-of patches with [patch-id = current-plot-bid-on-of myself][k-acres] 
                             set distance-to-farmstead-of(random-one-of patches with [patch-id = current-plot-bid-on-of myself])  
                                 abs((xcor - value-from random-one-of patches with[patch-id = current-plot-bid-on-of myself][pxcor]))+ 
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                                 abs((ycor - value-from random-one-of patches with[patch-id = current-plot-bid-on-of myself][pycor])) 
                                
                            set land-value land-value + total-bid 
                            set sold sold + 1 
                            capital-expenditure-module 
                            determine-asset-value 
                            determine-equity-value 
                                      
  set bids lput adjusted-bid bids ]]                                                               
                       
  ifelse adjusted-bid >= ((landlord-discount) * (mean-bid * (average-rent / interest-rate))^ 0.5) 
                           [check-if-more-land-available-for-sale] 
                            
                           [set bids lput ((landlord-discount) * (mean-bid * (average-rent / interest-rate))^ 0.5) bids]       
 
end     
 
to check-if-more-land-available-for-sale 
 
  if (count patches with [for-sale? = true]) > 0 [screen-farmers-bidding-on-sold-land] 
                                                        
end 
 
to screen-farmers-bidding-on-sold-land 
 
  ask farmers with [current-plot-bid-on = land-unit-sold][without-interruption 
              [ifelse (    ((cash > 10 * acres-total-crop + 150 * land-price * downpayment)) 
                       and ((debt / asset-value) < D-A-ratio) 
                       and ((lease-payment + debt-payment + min-family-withdrawal) < (residual-to-land-labor-exp * acres-total-crop)) 
                       and (age <= preretirement-age) ) 
                           [select-land] 
                           [set current-bid 0]]] 
   
  ask farmers with [current-plot-bid-on = land-unit-sold] 
                   [set current-bid precision((current-bid * (mean-bid))^ 0.5 *  
                                  (value-from (random-one-of patches with [patch-id = current-plot-bid-on-of myself])[quality]))0]  
                            
  if (count farmers with [current-bid > 0] > 0)[auction-land] 
   
end 
       
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------------------------------- LAND LEASE AUCTION MODULE ---------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             
to land-lease-auction-module 
       
  check-if-land-available-for-rent 
   
end     
       
to check-if-land-available-for-rent 
 
  ask patches [if for-sale? = true [set for-rent? true]] 
  ask farmers [set current-plot-bid-on "NA"]  
  set units-for-sale (count patches with [for-rent? = true]) 
  if (count patches with [for-rent? = true]) > 0 [screen-farmers-rent]    
   
end 
 
to screen-farmers-rent 
 
  ask farmers [without-interruption [ifelse ((cash > 10 * acres-total-crop) 
                       and (residual-to-land-labor-exp > 0) 
                       and (age <= preretirement-age) ) 
                           [select-land-rent] 
                           [set current-bid 0]]] 
   
  set mean-bid (mean values-from farmers with [current-plot-bid-on != "NA"] [current-bid]) 
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  ask farmers with [current-plot-bid-on != "NA"] 
                     [set current-bid precision((current-bid * (mean-bid))^ 0.5 *  
                                  (value-from (random-one-of patches with [patch-id = current-plot-bid-on-of myself])[quality]))0]  
   
  set buyers-in-market (count farmers with [current-bid > 0])                          
  if (count farmers with [current-bid > 0] > 0)[auction-land-rent] 
                         
end       
  
to select-land-rent 
 
  set current-plot-bid-on value-from (max-one-of patches with [for-rent? = true] 
        [((abs(pxcor - xcor-of myself) + (pycor - ycor-of myself))) * -1 * 
         ((trucking-rate * expected-production-volume-of myself) + travel-adjustment / k-acres)  
        + residual-to-land-labor-exp-of myself * quality]) 
        [patch-id] 
 
  set-bid-rent 
     
end       
    
to set-bid-rent 
 
  locals [expected-value-plot] 
  
  set expected-value-plot ((abs((value-from random-one-of patches with [patch-id = current-plot-bid-on-of myself][pxcor]) - xcor)) + 
                            (abs((value-from random-one-of patches with [patch-id = current-plot-bid-on-of myself][pycor]) - ycor)))      
                          * ((trucking-rate * expected-production-volume) + (travel-adjustment  
                          / (value-from random-one-of patches with [patch-id = current-plot-bid-on-of myself][k-acres]))) * -1 
                          + value-from (random-one-of patches with [patch-id = current-plot-bid-on-of myself])[quality]  
                          * residual-to-land-labor-exp * 0.80  
   
  if attitude = 1 [set current-bid precision ((expected-value-plot - equip-purchase-adjustment  
                                              - (min-family-withdrawal / (acres-total-crop + 150))  
                                              - ((0.8 / (1 + 14500 * exp (-0.009 * (acres-total-crop + 150)))) + 0.03)) 
                                              * (discount-value-1 ))2]  
   
  if attitude = 2 [set current-bid precision ((expected-value-plot - equip-purchase-adjustment  
                                              - (min-family-withdrawal / (acres-total-crop + 150))  
                                              - ((0.8 / (1 + 14500 * exp (-0.009 * (acres-total-crop + 150)))) + 0.03)) 
                                              * (discount-value-2 ))2]  
  if attitude = 3 [set current-bid precision ((expected-value-plot - equip-purchase-adjustment  
                                              - (min-family-withdrawal / (acres-total-crop + 150))  
                                              - ((0.8 / (1 + 14500 * exp (-0.009 * (acres-total-crop + 150)))) + 0.03)) 
                                              * (discount-value-3 ))2]  
      
  if current-bid < 0 [set current-bid 0] 
 
end 
      
to auction-land-rent 
 
  locals [adjusted-bid] 
   
  ask max-one-of farmers [current-bid][if current-bid > 0 [ 
                         set renter-of(random-one-of patches with [patch-id = current-plot-bid-on-of myself]) who          
                         set farmer-of(random-one-of patches with [patch-id = current-plot-bid-on-of myself]) who     
                         set adjusted-bid (current-bid / value-from                            
                             (random-one-of patches with [patch-id = current-plot-bid-on-of myself])[quality])                                  
                         ask (random-one-of patches with [patch-id = current-plot-bid-on-of myself]) 
                             [set lease-payment current-bid-of myself set lease-term random 5 + 1]    
                         set land-unit-rented current-plot-bid-on                                                                               
                         set for-rent?-of (random-one-of patches with [patch-id = current-plot-bid-on-of myself])false                         
                         set for-sale?-of (random-one-of patches with [patch-id = current-plot-bid-on-of myself])false 
                         set pcolor-of (random-one-of patches with [patch-id = current-plot-bid-on-of myself])green 
                         set plots-leased plots-leased + 1 
                         set acres-total-crop acres-total-crop +  
                                 value-from random-one-of patches with [patch-id = current-plot-bid-on-of myself][k-acres] 
                         set distance-to-farmstead-of(random-one-of patches with [patch-id = current-plot-bid-on-of myself])  
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                                 abs((xcor - value-from random-one-of patches with[patch-id = current-plot-bid-on-of myself][pxcor]))+ 
                                 abs((ycor - value-from random-one-of patches with[patch-id = current-plot-bid-on-of myself][pycor])) 
                         set total-lease-payment total-lease-payment + current-bid  
                                 * k-acres-of (random-one-of patches with [patch-id = current-plot-bid-on-of myself])  
                         capital-expenditure-module 
                         determine-asset-value 
                         determine-equity-value         
                         ]] 
   
  if adjusted-bid > 0 [check-if-more-land-available-for-rent] 
   
end   
 
to check-if-more-land-available-for-rent 
 
  if (count patches with [for-rent? = true]) > 0 [screen-farmers-bidding-on-rented-land] 
   
end 
 
to screen-farmers-bidding-on-rented-land 
 
  ask farmers with [current-plot-bid-on = land-unit-rented][without-interruption  
              [ifelse (    (cash > 10 * acres-total-crop) 
                       and (residual-to-land-labor-exp > 0) 
                       and (age <= preretirement-age) ) 
                           [select-land-rent] 
                           [set current-bid 0]]] 
                                                       
  ask farmers with [current-plot-bid-on = land-unit-rented] 
                     [set current-bid precision((current-bid * (mean-bid))^ 0.5 *  
                                  (value-from (random-one-of patches with [patch-id = current-plot-bid-on-of myself])[quality]))0] 
                                     
  if (count farmers with [current-bid > 0] > 0)[auction-land-rent] 
   
  set average-rent mean values-from patches with [renter != "NA" and patch-id != "border"][lease-payment * quality]  
 
end 
 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------ CAPITAL INVESTMENT MODULE ------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
       
to capital-expenditure-module 
   
  locals [payment capital-purchase] 
   
  set capital-purchase ((acres-total-crop * capital-per-acre) - capital-value)                                                     
  ifelse capital-purchase > 0 [set payment precision(((1 - downpayment) * capital-purchase) 
    * (interest-rate / (1 - (1 / (1 + interest-rate) ^ 5))))0                                                                             
  set cash precision(cash - (downpayment * capital-purchase))0 
  set debt-list fput (list 5 payment (precision (0.75 * capital-purchase)0)) debt-list 
  set debt precision (debt + (0.75 * capital-purchase))0  
  set debt-payment precision(debt-payment + payment)0 ]                                                               
    [set cash precision(cash - capital-purchase)0] 
      
  set capital-value (acres-total-crop * capital-per-acre) 
      
  end    
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------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------- UPDATE DATA AND PARAMETERS --------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
       
to export-data 
           
  let plots-total count patches with [patch-id != "border"] 
  set plots-not-in-crop-prodn-percent ((count patches with [patch-id != "border" and farmer = "NA"]) / (plots-total) * 100) 
  set plots-leased-percent ((count patches with [patch-id != "border" and renter != "NA"]) / (plots-total) * 100) 
  set farms (count farmers) 
           
  file-open "farms.txt" 
  file-print farms 
  file-close  
  file-open "debt.txt" 
  file-print (mean values-from farmers [debt]) 
  file-close  
  file-open "debt per acre.txt" 
  file-print (mean values-from farmers [debt / acres-total-crop]) 
  file-close  
  file-open "mean size.txt" 
  file-print (mean values-from farmers [acres-total-crop]) 
  file-close  
  file-open "leased.txt" 
  file-print plots-leased-percent 
  file-close  
  file-open "unmanaged.txt" 
  file-print plots-not-in-crop-prodn-percent 
  file-close  
  file-open "land price.txt" 
  file-print land-price 
  file-close  
  file-open "lease rate.txt" 
  file-print average-rent 
  file-close  
  file-open "returns.txt" 
  file-print (mean values-from farmers [residual-to-land-labor]) 
  file-close 
  file-open "transfers.txt" 
  file-print sum values-from farmers [transfers-received + NISA-deposit] 
  file-close 
  file-open "age.txt" 
  file-print mean values-from farmers [age] 
  file-close 
  file-open "attitude-1.txt" 
  file-print count farmers with [attitude = 1] 
  file-close 
  file-open "attitude-2.txt" 
  file-print count farmers with [attitude = 2] 
  file-close 
  file-open "attitude-3.txt" 
  file-print count farmers with [attitude = 3] 
  file-close 
  file-open "land-attitude-1.txt" 
  file-print sum values-from farmers with [attitude = 1][acres-total-crop] 
  file-close 
  file-open "land-attitude-2.txt" 
  file-print sum values-from farmers with [attitude = 2][acres-total-crop] 
  file-close 
  file-open "land-attitude-3.txt" 
  file-print sum values-from farmers with [attitude = 3][acres-total-crop] 
  file-close 
  file-open "mean-size-attitude-1.txt" 
  file-print mean values-from farmers with [attitude = 1][acres-total-crop] 
  file-close 
  file-open "mean-size-attitude-2.txt" 
  file-print mean values-from farmers with [attitude = 2][acres-total-crop] 
  file-close 
  file-open "mean-size-attitude-3.txt" 
  file-print mean values-from farmers with [attitude = 3][acres-total-crop] 
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  file-close 
  file-open "mean-equity-attitude-1.txt" 
  file-print mean values-from farmers with [attitude = 1][equity-value] 
  file-close 
  file-open "mean-equity-attitude-2.txt" 
  file-print mean values-from farmers with [attitude = 2][equity-value] 
  file-close 
  file-open "mean-equity-attitude-3.txt" 
  file-print mean values-from farmers with [attitude = 3][equity-value] 
  file-close 
  file-open "mean-equity.txt" 
  file-print mean values-from farmers [equity-value] 
  file-close 
  file-open "acres-wheat.txt" 
  file-print sum values-from farmers [acres-crop-1] 
  file-close 
  file-open "acres-oats.txt" 
  file-print sum values-from farmers [acres-crop-2] 
  file-close 
  file-open "acres-barley.txt" 
  file-print sum values-from farmers [acres-crop-3] 
  file-close 
  file-open "acres-flaxseed.txt" 
  file-print sum values-from farmers [acres-crop-4] 
  file-close 
  export-size-distn  
    
end 
 
to export-size-distn 
 
  file-open "size-1.txt" 
  file-print (count farmers with [acres-total-crop < 400 ]) 
  file-close 
  file-open "size-2.txt" 
  file-print (count farmers with [acres-total-crop >= 400  and acres-total-crop < 560 ]) 
  file-close 
  file-open "size-3.txt" 
  file-print (count farmers with [acres-total-crop >= 560  and acres-total-crop < 760 ]) 
  file-close 
  file-open "size-4.txt" 
  file-print (count farmers with [acres-total-crop >= 760  and acres-total-crop < 1120]) 
  file-close 
  file-open "size-5.txt" 
  file-print (count farmers with [acres-total-crop >= 1120 and acres-total-crop < 1600]) 
  file-close 
  file-open "size-6.txt" 
  file-print (count farmers with [acres-total-crop >= 1600 and acres-total-crop < 2240]) 
  file-close 
  file-open "size-7.txt" 
  file-print (count farmers with [acres-total-crop >= 2240 and acres-total-crop < 2880]) 
  file-close 
  file-open "size-8.txt" 
  file-print (count farmers with [acres-total-crop >= 2880]) 
  file-close 
 
end 
 
   
   
 
 
